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Foreword
The current report is the result of an innovative analysis of national responses to
the Sixth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of the Criminal
Justice Systems (1995-1997). Responses to the Sixth United Nations Survey
were received from most of the European region member states. Corresponding
data from the United States and Canada were secured through other channels.
The analysis has been carried out by an international working group. The group
has, in addition to the United Nations Survey responses, had access to large
amounts of other data, in particular the data emerging from the International
Crime Victim Survey.
The working group consists of following international experts: Mr Adam
Bouloukos (the Centre for International Crime Prevention, United Nations),
Professor Graham Farrell (United States), Professor Gregory Howard (United
States), Professor Gloria Laycock (England), Dr Patricia Mayhew (Eng-
land/Australia), Professor Tony Smith (United States) and Professor Elmar
Weitekamp (Germany/Belgium). Professor Károly Bárd (Hungary), Dr Matti
Joutsen (Finland) and Mr Roy Walmsley (England) have actively assisted the
group in their work. Mr Kauko Aromaa (HEUNI), Mr Seppo Leppä (HEUNI),
Mr Sami Nevala (HEUNI) and Ms Natalia Ollus (HEUNI) have overseen the
compilation of the data as well as the editing. Mr Mikko Myrskylä (HEUNI) has
worked on the validation of the data. HEUNI wishes to express its heartfelt ap-
preciation to the members of the working group for their time, expertise and ded-
ication to the cause of international comparisons.
The views expressed in the texts are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the organizations with which the authors are affiliated.
Helsinki, 26 June 2003
Kauko Aromaa
Director, HEUNI
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To the reader
The data used in this report are taken primarily from the responses submitted by
the countries in question. Supplemental data have frequently been used, in which
case the sources are cited.
In the process of the validation of the data, a number of presumable errors
were noted. These often appeared to be errors in understanding the questions or
in transcription. In such cases, the respondents have been asked to comment on
the issue. Replies were received from most, but not all, of such respondents.
In several passages of the report the difficulties in analyzing official or re-
search data on crime and criminal justice from different countries are noted. The
importance of bearing these cautions in mind when reading the present report
cannot be stressed too highly.
The report as a whole is the result of co-operation, but at the same time each
author is responsible for his or her own contribution.
The spreadsheets containing the basic data compiled from the Sixth United
Nations Survey may be accessed at the ODCCP web site of the United Nations
Secretariat, the address of which is: www.uncjin.org/ Statistics/WCTS/
wcts.html.
Symbols used in the tables and figures
na indicates that data are not available
ns indicates that the value is not significant
, separates thousands and hundreds
. separates wholes and decimals
< denotes that the value is less than the smallest whole used
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Summary
The Sixth United Nations Survey
The purpose of the report is to describe public safety in the European and North
American region as a whole, and in the individual countries within the region.
The report is based on an analysis of national responses to the Sixth United Na-
tions Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems. It
covers the years 1995 through 1997. The Sixth United Nations Survey data have
been supplemented by other information, including in particular the results of
the International Crime Victim Survey. It must be underlined, however, that an
assessment of ”public safety” by means of crime statistics and other crime-re-
lated data cannot be reliably made, owing to the fact that the level of criminality
as a phenomenon cannot be reliably measured.
During the last few decades the impact of demographic and social changes on
crime and on crime control in the region has been a marked one. Consequently,
the structure of crime has also changed. New criminalizations have been
adopted, for example in the area of environmental crime, economic crime, com-
puter crime, traffic crime and narcotics crime. Moreover, crime has acquired a
more international character. All this is seen to overburden the criminal justice
systems of many European and North American countries. This is particularly
true in the former socialist states of the Central and Eastern European region,
where considerable restructuring efforts of the criminal justice systems can be
observed. When reforming the system legislators have frequently turned to the
pre-Soviet traditions of their country. In the Western European region and in
North America, it is not possible to point at reforms comparable to those of the
Central and Eastern Europe. In Western Europe and North America, the scope of
reforms is targeted at larger geographical areas. In ths respect the roles of the Eu-
ropean Union and the Council of Europe must be seen to be in the forefront.
As to the levels of crime in the region analysed, only comparisons over time
are the only ones that can be seen as meaningful, while comparisons between re-
sponding states are more or less artificial, owing to the fact that legal definitions
of offences vary considerably from one country to the next. Similarly, compari-
sons are meaningful only within certain clear-cut crime categories, but even then
certain reservations should be borne in mind. It is, for example, pointless to com-
pare the numbers of total crime between countries. It has not been possible to ex-
plain, in most cases, what have been the causes of great variations in the chosen
crime categories, i.e. burglary, motor vehicle crime, petty crime, violent crime,
and corruption, from the time period 1990-1994 to the time period 1995-1997 in
many of the countries studied. The data readily available have only allowed a de-
scriptive approach; no in-depth analysis was feasible, unless a common knowl-
edge base has made it possible to point to a certain fact as the cause for the varia-
tion. We know, for example, with reasonably high certainty, on one hand, that the
upward trend as regards homicide in Scotland is due to the Dunblade mass mur-
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der case in March 1996 with 18 people killed. But we only guess what lies behind
the quite strong downward tendency of motor vehicle theft in many of the Cen-
tral and Eastern European (CEE) countries, with Bulgaria and Russian Federa-
tion in the lead.
One crime category of which few standardized measures exist is transnational
organized crime. While some of the data gathered through the periodic United
Nations surveys or the International Crime Victim Surveys might be construed
as indicators of organized crime, the surveys do not systematically collect infor-
mation which directly measures the prevalence of transnational organized crime.
It might, however, be possible in connection with the future sweeps of the United
Nations surveys to develop tools to capture data on organized crime. Member
states could be encouraged to include transnational organized crime in their leg-
islation and to record offences that fit that category. There are also plans to de-
velop, with the assistance of national experts, criminal economy profiles. The in-
tention is to better understand the phases through which an illicit or licit product
moves through the economy with the assistance of criminal actors.
What has been said above also holds true in many respects when the opera-
tions of the national criminal justice systems are examined. The use of explana-
tory measures by means of comparing the results given by the responding states
is not recommendable, even if quantitative information on the operations is pre-
sented. The main results as regards this sector are that in all the responding coun-
tries, police officers made up by far the highest proportion of criminal justice
personnel. The police appeared more productive in Western European and North
American countries than in Central and Eastern Europe. According to the analy-
sis, neither of the two competing views on policing levels received absolute sup-
port - one being that ’more police equals more crime’ (because of greater capac-
ity to record crime), and the other ’more policing equals less crime’(because the
police are an effective deterrent). In respect of prosecutors, the median number
of them in the CEE countries was over double that in Western countries. On the
other hand, the greater number of prosecutors in the CEE countries, on the other
hand, processed far fewer prosecutions (median: 56 cases per prosecutor) than in
Western countries (median: 270 cases per prosecutor). As far as the judges were
concerned, there was no marked difference between the CEE countries and
Western ones. All countries with judicial rates around or above the median were
civil law countries. The highest correctional staff rates equaled high imprison-
ment levels, but generally there was only a modest tendency to have more correc-
tional staff when there were more prisoners to look after. In the countries with the
most unfavourable staff/inmate ratios, the situation was usually caused by high
prisoner numbers, not by particularly low staffing rates.
It is clear that criminal justice is still fairly male dominated. Women were least
well represented in the police: overall, 9 % of the officers were women. In a num-
ber of countries, the figure was much lower. Women were better represented
among prosecutors and judges, whose work is probably seen as less dependent
on physical, “masculine” traits. In all, about a third of prosecutors and judges,
and about a fifth of staff in correctional institutions were women.
The analysis of differential attrition, i.e. the progressive funnelling away of
the number of crimes the police know about to the number of convictions in
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court, was done mindful of the substantial problems that result from the wide
range of procedural arrangements, and the lack of linkage within countries be-
tween respective measures of crimes, suspects, prosecutions and convictions.
The volume of crime is much greater in Western countries, and this may well be
because of more complete recording. In any event, though, the fall-off between
recorded crime and suspects is much more marked in Western countries (29 sus-
pects for every 100 crimes) than in the CEE (53 suspects for 100 crimes). Taking
all countries together, for every 100 crimes, there were 41 suspects, 28 prosecu-
tions and 21 convictions.
There was no clear association between the overall performance measure and
the level of crime in different countries. This may reflect the fact that countries
that appear to be performing badly in terms of the volume of crime simply have
more capacity to record it. It may also signify that criminal justice systems play a
minor part in determining crime levels when compared with social, political and
economic dynamics.
In the field of sentencing one quite obvious positive trend, notwithstanding
the validity and reliability problems discussed, is the continued reduction of
death penalty sentences imposed during the period analysed. This is mainly due
to the former republics of the Soviet Union which have reduced the use of this
sanction, but also in the USA, a slight reduction can be observed. Another feature
backed by hard figures in the sanctions sector is the substantial growth in prison
populations both in Europe and North America. Crime rates alone cannot ex-
plain the increases. In the 1990s many countries of the region experienced a re-
duction in their crime rates and, in particular, in the rates of serious crimes. The
increase in imprisonment rates might be seen as the end result of fear of crime
and of a belief that locking up people is the best solution. In several country re-
sponses it was also indicated that the proportion of pre-trial detainees among the
prison population exceeds one fourth of the total population, not only in Central
and Eastern Europe, but also in Western European countries. However, between
1995 and 1997, the length of time spent in prison awaiting trial increased only in
a few cases. A slight increase during the period can also be observed as regards
the number of imprisoned females.
All that has been said above amounts to three central issues. First, as far as the
reliability and validity of popular cross-national measures of crime are con-
cerned, it must be asked whether official measures of national crime rates sub-
stantially agree with one another and with victimization data from the Interna-
tional Crime Victim Survey in their representations of criminal offending. Sec-
ond, owing to observations reported in the extant comparative criminological lit-
erature concerning the unique causal mechanisms linked to violent and non-vio-
lent crime, it must be asked whether key concepts from modernization, inequal-
ity, and opportunity theory differentially explain violent and non-violent crimes.
Third, since previous studies in the field of comparative criminology have em-
ployed a variety of data sources with which to construct dependent variables, it
should be examined whether measures of theoretical concepts explain more or
less variation in crime rates depending on the source of the crime data. As to the
first issue, while official measures of cross-national crime rates seem to be reli-
able, there is little evidence to support the validity of either the official or victim-
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ization measures. Looking at the second issue, it seems that theoretical accounts
of cross-national variation in crime rates need to take account of the types of
crime that are examined since some crimes seem to have distinct causal mecha-
nisms at work. Conclusions that can be drawn from studying the third central is-
sue are that theoretical accounts of cross-national variation in crime rates may
yield different pictures depending on the source of crime data deployed. In sum,
these findings suggest that comparative criminologists should be especially
careful when engaging in quantitative analyses, and that they should pursue the-
oretical models that are more narrowly specified. Taking a step further, it might
be worth testing the explanatory power of indicators and variables that are not di-
rectly connected with the phenomenon of crime.
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Résumé
La sixième Enquête des Nations Unies
L’objet du présent rapport est de décrire la sécurité publique dans la région Eu-
rope-Amérique du Nord, dans son ensemble, et au sein des pays de la région, pris
individuellement. Le rapport se base sur une analyse des réponses à la Sixième
Enquête des Nations Unies sur les tendances du Crime et des Systèmes de la Jus-
tice pénale. Il couvre les années 1995 à 1997. Les données de la Sixième Enquête
des Nations Unies ont été complétées par une autre information, laquelle fait
place, en particulier, aux résultats de l’Enquête internationale sur la Victime du
Crime. Il convient toutefois de souligner qu’une évaluation de la « sécurité
publique » s’appuyant sur des statistiques et sur d’autres données se rapportant
au crime ne saurait être fiable, compte tenu du fait que le niveau de la criminalité,
en tant que phénomène, ne peut être mesuré de manière fiable.
Au cours des dernières décennies, l’impact des changements démogra-
phiques et sociaux sur le crime et sur le contrôle du crime dans la région a été
prononcé. En conséquence, la structure du crime a également changé. De
nouvelles formes de criminalité ont été adoptées, par exemple dans les domaines
de l’environnement, de l’économie, de l’informatique, de la circulation et de la
drogue. En outre, le crime a acquis un caractère plus international. Tout ceci sem-
ble devoir surcharger les systèmes de la justice pénale de nombreux pays d’Eu-
rope et d’Amérique du Nord. C’est particulièrement vrai dans les Etats
ex-socialistes d’Europe centrale et orientale, où des efforts considérables de
restructuration des systèmes de la justice pénale peuvent être observés.
Lorsqu’ils ont procédé à la réforme du système, les législateurs se sont
fréquemment penchés sur les traditions pré-soviétiques de leur pays. Dans la
région Europe-Amérique du Nord, on ne peut parler de réformes comparables à
celles de l’Europe centrale et orientale. En Europe occidentale et en Amérique
du Nord, le champ des réformes est ciblé sur des espaces géographiques plus
vastes. A cet égard, le rôle de l’Union européenne et du Conseil de l’Europe doit
être vu comme un rôle de premier plan.
En ce qui concerne les taux de criminalité dans la région sujette à l’analyse, les
comparaisons dans le temps sont les seules qui semblent pertinentes; les
comparaisons entre les Etats qui répondent (à l’enquête) étant plus ou moins
artificielles, du fait que les définitions juridiques des crimes/délits varient
considérablement d’un pays à un autre. De même, les comparaisons n’ont de
sens qu’au sein de certaines catégories, clairement délimitées; toutefois, même
dans leur cas, certaines réserves s’imposent. Comparer, par exemple, le nombre
total de crimes/délits entre les pays serait sans intérêt. Il n’a pas été possible
d’expliquer, dans la plupart des cas, la cause des variations importantes selon les
catégories de crimes/délits retenus - cambriolage, vol de véhicule, délit mineur,
crime violent et corruption – entre la période 1990-1994 et la période 1995-1997
dans plusieurs pays étudiés. Les données déjà disponibles n’ont permis qu’une
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approche descriptive; il n’était pas possible de procéder à une analyse en
profondeur, à moins qu’une base de connaissance commune ne permette de
désigner un fait particulier pour expliquer la variation. Nous savons, par
exemple, avec une relative certitude, que la tendance à la hausse des homicides
en Ecosse résulte de l’affaire des meurtres en série de Dunblade, en mars 1996 -
18 personnes avaient alors été tuées. Mais nous ne pouvons que deviner ce qui
peut expliquer la tendance, relativement prononcée, à la diminution des vols de
véhicules dans plusieurs pays d’Europe centrale et orientale (PECO), la Bulgarie
et la Fédération de Russie venant en tête.
Le crime organisé transnational est une des catégories de crime pour laquelle
il n’existe que peu de mesures standardisées. Si certaines des données recueillies
dans le cadre des enquêtes périodiques des Nations Unies ou des Enquêtes
internationales sur les Victimes du Crime peuvent être érigées en indicateurs du
crime organisé, les enquêtes ne recueillent pas systématiquement d’informations
mesurant directement la prévalence du crime organisé transnational. Il pourrait
cependant être possible, à l’occasion de futurs balayages des enquêtes des Na-
tions Unies, d’élaborer des outils destinés à saisir des données sur le crime
organisé. Les Etats membres pourraient être encouragés à inclure dans leur
législation la notion de crime organisé transnational et à enregistrer les crimes et
délits qui entrent dans cette catégorie. Il existe également des plans visant à
élaborer, avec le concours d’experts nationaux, des profils criminels concernant
l’économie. L’intention visée est de mieux comprendre les étapes par lesquelles
un produit, illicite ou licite, se déplace dans l’économie avec l’assistance de
quelques acteurs criminels.
Ce qui précède vaut également, à maints égards, lorsque l’on examine le
fonctionnement des systèmes de la justice pénale. L’utilisation de mesures
explicatives en comparant les résultats fournis par les Etats qui ont répondu n’est
pas recommandable, même si une information quantitative sur les
fonctionnements est présentée. Les principaux résultats concernant ce secteur,
indiquent que dans tous les pays qui ont répondu, les policiers représentent, de
loin, la plus forte proportion de leur personnel de la justice pénale. La police
semblait plus productive dans les pays d’Europe occidentale et d’Amérique du
Nord que dans les pays d’Europe centrale et orientale. Selon l’analyse, aucune
des deux vues concurrentes sur les niveaux de maintien de l’ordre n’a reçu de
soutien absolu – l’une consistant à dire « s’il y plus de policiers c’est qu’il y a plus
de crimes » (en raison d’une plus grande capacité d’enregistrer les crimes), et
l’autre signifiant « plus de maintien de l’ordre signifie moins de crimes » (parce
que la police joue un rôle préventif) . En ce qui concerne les procureurs, leur
nombre moyen, dans les PECO est deux fois supérieur à leur nombre dans les
pays d’Europe occidentale. D’un autre côté, les procureurs, plus nombreux dans
les PECOs traitaient beaucoup moins de poursuites (moyenne : 56 cas par
procureur) que dans les pays occidentaux (moyenne: 270 cas par procureur).
S’agissant des juges, il n’y avait pas de différence marquée entre les PECOs et les
pays occidentaux. Tous les pays où les taux relatifs au judiciaire sont voisins ou
supérieurs à la moyenne sont des pays de droit civil. Les proportions les plus
élevés de personnel carcéral correspondaient à des taux d’incarcération élevés;
mais, en général, la tendance à avoir plus de personnel carcéral là où le nombre
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de détenus était plus élevé, n’était que modeste. Dans les pays où le rapport per-
sonnel/détenu est le plus défavorable, la situation s’explique habituellement par
des effectifs de prisonniers plus élevés, et non pas par des taux d’effectifs
particulièrement bas.
Il est clair que la justice pénale reste nettement dominée par les hommes. C’est
dans la police que les femmes étaient les moins bien représentées: dans l’ensem-
ble, 9% de femmes parmi les policiers. Dans un certain nombre de pays, la pro-
portion était beaucoup plus faible. Les femmes étaient mieux représentées parmi
les procureurs et parmi les juges, dont le travail est probablement perçu comme
moins dépendant de caractéristiques physiques, « masculines ». En tout, environ
un tiers des procureurs et des juges, et environ un cinquième du personnel des
établissements pénitenciers étaient des femmes. L’analyse de l’usure
différentielle, c’est à dire l’écart entre le nombre de crimes connus de la police
par rapport au nombre de condamnations prononcées par les tribunaux, a été faite
en étant parfaitement conscient des problèmes de fond qui résultent du large
éventail des dispositions de procédure, et du manque de liens entre les mesures
concernant, respectivement, les crimes, les suspects, les poursuites et les
condamnations. Le volume des crimes est beaucoup plus élevé dans les pays
occidentaux, ce qui peut s’expliquer par leur enregistrement plus complet. En
tout cas, cependant, l’écart entre le crime enregistré et le nombre de suspects est
beaucoup plus net dans les pays occidentaux (29 suspects pour 100 crimes) que
dans les PECOs (53 suspects pour 100 crimes). Si l’on parle de tous les pays
réunis, pour 100 crimes on dénombrait 41 suspects, 28 poursuites et 21
condamnations.
Il n’y avait pas de lien clairement défini entre la mesure de performance d’en-
semble et le taux de criminalité observé dans différents pays. Ceci peut refléter le
fait que les pays qui semblent produire de mauvais résultats, en terme de volumes
de crimes, ont, tout simplement, une plus grande capacité de les enregistrer. Il
peut également être significatif que les systèmes de la justice pénale jouent un
rôle mineur dans la détermination des taux de criminalité, si l’on compare avec
les dynamiques sociale, politique et économique.
Au chapitre des condamnations, la diminution constante du nombre des
condamnations à la peine capitale prononcées durant la période analysée, sans
considération de la validité ni de la fiabilité des problèmes discutés, est une tend-
ance positive tout à fait évidente. Ceci s’explique essentiellement par les
ex-républiques d’URSS, lesquelles ont moins fréquemment recours à cette sanc-
tion, mais également aux Etats-Unis, où une légère diminution peut être
observée. Autre caractéristique, confirmée par les chiffres crus, dans le secteur
des sanctions, l’augmentation substantielle des effectifs de la population
carcérale, tant en Europe qu’en Amérique du Nord. Les taux de criminalité ne
peuvent expliquer les augmentations. Dans les années 1990, de nombreux pays
de la région ont connu une diminution de leur taux de criminalité et, en
particulier, des taux relatifs aux crimes graves. L’augmentation des taux
d’emprisonnement peut être considérée, au bout du compte, comme le résultat
de la crainte inspirée par le crime et la conviction que mettre les gens sous les
verrous est la meilleure solution. Dans plusieurs pays, les réponses indiquent
aussi la proportion des détenus en attente de jugement, dans la population
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carcérale, représente plus d’un quart de la population totale, non seulement en
Europe centrale et orientale, mais également dans les pays d’Europe occidentale.
Toutefois, la durée de la détention dans l’attente de passer en jugement, n’a
augmenté que dans quelques cas. Durant la période considérée, une légère aug-
mentation du nombre de femmes incarcérées peut également être observée.
Tout ce qui précède se ramène à trois questions principales. Premièrement, en
ce qui concerne la fiabilité et la validité des mesures transnationales habituelles
du crime, on doit se demander s’il y a, au fond, correspondance entre les mesures
officielles du taux de criminalité national et avec les données relatives aux
représailles dans l’Enquête internationale sur la Victime du Crime, dans leur
représentation du délit pénal. Deuxièmement, compte tenu des observations
dont l’abondante littérature pénale comparative, relative aux mécanismes
uniques de causalité liés au crime violent et non-violent, on doit se demander si
les concepts-clés relatifs à la théorie sur la modernisation, l’inégalité et
l’opportunité expliquent, de manière différenciée, les crimes violents et les
crimes non-violents. Troisièmement, puisque les études antérieures menées
dans le domaine de la criminologie comparative ont puisé à toute une variété de
sources de données, utilisées pour élaborer des variables dépendantes, il
conviendrait d’examiner si les mesures de concepts théoriques permettent
d’expliquer une variation plus ou moins forte des taux de criminalité, selon la
source de données relatives au crime. S’agissant de la première question, si les
mesures officielles du crime transnational semblent être fiables, on trouve peu de
preuves à l’appui de la validité des mesures officielles ou relatives aux
représailles Considérant la seconde question, il semble que les calculs
théoriques d’une variation transnationale des taux de criminalité doivent tenir
compte des types de crimes examinés; dans la pratique, en effet, certains crimes
semblent obéir à des mécanismes de causalité distincts. Les conclusions qui
peuvent être tirées de l’étude de la troisième question principale sont que les
calculs théoriques de la variation transnationale des taux de criminalité peuvent
produire des vues différentes selon la source de données relatives au crime qui a
été utilisée. En résumé, ces observations permettent de penser que les
criminologues qui procèdent à des études comparatives devraient être
particulièrement prudents lorsqu’ils s’engagent dans des analyses quantitatives
et qu’ils devraient suivre des modèles théoriques plus strictement définis. Pour
aller plus loin, il pourrait s’avérer utile de tester le pouvoir d’explication
d’indicateurs et de variables qui ne sont pas directement liés au phénomène du
crime.
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Содержание
Шестой обзора ООН
Настоящий отчет предназначен для обзора состояния общественной
безопасности в регионе Европы и Северной Америки в целом, а также
по отдельно взятым странам. Отчет основан на анализе информации,
подданной странами в рамках VI обзора ООН по преступности и работе
уголовно-правоохранительных систем в период 1995-97 гг. Данные,
полученные в ходе обзора, дополнены прочей информацией, в частнос-
ти, результатами Международного обзора по жертвам преступности. Тем
не менее, следует подчеркнуть, что надежная оценка состояния
«общественной безопасности» через анализ статистики по преступности
и прочих данных по криминогенной обстановке невозможна ввиду того,
что уровень преступности как явления не поддается объективному
количественному измерению.
За последние десятилетия в регионе отмечается влияние
демографических и социальных перемен на криминогенную обстановку
и борьбу с преступностью. Сама структура совершаемых преступлений
также изменилась. Были приняты решения по криминализации новых
действий, например, в сфере экологической и экономической
преступности, компьютерных технологий, транспорта и наркотиков.
Преступная деятельность приобретает все более международный
характер. Все это приводит к перегрузке потенциала
правоохранительных структур многих стран Европы и Северной
Америки, что особенно проявляется в бывших соцстранах Центральной
и Восточной Европы, где наблюдаются серьезные усилия по
реорганизации правоохранительной системы. Проводя реформу
системы, законодатели зачастую обращаются к досоветским традициям
своих стран. В регионе Западной Европы и Северной Америки реформ,
по масштабам сравнимым с тем, что происходит в странах ЦВЕ, не
отмечается. В Западной Европе и Северной Америке реформы
направлены на более крупные географические пространства. В этом
смысле на передний план выходит роль Евросоюза и Совета Европы.
Что касается уровня преступности в анализируемом регионе, то
можно считать, что знаковым выступает лишь сравнение во временной
ретроспективе, в то время как сравнение между показателями
различных стран представляется более или менее искусственным, ввиду
того факта, что юридическое определение правонарушений серьезно
различается от страны к стране. Точно так же сравнения обретают
смысл только в рамках определенной и четкой категории преступлений,
но даже и здесь необходимо учитывать известные допуски. Так, нет
смысла сопоставлять страны по количественным показателям
преступлений. В большинстве случаев невозможно объяснить причины,
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приводящие к сильным вариациям в определенной категории
правонарушений, - например, кража со взломом, угон автомобилей,
мелкие преступления, насильственные преступления и коррупция,
которые отмечены во многих анализируемых странах в период 1990-94
гг. и 1995-97 гг. Имеющиеся данные позволили использовать только
описательный подход, не обеспечивая целесообразности глубокого
анализа, если не удавалось выявить в общей базе данных наличия
определенного факта как причины таких вариаций. Например, в
достаточно высокой степенью вероятности известно, с одной стороны,
что тенденция к повышению убийств в Шотландии выводится из т.н.
Данблэйдского случая массового убийства, когда в марте 1996 года было
убито 18 человек. Но с другой стороны, только можно гадать о
причинах тенденции к снижению угонов автомобилей во многих
странах Центральной и Восточной Европы (ЦВЕ), причем с Болгарией
и Россией во главе.
Среди категорий преступлений, по которым не существует большого
количества стандартизованных мер, - это международная
организованная преступность. Хотя некоторые данные, собранные по
линии периодических обзоров ООН или Международных обзоров по
жертвам преступности, и могут рассматриваться как показатели
оргпреступности, сбор такой информации в обзорах не поставлен на
систематическую основу с прямым выходом на анализ распространения
международной оргпреступности. Видимо, тем не менее, будет
возможно в рамках будущих обзоров ООН разрабатывать инструменты
сбора данных конкретно по оргпреступности. Следует предлагать
странам-членам переходить к включению определений по
международной оргпреступности в их законодательство и учитывать
правонарушения, вписывающиеся в эту категорию. Имеются также
планы разработки профилей криминальной экономики, привлекая к
этому национальных экспертов, с целью повышения уровня понимания
фаз передвижения неразрешенных или разрешенных продуктов в
структуре экономики, которому содействуют криминальные силы.
Сказанное выше во многих отношениях применительно и к анализу
функционирования государственных правоохранительных систем. Здесь
также не рекомендуется использование простого сопоставления
результатов, поданных различными странами, для толкования явлений,
даже при наличии количественной информации по оперативной работе.
По данной линии основным результатом по всем странам выступает то,
что во всех странах-респондентах подавляющее большинство занятых в
системе уголовного права составляют полицейские силы. Полиция
показывает большую степень продуктивности в странах Западной
Европы и Северной Америки, нежели в странах ЦВЕ. В ходе анализа
выявляется, что ни один из двух конкурирующих подходов к уровню
полицейской работы не получает абсолютно однозначной поддержки –
«чем больше полицейских, тем больше преступности» (так как
повышается потенциал регистрации и выявления преступлений) и «чем
больше полиции, тем меньше преступности (ввиду эффективности
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полиции как фактора сдерживания). Что касается прокуратуры, то
среднее количество прокуроров в странах ЦВЕ более чем вдвое
превосходит соответствующие показатели по Западным странам. С
другой стороны, большее количество прокуроров в странах ЦВЕ
справляется с гораздо меньшим количеством дел (в среднем 56 дел на
одного прокурора) по сравнению с Западом (в среднем 270 дел на
прокурора). В отношении судей различий между странами ЦВЕ и
Западными странами не отмечено. Все страны с показателями по судьям
на среднем уровне и выше относятся к категории стран гражданского
права. Наивысшие показатели по количеству
пенитенциарно-исправительного персонала сопутствовали высоким
уровням тюремных приговоров, но в целом отмечена только небольшая
тенденция к тому, что большее количество пенитенциарного персонала
проявляется там, где имеется больше заключенных пенитенциарных
учреждений. Страны с наиболее невыгодными соотношениями
персонала и заключенных обычно обладают большими количествами
заключенных, а не заниженным обеспечением соответствующих
работников.
Понятно, что в системе уголовной юстиции по-прежнему работают в
основном мужчины. Наиболее низкая доля женщин наблюдается в
полиции: средний показатель – женщины составляют 9 %. В ряде стран
этот показатель находится на гораздо более низком уровне. Женщины
лучше представлены среди судебных и прокурорских работников,
функции которых не в такой мере рассматриваются как зависящие от
физических, «мужских» качеств. В целом около трети судей и
прокуроров и около пятой части работников
пенитенциарно-исправительных учреждений – женщины.
Анализ т.н. дифференциальной аттриции, т.е. нарастающего
перемещения количества преступлений, ставших известными
правоохранительным органам, в количество судебных приговоров,
производился с учетом существенной проблематики, связанной с
широким разбросом различных процедурно-процессуальных вариантов,
а также отсутствия связи внутри стран между соответствующими
количественными мерами преступлений, подозреваемых, уголовных
расследований и приговоров. Объем преступности в Западных странах –
гораздо больше, что может объясняться более эффективной
регистрацией преступлений. В любом случае, разброс показателей
подозреваемых и преступлений более проявляется на Западе (29
подозреваемых на 100 преступлений), нежели в странах ЦВЕ (53
подозреваемых на 100 преступлений). Совокупно по всем странам на
100 преступлений приходится 41 подозреваемый, 28 уголовных
преследований и 21 приговор.
Между показателями функциональности и уровнем преступности в
разных странах четкой взаимозависимости не отмечается. Возможно,
этим отражается тот факт, что страны, которые показывают большие
объемы преступности просто обладают более эффективным
потенциалом ее регистрации. Также это может свидетельствовать, что
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система уголовной юстиции не играет такой роли при определении
уровня преступности, как факторы социальной, политической и
экономической динамики.
В сфере приговоров отмечена явная положительная тенденция,
невзирая на отмеченные проблемы сопоставимости и корректности
данных, - это продолжение уменьшения количества смертных
приговоров, вынесенных за анализируемый период. Это в основном
связано с сокращением использования этой меры наказания в бывших
республиках СССР, но небольшое сокращение наблюдается и в США.
Другое явление, отражаемое в четкой статистике, в сфере мер наказания
– серьезный рост населения тюрем и в Европе, и в Северной Америке.
Это нельзя объяснять лишь ростом преступности. В 90-е годы во
многих странах региона отмечалось снижение преступности, в
частности, тяжких преступлений. Рост числа заключенных может
рассматриваться как конечный результат страх перед преступностью и
убеждения, что оптимальный выход – это лишение свободы. В
материалах, поданных рядом стран, отмечалось, что заключенные
СИЗО составляют более четверти всех заключенных, причем не только
в ЦВЕ, но и в некоторых странах западной Европы. Правда, в период с
1995 по 1997 гг. длительность сроков, проведенных под стражей в
ожидании суда, возросла только в отдельных немногих случаях. Также
может быть отмечено и небольшое увеличение в тот же период
количества находящихся под стражей женщин.
Все отмеченное выше сводится к трем основным выкладкам.
Во-первых, что касается надежности и корректности популярных
сравниваемых показателей преступности между разными странами,
следует поднять вопрос о сопоставимости официальной
государственной статистики по преступности и данных по
преступности согласно Международному обзору по жертвам
преступности. Во-вторых, ввиду наблюдений, отмеченных в
существующей криминологической литературе по уникальным
каузальным механизмам, связанным с насильственной и
ненасильственной преступностью, следует задать вопрос, не
объясняется ли феномен насильственной и ненасильственной
преступности по-разному в теориях, основанных на влиянии
модернизации, неравенства или использования предоставленной
возможности. В третьих, так как в ранее проводимых исследованиях в
сфере сопоставительной криминологии для конструирования
зависимых переменных применялись различные источники данных,
следует проанализировать, как показатели теоретических концепций
могут в большей или меньшей степени объяснять вариации уровней
преступности в зависимости от применяемого источника данных по
преступности. Что же касается первого вопроса, то наряду с тем, что
официальные показатели сопоставления преступности по странам
представляются корректными, не существует достаточных свидетельств
для обоснования достоверности ни официальных показателей, ни
показателей по виктимизации. Если посмотреть на второй вопрос, то
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представляется, что для теоретических выкладок по различиям в
уровнях преступности при сопоставлении между странами требуется
учитывать виды анализируемых преступлений, так как для некоторых
видов преступлений очевидно влияние каузальных механизмов. Анализ
третьего основного вопроса подводит к выводу, что теоретическими
выкладками сопоставления стран в плане уровня преступности может
создаваться различная картина, в зависимости от источника
используемых данных. В конечном итоге, все это позволяет полагать,
что криминологам-компаративистам следует с особой осторожностью
подходить к применению количественного анализа, а также стремиться
к использованию более узко специализированных теоретических
моделей. В качестве дальнейших шагов может быть полезно
апробирование интерпретационного потенциала показателей и
переменных, не связанных напрямую с феноменом преступности.
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1 Introduction
Kauko Aromaa and Matti Joutsen1
1.1 The Sixth United Nations Survey of
Crime Trends and Operations of
Criminal Justice Systems
This report is based on an analysis of national responses to the Sixth United Na-
tions Survey. It is supplemented by other information available to the members
of the expert group that performed the analysis. This international expert group
consisted of Professor Gregory Howard (Western Michigan University, the
United States), Professor Tony Smith (Saint Anselm College, the United States),
Dr Pat Mayhew (Australian Institute of Criminology, Australia), Professor
Elmar Weitekamp (Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium), Dr Adam
Bouloukos (United Nations Office at Vienna, Austria), Dr Graham Farrell (Po-
lice Foundation, the United States), Professor Gloria Laycock (Jill Dando Insti-
tute for Crime Sciences, University College London, the United Kingdom), and
Mr Kauko Aromaa (HEUNI). Professor Károly Bárd (Central European Univer-
sity, Hungary) has contributed to the text of the report, as has Mr Roy Walmsley,
an English expert on penological issues. Mr Walmsley has also validated the re-
sponses to the penal institutions section of the questionnaire. Mr Mikko
Myrskylä (HEUNI) has undertaken the validation of the responses to the police,
prosecution and courts sections of the questionnaire. Mr Seppo Leppä (HEUNI),
Mr Sami Nevala (HEUNI), and Ms Natalia Ollus (HEUNI) have overseen the
compilation of the data and the editing. Last but not least: the editing team grate-
fully acknowledges the opportunity to make use of texts (in a slightly modified
form) written by Dr Matti Joutsen (Ministry of Justice, Finland) for the Fifth Sur-
vey report and for other purposes.
In the Sixth Survey, responses were received from all European and North
American countries except Austria, France, Georgia, Liechtenstein, Luxem-
bourg, Malta and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. In addition to the re-
sponses from the European and North American region, also national responses
from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (both of which belong to the Central Asian re-
gion) and Israel are included in the analysis. The Central Asian states were con-
sidered relevant, because they are former republics of the Soviet Union, while Is-
rael, although geographically part of the Near East, has traditionally participated
in this regional analysis.
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1 Much of what is written in sequences 1.2 to 1.6 are modified versions of texts by Matti Joutsen, published in
Kangaspunta, K., M. Joutsen and N. Ollus (1998).
The report consists of eight chapters. The present chapter provides a back-
ground to the Sixth Survey itself as well as a discussion of the problems of inter-
national comparisons. It is to a considerable extent based on the corresponding
chapter in the Fifth Survey report, written by Dr Matti Joutsen. Chapter two dis-
cusses the background to the criminal justice systems of the region. Also parts of
that chapter have been quoted from the Fifth Survey report, written by Dr
Joutsen. Chapter three provides an analysis on cross-national variations in crime
rates. Chapter four explores the crime situation and the relevant methodology.
Chapter five presents findings on the operation of the criminal justice systems in
the region. Chapter six concentrates on the sanctions delivered by the criminal
justice system. Chapter seven brings a new element to the report, namely that of
organized crime, reflecting the new priorities adopted by the United Nations
crime prevention programme. It should be noted that systematic comparable in-
formation on (transnational) organized crime phenomena is still much harder to
come by than that on traditional crime. In chapter eight a few concluding notes
are presented. Annex A. to the report reproduces the survey questionnaire form,
while annex B. lists the data sets used in computing the different indices utilized
in analyzing the response results (see sequence 1.6 below for a more detailed dis-
cussion on the indices). Annex C. comprises two presentations of trend distribu-
tions in two crime sub-categories.
1.2 The purpose of the report
The purpose of the report is to describe public safety in regards of crime both in
the region as a whole and in the individual countries. “Public safety” is under-
stood as the general risk of victimization to crime, as shown by the data. How-
ever, it must be underlined at the outset that an assessment of “public safety” by
means of crime statistics and other crime-related data cannot be reliably made,
owing to the fact that the level of criminality as a phenomenon cannot be reliably
measured. The available tools are simply not valid enough (on a more detailed
discussion on this dilemma; see chapter 3 below; cf. also for example Barberet,
1999), and for want of better devices in this respect, the use of the data must be
accepted. However, chapters three to seven of the report attempt to shed light on
various comparative approaches to studying crime as a phenomenon internation-
ally. The purpose of this endeavour is to learn whether it is on the whole oppor-
tune and judicious to continue with these types of transnational research efforts.
The basic idea of the surveys has been to collect routinely produced and pub-
lished data on recorded crime trends and features of the criminal justice system,
as provided by national correspondents for each country. It is evident that such
data are as a rule not fully comparable across countries, and even the comparabil-
ity over time may cause some problems.
A very basic and peroetual problem seems to be that some member countries
are not able to provide any or some of the required information. This state of af-
fairs reflects the need of motivation, as well as of technical assistance and sup-
port, both in regards of information systems and of criminological expertise in
the countries concerned.
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A further problem is related to the unavoidable time lag: data collection, vali-
dation, complementation, and analysis/reporting all require a certain amount of
time. Overcoming undue delays poses a major practical challenge to the entire
endeavour. This is vitally important to the final objective of the exercise: moni-
toring trends in crime and the criminal justice system is a necessary exercise if
governments are to understand and evaluate the consequences and successful-
ness of their policies.
In the end, assessing how successfully United Nations standards and norms
are applied provides in this sense a justification for the entire data collection and
reporting work. Interest in knowing how recommendations become action stems
not from scientific curiosity but from practicality.
At a national level, monitoring the situation and trends is possible only if the
data are reliable and reflect central features of the target as defined from a policy
perspective. At a comparative level, the same requirements are necessary but not
sufficient: comparability must also be established. As far as the routinely pro-
duced data on recorded crime and on features of the criminal justice system are
concerned, comparability is notoriously hard to achieve.
1.3 The pitfalls of using statistics: definitions,
classifications and counting rules
A number of problems have been noted in connection with the United Nations
Surveys. These are problems are, to a large extent, common to all efforts in gath-
ering international criminal justice statistics. The major problems in regard to
data analysis are the imprecise definition of the terms, improper classifications,
ambiguous coding structures, and differences in the units of count used.
The Sixth Survey questionnaire includes a brief section setting out the key
definitions, for example the definition of “assault”, the definition of “persons
prosecuted” and the definition of “admissions to prison”. This section of the sur-
vey instrument is a necessity since even the basic terms are defined differently in
the different countries of the region. However, even the most rigorous definitions
are of little help if countries have not adopted them also in their statistical report-
ing systems. In this respect, as in some others, the United Nations Surveys are ex-
pected to function as an instrument of “emancipation”. But progress in these
matters is slow, and in practice, the problem of imprecise definitions remains.
Imprecision results in several inconsistences: First, the detection rate or the
likelihood of crimes being recorded varies considerably both across crime cate-
gories and also over time. Consequently the desire to measure some aspects of
public safety by using recorded crime does not have a very realistic basis.
Second, the legal definitions of offences vary considerably from one country
to the next. For example, “assault” may be an independent crime category in
some jurisdictions, while others may not consider an incident to be an assault un-
less it results in bodily injury. Similarly, “burglary” and “robbery” may encom-
pass quite dissimilar types of acts. Another illustration is the extent to which neg-
ligence affects the determination of criminal responsibility. The scope of
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criminalization poses yet another problem: Matters that in one country are dealt
with by regulatory authorities (such as labour safety authorities) may be matters
for the police in another. Acts that are criminalized in some countries (such as the
possession of drugs, certain sexual behaviour, and gambling) may be tolerated
elsewhere. Similarly, the scope of criminalization may vary considerably across
countries even if the crime definitions would seem to be similar, as for example
the different blood alcohol limits (or the total lack of precise limits) stipulated for
drunken driving, or the dissimilar criteria applied when ascertaining driving un-
der the influence of drugs. All such differences call for extreme caution in com-
parisons of crime rates or absolute numbers. It is often held that such problems
become less central if the assessment and the comparisons concentrate on trends.
Even then, however, pitfalls remain. Trends, too, are vulnerable to changes in
definitions and counting rules, both of which do indeed occur occasionally.
Problems of definition may also be encountered elsewhere. For example, a
classic case is the comparison of imprisonment rates. The deprivations of liberty
included in the country-specific counts may show significant variations as to
what kinds of institutions they comprise. Persons imprisoned as a consequence
of offending may be kept in institutions that are not classified as prisons at all.
Third, there are considerable procedural differences between countries.
Crimes are not always dealt with by the police and the lower courts. Certain cases
may be handled with a simplified procedure or by special investigatory and
adjudicatory bodies. Some respondents may understand a category such as “per-
sons prosecuted” to refer only to persons against whom the public prosecutor
brings charges in court, while others may include cases where the prosecutor
takes other action, such as closing the case with a warning or the arrangement of
victim/offender mediation.
Another example of the significance of procedural differences is provided by
traffic offences. In many countries they are not considered “offences”, and are
dealt with by a special branch of the police or through a special procedure (and
often not recorded in the statistics). Without a full appraisal of these procedural
differences, countries that include such petty offences in their statistics will show
considerably higher figures than do countries that do not include them.
Yet another procedural difference relates to the extent to which discretion is
permitted, either formally or informally. Some countries require criminal justice
agencies to proceed with any prima facie case (“principle of legality”). Other
countries may allow more discretion (“principle of opportunity”, also known as
the “principle of expediency”), which may in practice mean that further mea-
sures are waived in a large portion of the cases. In still other countries, the police
and the prosecutor will not proceed with certain types of cases unless the victim
requests that measures be instituted. If no such request is made, the case is gener-
ally not recorded as an offence.
A fourth difference between countries in respect of definitions is in the statis-
tical classification of crime. The classification of theft is a good example: de-
pending on the country, this crime category may or may not include burglary or
theft of a motor vehicle, simple or aggravated theft as defined by the law of the ju-
risdiction in question, or shoplifting.
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Fifth, the rules of counting offences or offenders vary. Some authorities in
some countries count offenders, others count offences; some count each separate
incident in a series of offences, while others record a series as one unit. One par-
ticular difference which has led to considerable confusion is the unit used for a
successful outcome of police investigations. Some countries count “arrests”,
others use “reported offences”, and still others use “cleared offences”. Any com-
parison of statistics based on such different units would be quite misleading.
Variations in counting units occur also with prosecutorial data. Some coun-
tries count persons prosecuted, others may count cases dealt with by the prosecu-
tor. In the latter instance, several persons may be included in one “case”.
Furthermore, counting rules differ in admissions to prison. Some countries
count only the instances when an individual is admitted to prison for the first time
during the present imprisonment period, often as a suspect remanded in pre-trial
custody. Other countries may be of the view that, for example, a change in the
status from pre-trial detainee to convicted prisoner counts as a new “admission”.
Yet other countries may take the word “admission” literally, and count each time
a prisoner enters the prison doors, for example on returning from an appearance
in court or from a prison furlough.
Sixth, the comprehensiveness of the statistics varies. Some countries include
only the major criminal offences. Others include petty offences or violations of
tax laws, alcohol laws, administrative regulations and similar subsidiary legisla-
tion. Consequently, any comparisons should be made between specific catego-
ries of offences, and not between aggregate amounts such as “all crimes re-
corded”.
In addition to the differences in laws, procedures and statistical routines, there
are differences also in legal terminology. They not only confound comparisons
when translation into a foreign language is required (where concepts such as
“plea-bargaining” may not exist) but also comparisons between jurisdictions in
which the same language is nominally used. Examples from English-speaking
countries range from differences in spelling (jail/gaol) to those in definitions
(compensation/restitution).
Attempts to reach an international agreement, either formal or informal, on
uniform definitions, classifications, coding structures and units of counts have
consistently been unsuccessful. No country is likely to change its administrative
and statistical practice in order to promote the international exchange of infor-
mation. The current statistics have been prepared by administrators for adminis-
trative purposes and, for them, this purpose remains the most important.
A more realistic approach has been pursued in connection with the United Na-
tions Surveys: Respondents are asked to compare their usage with a basic, rela-
tively precise definition of terms, provided by the United Nations Secretariat,
and note how their definition is different (if there are differences). The amount of
respondents who submit their responses to the Secretariat together with these
notes seems to be on the increase. The comments and notes provided by the re-
spondents may be accessed through the web address www.uncjin.org/Statitics/
WCTS/WCTS6/ wcts6data/6_section_comments.pdf.
One final point regarding pitfalls in the use of statistics: official statistics on
reported crime and the operation of the criminal justice system tend to focus our
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attention on traditional crime and administrative procedures. No matter what
work is done on the Surveys, some questions remain unanswered. The detection
rate for, for example, drug crimes, economic crimes and environmental crimes is
believed to be very low, and so there are few recorded/reported cases. Another
example is that, despite the strong interest in Europe and North America in orga-
nized crime, the present report offers very little relevant quantitative information
on the matter; in chapter seven a few qualitative features as regards this phenom-
enon are delineated. We know, on the other hand, that much of what could be
termed organized crime is categorized – in terms of traditional criminal law – as
homicide, aggravated assault, extortion, aggravated theft and so on, and for this
reason reported organized crime tends to lose its distinctive profile in the statis-
tics. Organized crime does not allow simple counting of “offences”, and this
poses a fundamental counting problem – a point well illustrated in the annual Or-
ganized Crime reports of the European Union or the Council of Europe, or int
country level, for example, the Netherlands or the U.K. (NCIS).
A third example is that it is difficult to gather data on the “invisible” facets of
criminal justice, such as the use of discretion, or on the possible differential treat-
ment of ethnic and other minorities. Cross-national studies based solely on sta-
tistics can scarcely come to grips with the operation of “alternatives” to criminal
justice, such as mediation and conciliation proceedings, informal social control
or the operation of private security companies. The last point concerning the dif-
ferences in the structure and intensity of overall social – formal and informal –
control across countries and over time is practically entirely overlooked in the
existing statistical sources.
1.4 Errors and non-response
No country was capable of providing data on all the issues covered by the Survey.
There are several possible reasons for a lack of response. The more important
ones are as follows.
First, it is possible that the data requested simply do not exist. The country in
question does not keep the statistics or conduct the particular research. Some re-
spondents noted that their statistical system was being developed, and as a result
data from certain years could not be provided.
Second, the information may exist, but not in a coordinated format. It may be
dispersed horizontally (between different departments or agencies) or geograph-
ically (at a regional level with no centralized repository for statistics). (This latter
possibility is particularly a problem in federal states such as Canada, Germany,
and the United States).
Third, the information may exist, but it is several years out of date. It seems
that while many countries would be capable of furnishing more recent data than
what is expected in the questionnaire (for example already being able to cover
the years 2000 through 2002), there are countries where the lag in the production
of statistics tends to be very long.
It is also possible that the survey instrument simply never got to a person will-
ing and able to respond. Although the Surveys are available in all six United Na-
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tions languages, the person(s) who could best respond may not have been fluent
in any of them. Language problems may thus have led to difficulties in under-
standing the questions or, in the case of open-ended questions, difficulties in de-
scribing the experience and/or policy of the country.
Finally, there is the ever present possibility of clerical error when data are tran-
scribed many times over. This may happen in the country in question when the
data are first entered into the statistics, or later on when the data are entered into
the survey instrument. it may also happen when the data are analyzed for the
present report. As a precaution the United Nations Secretariat has attempted to
reduce the possibility of error by asking countries to verify unusual entries (for
example, when there is a jump or drop of over 30 % from one year to the next, or
when the number of persons entering prison for a certain type of offence exceeds
the number of persons convicted of that offence).
1.5 Comparing the incomparable:
an attempt to develop indicators of
crime and of performance
The dangers of using statistics as a reflection of crime and crime control at a na-
tional level are well documented, not to mention the use of statistical data in or-
der to manifest changes wit regard to crime as a phenomenon. We all know that
reported crime is not the same as actual crime and that statistics have been devel-
oped for administrative purposes, not for satisfying research interests. The vaga-
ries of changing laws, statistical practices and the idiosyncrasies of those in-
volved in defining criminal incidents make it difficult to draw any conclusions
when comparing statistics from different areas or different times. We also know
that the crimes punished under the penal codes of different countries (the crimes
that are usually noted in the statistics) are generally the “traditional” offences,
which do not necessarily have the greatest economic and social consequences for
society.
International comparisons are even more rife with misunderstandings, as has
been repeatedly noted in discussions concerning the United Nations Surveys
(see, for example sequences 1.3 and 1.4 above)2.
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2 The following discussion on the attempts to make various aspects of crime data commensurable has also benefited
from observations and comments by Mr john van Kesteren (Research Officer, UNICRI, Italy) acting as the coordinator
of the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) project. The general methodology of the Survey is to randomly sam-
ple respondents from several countries, and to examine their experiences with crime policing, crime prevention and
feelings of unsafety. Attention is paid to social correlates that may help in explaining crime and to demographic data
such as age, gender, education and income. Sample sizes in the ICVS are small by the standards of most “bespoken”
national crime surveys, and this results in relatively large sampling errors. However, for straightforward comparisons
of national risks, samples of 1,000 or more suffice to judge broad variations in levels of crime. Modest samples do, on
the other hand, restrict the scope for analyzing issues about which a small portion of the sample would provide infor-
mation. Comprehensive information on the ICVS can be found in Alvazzi del Frate, A., U. Zvekic, and J.J.M. van Dijk
(eds.) (1993), Understanding Crime: Experiences of Crime Control. Acts of the International Conference, Rome,
18-20 November 1992. Rome: UNICRI, Publication No. 49; and on the Internet: www.unicri.it/icvs.
At least in the short run, no uniform basis will be developed for international
statistics. When reading the forthcoming comments on the results of the Sixth
Survey for Europe and North America, the following caveat must be kept in
mind: comparisons will continue to be fraught with the risk of misinterpretation
and overgeneralization.
One plausible remedy for this problematic situation is to gather data from dif-
fering but tangential, preferably independent sources in the field to see if they
point in the same direction. The idea represents an analogy which in research
terms is denoted as “triangulation”, and which in quantitative survey and other
data analysis is used when constructing sum scales: several unsatisfactory mea-
sures, if combined, represent a more robust and often more valid measure of the
phenomenon under scrutiny.
In preparing the previous report in this very same series (Kangaspunta,
Joutsen and Ollus, 1998), data were taken not only from the Fifth Survey (which,
alike the Sixth Survey, is based largely on the official statistics of the respondent
countries), but also for example from the health and mortality statistics collected
by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Centre for Disease Control
(CDC). The International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) had already at that time
been carried out in almost every European and North American country. The
ICVS was considered to provide a welcome supplement to statistical data on re-
ported crime, including unique information on differences in the reporting be-
haviour of the population.
The key findings of the ICVS include percentages of the public victimized by
crime – as measured by a standard list of crimes – over the past five years, and re-
spectively, during the last year, respectively. Data from countries where the sur-
vey has been conducted more than once were averaged for the analysis of the
Fifth Survey. If, for example, the survey was carried out in 1989, 1992, and 1996,
the three victimization rates were averaged. In the analysis of the Sixth Survey, a
slightly more nuanced solution has been employed for countries that show a ma-
jor change in rates over the four surveys of, for example, 1989, 1992, 1996 and
2000.
Selected other studies have also been used in the Sixth Survey report, fore-
most among them the European Sourcebook materials3.
A second way to augment the explanatory power of statistical data is to try to
measure different dimensions of one and the same phenomenon. For example,
the combined number of reported assaults and reported robberies measure dif-
ferent dimensions of non-fatal physical violence in society. Somewhat similarly,
an index of motor vehicle theft combines data derived from a HEUNI study (see
Liukkonen, 1997) and the ICVS. A further example could be an index of the way
in which the public evaluates the performance of the police, developed by com-
bining measures of how often victims of certain types of crime report them to the
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3 In the mid 1990’s the European Committee on Crime Problems of the Council of Europe entrusted a Group of Special-
ists with preparing a compendium of crime and criminal justice data for the whole of Europe (i.e. the European
Sourcebook on Crime and Criminal Justice). The adopted mentodology of the Group consists of a co-ordinated net-
work of national correspondents providing data from current statistical sources within each country. This data is then
supplemented by the collection of information on statistical and legal definitions. For additional information on the
European Sourcebook project, see www.europeansourcebook.org/esb/index.html.
police, the degree to which victims who have reported an offence to the police are
satisfied with the way the matter was handled, and the degree to which members
of the public believe that the police in their society are doing a good job in con-
trolling crime – all these questions have been addressed in the International
Crime Victim Surveys.
The analysis carried out by the HEUNI expert group of the responses to the
Fifth United Nations Survey sought to break new ground by utilizing both of the
approaches presented above. An attempt was made to combine as many different
sources of data as possible dealing with one and the same phenomenon. This was
done in order to maximize the number of countries from which at least some data
were available, and to ascertain that the data from the different sources pointed in
the same direction. Theoretically, a combination of data from several sources
dealing with one and the same phenomenon should produce a more reliable and
robust index than what is possible on the basis of individual variables.
Three sets of indicators were developed. The first set contained indicators on
the amount of crime (on, respectively, homicide, non-fatal violence, serious vio-
lence, burglary, violence against women, vehicle-related crime, corruption and
petty crime). The second set contained indicators on motivation and opportunity.
The third set contained indicators on the operation of the criminal justice system
(the resources available to law enforcement, gender balance among criminal jus-
tice practitioners, and citizen evaluation of police performance). The structure
usage of these sets are explained in a greater detail in the respective sections of
this report. An overview is provided in section 1.6 below.
1.6 Developing combined indicators of
crime and of performance
As was already noted, one of the difficulties in making international compari-
sons is that corresponding data may be missing, or the data cover different years.
On the other hand, the wealth of data available from a variety of sources that
could shed light on crime and criminal justice is so large that at times it is too
great to process.
No country has filled out every box in its the response to the Sixth Survey. Of-
ten, the country does not have the required data, or data are available for only a
limited number of years. Furthermore, making comparisons on the basis of just
one indicator (such as the number of reported homicides) may well be mislead-
ing for a number of reasons – the definition of homicide varies, the figures are
calculated differently, and so on.
If several indicators can be brought together to form an index, the problem
with missing data is somewhat eased. These indices are also more reliable than
the raw data, and hence compensate for at least some of the flaws in the data. One
source can give an overly high estimate of the actual situation, another an under-
estimate. In addition, the indices can, at least partially, overcome the problem of
“outliers” (i.e. of country data from a single source have values that deviate sig-
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nificantly from those of other sources or other countries, and thus “skew” the re-
sults).
Another advantage of “bundling” together different data sets describing the
same phenomenon is that this reduces the vast amount of data to a more manage-
able size, and therefore eases the processing of data and the drawing of conclu-
sions.
The following procedure was used in combining the different variables into
indices4:
1. The different variables describing the same phenomenon are identified;
2. The rank order is determined for each of the variables. The country with the
lowest value gets rank 1, the second lowest rank 2, and so on:
3. The rank orders are standardized5 by dividing by the highest rank and subse-
quently multiplying by 100;
4. The index is the average of these standardized rankings.
The resulting indices are on a scale from 1 to 100. The scores are interpreted as
follows:
0–25 very low
26–40 below average
41–60 average
61–75 above average
76–100 very high
Differences of less than 10 are deemed insignificant.
We are aware that the procedure can justly be criticized on at least the following
grounds:
1. By computing indices we lose the possibility of an absolute interpretation.
The original data may show us, for example, what percentage of the popula-
tion has been victimized or the number of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants.
However, the indices are on the “ordinal” level, which means that they can
only be interpreted relative to the scores of other countries or to other crimes
within the same country. For instance, if one country has an index of 60 on,
say burglary, and the corresponding index of another country is 40, it is not
justified to say that the level of burglary in the first country is 50 % higher
than in the second. It is, however, justified to say that the level of burglary is
higher in the first country (where it is a bit above average), than in the second
(where it is a bit below average). Similarly, if a country has an index value of
10 on homicide and 90 on petty crimes, we cannot conclude that there are
nine times more petty crimes than murders. What we can conclude is that the
rate of petty crimes in that country is, internationally speaking, amont the
highest, whilst the rate of homicide is comparatively among the lowest;
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4 There are many different ways to combine several sets of data into a single index, including complicated multivariate
techniques. Experience shows that the results of these exercises are often very similar. We have chosen the one used
here for its simplicity.
5 As already noted, not all data are available for every country. As a result, the highest rank depends on the number of
countries for which that particular data source is available. If we want to use the same scale to assess each variable, the
rankings need to be standardized.
2. The procedure assumes that the data are valid and reliable, i.e. that they de-
scribe the phenomenon in question, and that the data have been correctly
compiled and reported. We have assumed – with some reservations – that the
data supplied to us by the Governments, and provided by various surveys, is
proper and correct;
3. The procedure assumes that data from one country (for example, statistics on
reported crime) can readily be compared with data from another country.
With surveys carried out using much the same methodology in different
countries, this assumption can justifiably be made (although again, gener-
ally with some reservations). In the case of statistics, which the Sixth Survey
is in fact designed to collect, this assumption is much weaker – so weak, in
fact, that in earlier HEUNI reports on the United Nations Surveys, with the
exception of the report analyzing the results of the Fifth Survey, we have de-
liberately down-played the making of such comparisons. We now believe
that sufficient research data and supplemental statistical data, at least on con-
ventional crime, have become available to merit an exploration of the utility
of indicators in making cross-national comparisons of trends in crime and
criminal justice. In response to the criticism that international comparisons
should not be made, we note that the purpose of bundling different sets of
data together as an index is indeed to make a more robust measure – if, for ex-
ample, different indicators suggest that there occurs an unusually large
amount of violent crime in a country, then there are reasonable grounds to as-
sume that the indicators are correct, and that an unusually large amount of vi-
olent crime does indeed occur;
4. The procedure assumes that the data on which each index is based are at least
to some degree commensurable. It assumes, for example, that data on owner-
ship of autos, motor cycles, mopeds and bicycles, data on the average num-
ber of evenings spent away from home for recreational purposes, data on the
number of single-person households and data on the percentage of females
with paid employment all measure dimensions of the opportunity for prop-
erty crime, and for this reason they can be bundled to form an index. Even
though this assumption is more difficult to substantiate, we have chosen to
examine the data in this way mainly in order to test the index approach and its
explanatory quality in the context of crime prevention and criminal justice6.
5. The procedure also assumes that the selection of the data used is criminolog-
ically justified. This is a particularly sensitive issue in respect of the indica-
tors of motivation and opportunity. There is a burgeoning criminological lit-
erature on the possible link between, for example, unemployment and vio-
lence, between the prevalence of handguns and violence, and between the
prevailing type of housing and burglaries. Although we are aware that the se-
lection of factors is a value choice, we believe that the factors we have in-
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6 In respect of the crime indices, the strength of the assumption was tested by computing Cronbach’s alpha (the average
correlation between the constituting variables within a scale). This alpha is based on those countries that have no miss-
ing values on any of the constituting variables. The consistency for the burglary index was .55, which is acceptable.
The consistency for the homicide index was .71, and the consistency for all other crime indices was over .80; all of
these can be regarded as good.
cluded are justified. We are not claiming that these are the only factors that
contribute to crime or that affect the operation of the criminal justice system.
According to criminological theory, motivation, for example, can be influ-
enced not only by unemployment but also by (among many other factors)
family and peers, the media, and previous contacts with the criminal justice
system. It is unfortunate that international data sets that shed light on such
factors are so far not available. When and if they do become available, they
can be used in corresponding analyses;
6. Finally, the procedure assumes that aggregate national data (or, in some
cases, aggregate rural/urban data) can help to shed light on the prevalence of
crime or on the structure of criminal justice, when in fact there are often large
regional (and temporal) differences in both. A country may show a low
amount of violence on the national level, but this may mask the fact that there
are regions within that country where the amount of crime is extraordinary
high. Similarly, a country may have a low unemployment rate, but unem-
ployment may be particularly high among young urban males.
The data sets used in computing the different indices are presented in annex B at
the end of the report. The analysis presented in chapter five is based mainly on
these indices. A somewhat different index-based approach is being utilized in
chapter three. These indices are described more in detail at the end of that chap-
ter. Chapters four and six use a more straightforward methodological approach
in terms of the statistical analysis applied. The methods of analysis with respect
to chapters two and seven, respectively, are of more descriptive nature, all in line
with the materials discussed within their framework.
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2 A Backgrounder to the Criminal
Justice Systems of the Region
Károly Bárd, Matti Joutsen and Seppo Leppä
2.1 General observations1
The difficulties in comparing national crime scenes derives not only from prob-
lems of interpreting statistical data. Another source of concern lies in the differ-
ences between national criminal justice systems. Readers with a background in
comparative criminal justice are well aware of the differences between the Ger-
manic-based, the French-based and the common law criminal justice systems.
The diversity of terminology reflects the fact that each country defines and deals
with crime in a unique manner. After all, criminal law is perhaps the area of law
that is most closely bound to national values and interests. No two countries de-
fine crimes the same way or have quite the same criminal justice systems.
And yet, all countries must deal with basically the same problems of crime
and criminal justice. Most of the cases processed in every country and consid-
ered in this report are thefts, burglaries, assaults and other mass crimes. The
broad outlines of the process are also much the same: the police investigates in
response to a report of a crime, the prosecutor prosecutes, the court hears the case
and, on conviction, imposes a sentence, which is then enforced. At the same time
we are bound to notice that historical, political and economic factors explain to a
large extent the structure of the criminal justice system in a given country: the
balance of power between the central government and the local levels, the pow-
ers of the police, the training of judges and the basic principles of justice. They
very much serve to explain changes in the day-to-day operation of the criminal
justice.
During the few recent decades, the impact of demographic and social changes
on crime and on crime control in the European and North American region has
been a marked one. As a consequence of this there has also been a change in the
structure of crime. New criminalizations have been adopted, for example in the
area of environmental crime, economic crime, computer crime, traffic crime and
narcotics crime. Moreover, crime has acquired a more international character.
All this is seen to overburden the criminal justice systems of many European and
North American countries. The responses have been more or less the same from
one country to the next: some decriminalization de facto or de jure, attempts to
speed up the process for petty offences (for example by granting the police
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1 This passage is a modified version of “Background to European and North American criminal justice systems” by
Matti Joutsen. Pp. 15-19 in Kangaspunta, K., M. Joutsen and N. Ollus (eds.) (1998).
and/or the prosecutor powers to settle the matter, or by adopting simplified court
procedures), and to deal with certain serious offences (narcotics offences, in par-
ticular) more punitively. There has also been a growing interest in crime preven-
tion programmes and in revitalizing community-based informal social control.
Finally, attempts have been made to improve the position of the victim.
Two examples of increasing convergence in criminal justice systems can be
noted. First, the literature commonly refers to two basic principles of prosecu-
tion, the legality principle and the opportunity principle (or expediency princi-
ple). In its extreme form, the legality principle requires that the prosecutor brings
charges whenever there is sufficient evidence of the guilt of an identifiable sus-
pect. The opportunity principle, in turn, gives the pro- secutor discretion to de-
cide, in any individual case, whether there exists a public interest (or other over-
riding interest) in prosecution. In practice, however, the legality principle has
been eroded by granting the prosecutor discretion in certain (often broadly de-
fined) cases, and the opportunity principle, in turn, has been made more strict by
requiring the prosecutor to bring charges in certain types of cases. These changes
are often expressed in prosecutorial guidelines. More and more, prosecutorial
principles in Europe and North America are sharing common features (see Tak,
1986). The second example is provided by the classic distinction between
accusatorial and inquisitorial proceedings. In the former, the judge has tradi-
tionally been more passive, and it is up to the prosecutor (and the defendant) to
present the case. In the latter, the judge is supposedly more active in marshalling
the evidence for and against the guilt of the defendant. Again, in practice, the dif-
ferences between the theoretical extremes are being increasingly eroded.
Furthermore, all European and North American criminal justice systems
share fundamental principles, which have most notably been enshrined in the
first articles of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms: the right to life, the prohibition of torture and of inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment, the right to liberty and security, the right to due pro-
cess, the prohibition of criminalization ex post facto, and the prohibition of dis-
crimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Conven-
tion (Council of Europe, 1950). As the Convention has been signed by the 41
member States of the Council of Europe (as of November 1999), the work of the
Council of Europe is significant in the present connection. The Council formu-
lates conventions and recommendations that enshrine principles that can be re-
garded as universally respected in Europe. (These same principles are also
widely enshrined in basic legislation in both Canada and the United States.)
There exists a strong tendency to review national legislation to ensure that it ac-
cords with the requirements of, for example, the European Convention.
The impact of the Council of Europe does, however, vary from country to
country, and issue to issue. With perhaps the exception of the criminalization of
money laundering, which follows the ratification of the 1990 Convention, the
Conventions and numerous resolutions adopted by the Council of Europe allow
the member states considerable leeway in deciding how to adapt their criminal
justice system to the requirements of these Conventions. They do not provide a
detailed road map of the steps to be taken.
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The role of the European Union in fostering reconciliation in the field of crim-
inal justice within the member states, and also to some extent within the candi-
date states, will be discussed in chapter 2.3.
The Council of Europe and the European Union are not, however, the only in-
tergovernmental organizations seeking to influence criminal justice reform in
Europe (and, ceteris paribus, also in North America). Other examples include
the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the G-7/P-8, and the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Financial Action
Task Force (which was set up by the G-7) has worked to improve the regulation
of banking, the adoption of customer identification requirements, the retention
of transaction records for at least five years, the reporting of unusual and suspi-
cious transactions, and the need for the criminalization of money laundering.
In addition, there has been considerable bilateral activity in the development
of criminal justice systems, activity that has involved almost all European and
North American countries (see Joutsen, 1996).
In a world of increasing diversity, Europe and North America are thus seeking
greater uniformity in fundamental principle of criminal justice.
2.2 Central and Eastern European Scene
Owing to the political and social upheavals within the former socialist states of
the Central and Eastern European region at the end of the 1980’s and at the begin-
ning of the1990’s, considerable restructuring efforts of the criminal justice sys-
tems can be observed throughout the region. The main features in respect of
these changes are outlined below.
Prior to the political turnover in the late 80’s and early 90’s, the countries now-
adays referred to as post-communist states, new democracies or transition coun-
tries used to be considered from the outside as a homogenous entity. This was
also the case with their criminal justice systems. However, a more thorough look
at the criminal justice systems of the region reveals that just as there were varia-
tions in the degree to which the political system of the states under Soviet domi-
nance deviated from the values of liberal democracy, also the criminal justice
systems were considerably different. When in some European states cautious pe-
nal reforms in the early 70’s resulted in the introduction of Western type institu-
tions, the criminal justice system of some others was shaped by the Stalinist
criminal justice doctrine until the collapse of the communist political regime.
Similarly, while in some of the countries the autonomy of the criminal justice
system was more or less respected in the last decade of the communist regime, in
others the interference of the political elite in the operation of the prosecution
service and even the courts was a daily practice until the political turnover. How-
ever, it is true that certain typical ”socialist” traits shaped the criminal justice sys-
tems of the countries under Soviet dominance, clearly distinguishing them from
Western European models.
One of the most important differences between the ”socialist” procedural law
and the Western European model concerns the distribution of competence: ”so-
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cialist” procedural laws allowed the courts a far less significant role. This is re-
flected primarily in the fact that in the pre-trial phase, the court had almost no
power; decisions on restricting fundamental rights by, for example, pre-trial de-
tention, search and seizure were made by the police, investigators or the prosecu-
tor. In addition, as the primary ”guardian of legality”, the prosecutor had the
power to exercise supervision over court proceedings. A further characteristic of
the distribution of competence in the so-called socialist procedural laws was that
the police, the militia, and organs coming under the competence of the Ministry
of Interior were empowered with far broader licenses than their counterparts in
Western Europe. The police or other agencies subordinated to the Ministry of In-
terior conducted investigation and were linked to the prosecution service
through the institution of prosecutorial supervision over investigation. The li-
censes covered by this institution included on the one hand the prosecutor’s au-
thorization to carry out acts of investigation, giving instructions on how to inves-
tigate, and on the other hand the power to review measures taken by the investi-
gating agency on their lawfulness.
The distribution of competence affected the status and the position of the de-
fense counsel as well. Although ”socialist” procedural laws did not deny the de-
fendant’s right to a defense counsel yet the role of the latter was considerably less
important than that of his/her Western European counterpart. In the most deci-
sive phase of the ”socialist” criminal procedure, the pre-trial stage, the defense
lawyer’s rights were considerably limited.
Further differences between ”socialist” and Western models of criminal jus-
tice derive from a general refusal by socialist doctrine of formalism in criminal
procedure, from an underestimation of the importance of legal professional
skills and from the limited autonomy of the parties. In addition, financial consid-
erations, the idea that limited resources should be rationally distributed were
alien to ”socialist” procedural doctrine. Legislators in the former ”socialist”
countries opted for the principle of mandatory prosecution, though the so-called
material concept of the criminal offense enabled the crime control agencies to re-
frain from prosecuting minor offences.
Finally, socialist doctrine did not regard legal security as a value of criminal
justice. The absolute priority of the duty to ascertain material truth in the crimi-
nal process resulted in an underestimation of the principle of legal security. Final
court judgments could easily be annulled and altered through particular extraor-
dinary remedies whose preconditions were vaguely defined, and which were not
at the disposal of the parties but exclusively of persons holding top positions in
the administration of justice, such as the General Prosecutor, the Minister of Jus-
tice or the Head of the highest judicial body.
After the political turnover, legislators in Eastern Europe and the former So-
viet Union have been facing the difficult task of creating an efficient criminal jus-
tice system, which at the same time would provide for safeguards meeting inter-
national standards. The transition in all countries has been accompanied by an
increase in reported crime. New forms of criminality have emerged, and crimi-
nals have become more professional and well equipped. Kidnapping, extortion,
economic and organized crime, illegal trafficking in goods and people have
called, among others, for adequate provisions in the criminal laws and the laws
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on criminal procedure that would provide for effectively counteracting new
forms of criminality. Rules on the use of undercover agents, on wire tapping, and
witness protection schemes have been introduced. At the same time novel provi-
sions on criminal organizations, economic crime or on honoring cooperating
criminals have been adopted.
In addition to the introduction of institutions likely to guarantee efficiency in
law enforcement and crime prevention, the transition countries started to com-
pletely reconstruct their system of administration of justice. When reforming the
system, legislators frequently turned to the pre-Soviet traditions of their country.
This trend is the most obvious in reforms related to the structure of the adminis-
tration of justice, particularly the court system. A number of countries have re-
turned to their former four-level judicial system, and the role of the Supreme
Court as a kind of Cassation Court has also been shaped according to pre-war
patterns. Russian Federation has re-introduced juries and justices of peace, and
some other countries, following their pre-war model, have subordinated the
prosecution agency to the executive.
International criminal justice standards have also served as sources of the re-
form. The change in the political domain was accompanied by the re-assessment
of the relation between international and domestic law. Several new Constitu-
tions or amendments to the old ones explicitly pronounced the supremacy of in-
ternational human rights instruments over national regulations, and in order to
guarantee the compatibility of domestic law with international agreements, pro-
visions identical with those set forth in international human rights instruments
were included in the new Constitutions (or the amendments made to the old
ones) and the laws on the operation of criminal justice were modified accord-
ingly.
Today, almost all constitutions include the basic principles of fair criminal
justice, such as the nullum crimen and nulla poena sine lege principle, the pre-
sumption of innocence, the rule according to which individuals may be deprived
of their liberty only by a court’s order, or the right to an independent and impar-
tial tribunal. The majority of the new democracies have become members of the
Council of Europe and thereby parties to the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Pre-accession monitoring of the candidate
countries’ legal systems, and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights after accession have shaped the individual countries’criminal justice sys-
tems.
The structure of the laws on criminal procedure in the transition countries fol-
lows the model of the Continental mixed system, i.e. elements of an inquisitorial
procedure are blended with elements of an accusatorial (adversary or party) pro-
cedure.
The pre-trial phase is dominated by inquisitorial elements (ex officio proce-
dure; lack of strict separation of functions; secrecy) while the trial phase bears
the characteristics of a party procedure (publicity; separation of the prosecution,
the defense and the judicature; strict adherence to the prosecutor’s charge, etc.).
The fact that certain elements of the accusatorial process (e.g. participation of the
defense counsel of the accused is ensured within certain limits) are present also
in the pre-trial phase provides further proof for the mixed nature of the system.
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On the other hand, the trial phase is not entirely free from the elements of an in-
quisitorial procedure: the examination of the witnesses and the interrogation of
the defendant is primarily the duty of the judge and information collected in the
course of the pre-trial stage can be used to a large extent. Prosecution is governed
by the so-called legality principle: as a general rule all crimes reported are inves-
tigated, and the prosecutor cannot refrain from bringing the case before the court
for expediency considerations. However, the number of exceptions is on the in-
crease; prosecutors may discontinue cases with defendants’consent, and instruct
them to comply with orders to undergo treatment, compensate the victim or do
community service, etc.
In some countries the newly adopted laws on criminal procedure indicate a
shift towards the adversary model. Parties acquire more rights to present evi-
dence and examine witnesses. However, in all countries the court has retained its
power to introduce evidence it deems important for ascertaining the facts of the
case and necessary for fair adjudication. In this context it should be mentioned
that constitutional courts established after the political turnover have through
their decisions played an important role in a number of countries, contributed to
separating the functions of prosecution and adjudication, and thereby relieved
judges of part of their inquisitorial role.
2.3 Western European and North American
Scene
In the Western European region and in North America it is not possible to indi-
cate reforms comparable to those of Central and Eastern European. Powers with
the aim to continue with the harmonization of the criminal justice systems can
surely be observed, but the scope differs from the country-based efforts of the
Central and Eastern European region in that larger geographical areas are tar-
geted. In 2.1 above, the roles of the European Union and the Council of Europe in
this field were already examined. The following discussess the issue in greater
detail2.
As already mentioned, although the EU has been traditionally oriented to-
wards economic cooperation, it has taken over many functions related to police
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, with the emphasis on organized
crime, terrorism and drug trafficking. Decisions on these matters are made by the
Council of Ministers, i.e. the relevant ministers of the cabinets of the member
states. Since these are matters involving the sensitive issue of national sover-
eignty, decisions require full consensus among the fifteen members. In addition,
there are ongoing debates what could be be dealt with by the Union, and what
matters should be left entirely to the individual member states.
In general, it is safe to say that particularly during the second half of the 1990’s
and the first years of the new millenium, the European Union has transformed the
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2 Based on the article by M. Joutsen (2002).
European debate on criminal policy. Many key debates previously conducted on
the national level have now moved to the European Union level, and European
Union decisions have considerable influence on national law, policy and prac-
tice. Agreement has been reached on the minimum requirements when
criminalizing a number of different offences, such as racism and xenophobia,
trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of children, and participa-
tion in a criminal organization. International cooperation in criminal matters has
been smoothed by the establishment of Europol and the European Judicial Net-
work. Conventions have been adopted in order to simplify extradition and mu-
tual assistance.
Cooperation in the police sector rests not only on Europol, but also, for exam-
ple, on the Schengen arrangements. Europol can be best characterized as a coor-
dination body that seeks to ensure that the police force in every member state has
the cooperation and resources it needs to carry out its functions. The Schengen
arrangements (which do not apply to the United Kingdom and Ireland) allow for
extensive operational cooperation and the sharing of information. New struc-
tures for police cooperation that are being developed include the European Po-
lice Chiefs Task Force, and a European Police College.
The European Judicial Network has been up and running for several years. Its
purpose is to facilitate the exchange of information between prosecutors and
courts. In addition to improving general understanding of how the different crim-
inal justice systems work, the Network has produced tools by which practitio-
ners in one country can readily identify who is the competent authority in another
country for certain cases, and what are the requirements for extradition and mu-
tual assistance requests. Work is proceeding on a secure telecommunications
system between competent prosecutors. Also, plans are well advanced for
Eurojust, as a more or less parallel body to Europol to promote cooperation
among prosecutors. Eurojust will not have operational powers in the sense that it
could itself order prosecution or demand certain investigations. Instead, it will be
a body consisting of one prosecutor from each member state. These prosecutors
meet together, either in plenary to discuss over-all strategy, or in different com-
positions to deal with the coordination of cross-border cases.
Extradition and mutual recognition among the EU countries have to a large
extent been based on two conventions worked out already in the 1950’s within
the framework of another European organization, the Council of Europe. Since
that time, practices in respect of extradition and mutual recognition have devel-
oped considerably, including those restricting the grounds of refusal, expanding
the rights of the person in question, and developing a “good practice” in process-
ing requests. Two conventions designed to simplify extradition and supplement
the 1957 Council of Europe Extradition Convention were adopted in 1995 and
1996, and in 2000, a convention designed to supplement the 1959 Council of Eu-
rope Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters was adopted.
More complicated issues arise when the victim of, as a rule, white collar or or-
ganized crime turns out to be the European Community itself. As pointed out by
Pedersen, Elholm and Kolze (1999), “traditionally, Member States have laid
great store by the fact that penalties for contravening Community law are part of
the general system of national penalties that are based on national traditions and
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crime policies. However, significant differences in national criminal law have
given rise to a legal disparity difficult to reconcile with the development within
the European Community in general” (op.cit., p. 164). Thus, “in a series of cases
the European Court of Justice has established that the Community (...) is empow-
ered to impose the sanctions it considers necessary to ensure effective and uni-
form administration of the rules concerning (the misappropriation of subsidies
affecting the Community’s financial interests)” (op.cit., p. 168). This practice
might indicate that in the future an intergovernmental agency, in this case the Eu-
ropean Community/European Union will increasingly dictate the extent of the
juridical independence of the national administrations of the European region,
particularly in view of the Union’s ongoing enlargement process.
The rapprochement of the operative efforts in the field of law enforcement and
crime policy reached within the EU member states, and in the coming years also
in the candidate countries, is exemplified by the already mentioned Schengen
Agreement. Marc (2001) writes that already in the late 1980s “immigration con-
trol became the most important argument to justify compensatory measures for
the abolition of border controls. Only the combination of policing and immigra-
tion arguments made it possible to mobilise financial resources, namely for the
Schengen Information System (SIS). The practical implementation of the SIS
and the intensified police controls in the border regions have shown since then
that immigration control is the most important aspect under which the Schengen
cooperation has had practical impacts” (op.cit., p. 105). Also in this context it can
be observed that “international police cooperation has reached a major extent in
a context of governance without government”, since “institutions coordinating
the use of force at international levels exist without the formal framework of a
state” (op.cit., p. 111).
Comparing the North American scene with the European one in this respect
makes it plausible to claim that the existing mechanisms of transborder coopera-
tion in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice, particularly the systems
constructed between the law enforcement bodies, are much less complicated. It
has been notified that “due, in part, to the smaller number of partners involved
(namely, USA, Canada and, to a lesser extent, the most important countries of
Latin America) and, to a much bigger extent, to the inevitable weight of the USA,
cross-border police cooperation on the American continent appears to be more
straightforward than the European approach” (op.cit., p. 115). The straightfor-
wardness of the police cooperation is not the only common feature characteriz-
ing the crime prevention and criminal justice structures of the North American
region.
The legal systems of the North American countries have their roots in English
criminal law and the practices (especially common law) were transplanted to
those countries hundreds of years ago. Another factor having a profound effect
on the form and structure of the criminal justice administration of the two coun-
tries is the federalist system of government; responsibility for the various parts of
the criminal justice system is shared and divided among all levels of government:
federal, state or provincial, and municipal.
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2.4 Information on the national criminal justice
systems
Passages 2.2 and 2.3 above delineate the recent major changes in criminal justice
systems in those parts of the European and North American region where
large-scale reforms have been implemented or are planned. Those readers who
would like to examine details of the national systems, in which no notable re-
forms have taken place during the period in question, are recommended to study
the relevant country reviews in Kangaspunta et al. (1999).
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3 Understanding Cross-national
Variations of Crime Rates
in Europe and North America
Gregory Howard and Tony Smith
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to understand cross-national variations of crime
rates in Europe and North America during the middle of the 1990s. We are con-
cerned with three related questions. First, do official measures of national crime
rates (United Nations, Interpol, European Sourcebook and, for homicide, the
World Health Organization) substantially agree with one another as well as with
victimization data from the International Crime Victim Survey in their represen-
tations of criminal offending? Second, do measures of important concepts from
modernization, inequality, and opportunity theory differentially explain varia-
tions in national violent and nonviolent crime rates? Third, do these measures of
theoretical concepts explain more or less variation in a crime rate, say homicide
or theft, depending upon the source of crime data? With the analysis to be re-
ported below, we wish to confirm an important point already made in the com-
parative criminology literature, that theoretical accounts of cross-national varia-
tion in crime rates need to take account of the types of crime that are examined as
well as the source of the crime data that are used.
Our first question, about the degree to which the different data series provide
similar pictures of crime and criminal offending, is basically concerned with the
notion of triangulation. A standard warning in the comparative criminology lit-
erature alerts readers to the suspect nature of international crime data. We are
generously reminded, for instance, that official data are collected in national data
systems of varying sophistication, and the process by which they are collated and
disseminated by reporting agencies like the United Nations, Interpol, European
Sourcebook, and the World Health Organization are more or less rigorous. Given
the problems associated with official measures of crime, the International Crime
Victim Survey has been developed, but as with any method of measuring social
phenomenon, this technique also has its own share of difficulties. Indeed, all
sources of crime data will harbor various errors, both systematic and random.
While we can make solemn efforts to reduce these errors in the construction of
the various data series, the secretive nature of crime as well as the subjectivity in-
volved in all measurement exercises ensures that no data series will be perfect.
Nonetheless, we need not despair. If the different data series, despite their vary-
ing errors, converge on a particular image of crime, then we can feel more confi-
dent that the data are measuring what they are intended to measure. Such conver-
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gence is known as triangulation. We will assess triangulation in the crime data
studied in this chapter by examining agreement about crime rates among various
sources of official data as well as agreement between sources of official data and
a source of victimization data. This question of triangulation, then, speaks to the
quality of the dependent variables often used in comparative criminological in-
vestigations; simply put, quantitative studies of comparative criminology de-
pend crucially on the reliability and validity of cross-national indicators of crimi-
nal offending. Triangulation provides confidence that the concept of crime is be-
ing measured reasonably well and that assessments of theoretical efficacy are
giving theories a fair shake.
Our second question addresses the possibility that comparative criminologi-
cal theories might have differential explanatory power depending on the type of
crime under consideration. Messner (1986), for example, has provided evidence
that structural characteristics of a society are variously related to property crime
and violent crime. Similarly, Bennett (1991) has observed that modernization
and development are differentially related to crimes of violence and theft, while
LaFree and Kick (1986: 213) have suggested that “development, wealth distribu-
tion, and national demographic characteristics affect murder and theft rates dif-
ferently” (see also, LaFree, 1999). Moreover, in a crisply worded refutation of
general theory in comparative criminology, Groves and Newman (1989: 28)
have concluded on logical grounds that universal theory, claiming applicability
to all crimes, all offenders, and all cultures, “should be recognized for the dead
end that it is.” Accordingly, we assemble a host of variables linked to major con-
cepts in popular comparative criminological theories and assess their utility in
accounting for variations in different kinds of crime rates. If criminological theo-
ries differentially explain violent and nonviolent crime, comparative investiga-
tors will do well to specify their theories more narrowly and to consider other sit-
uational and contextual features of criminal offending in their efforts at theoreti-
cal elaboration.
Related to the two questions already discussed, our third question attends to
the possibility that different theoretical accounts explain more or less variance in
national crime rates depending upon the data source that it used by the investiga-
tor. While LaFree (1999) has concluded that certain generalizations may now be
stated as a result of dozens of published comparative criminological studies, the
listing of 34 studies considered in his meta-analysis of cross-national homicide
indicates that five different crime data sources have been used by researchers, in-
cluding figures from the World Health Organization, Interpol (modal homicide
data source), United Nations, Comparative Crime Data File, and the Human Re-
lations Area Files. Generally speaking, these previous studies have not consid-
ered more than one data source for purposes of constructing dependent variables
(But see, Neapolitan, 1994; 1996; 1997). In this study, we assess whether the re-
lationship between explanatory variables and crimes rates is conditioned by the
data source from which the dependent variable derives.
This is a preliminary analysis of cross-national variations in crime rates (1) us-
ing a variety of crime data sources (i.e., United Nations, Interpol, European
Sourcebook, World Health Organization, and the International Crime Victim
Study) for multiple dependent variables (i.e., violent and nonviolent crime) to
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explore triangulation and (2) deploying a set of explanatory variables from four
different domains (i.e., modernization, inequality, opportunity, and controls) to
assess differences in theoretical efficacy by type of crime and source of data. We
begin this study with a few words about the sources of crime data and then dis-
cuss the types of crime to be examined. We move next to describe the theoretical
perspectives evaluated in this analysis. From there, we spell out the method that
we followed in carrying out this investigation and then report on the results of the
analysis. We close with a discussion of these results and a number of general con-
clusions.
3.2 Sources of crime data
Official data and varieties of error. The larger part of the literature in compara-
tive criminology has been built on the back of admittedly fallible official data. In-
deed, no published study of cross-national variations in national crime rates is
complete without a standard litany of cautionary words. These alerts about the
quality of comparative crime data are warranted for two important reasons. First,
official data even within a single nation are saddled with systematic and random
error. For one thing, as records of official action, these data do not tell us anything
about crimes that go unreported to the police nor those that go unrecorded by
these authorities. Studies that have compared victimization data with official
data in the United States and around the world have consistently found that offi-
cial data dramatically undercount the number of criminal offenses in a society.
To the extent that criminal events that go unrecorded are different from those that
do find their way to the police ledgers, representations of crime based on these
figures will be biased. Moreover, official records of law enforcement and crimi-
nal prosecution are dependent upon the content of laws; as radical criminologists
have been keen to demonstrate, law oftentimes acts in the interest of the few over
the many (Reiman, 1990; Chambliss and Zatz, 1993). Thus, official measures of
crime typically overlook the offenses of the powerful. Neither the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation in the United States nor the Center for International Crime
Prevention of the United Nations publishes figures on corporate or government
crime in their standard statistical series. Another problem with official data is
that they are dependent upon the subjective judgments of law enforcement offi-
cials, prosecutors, and judges who must engage in discretionary practices that
might vary considerably by jurisdiction even within nations. Of course, these are
only a few of the many flaws associated with official data; a comprehensive dis-
cussion of other limitations associated with these data can be found in any intro-
ductory criminology textbook.
Second, hygiene warnings about official crime data are especially warranted
in the case of cross-national figures. For one thing, different nations may define
particular types of crime much differently; thus, what might be considered a fe-
lonious act in one country may only be treated as a misdemeanor in another, and
perhaps not even deemed offensive at all in still a third (Newman, 1999). Discre-
tionary practices that vary within the nation-state, such as the decision to arrest,
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charge, and convict, may be even more variant cross-nationally. Consequently,
systemic differences in legal standards under which police officers may make an
arrest or can initiate charges can have an influence on crime rates quite apart
from the actual amount of crime in the society. Another problem with official
cross-national data is that they are generally available for only a small number of
the world’s nations; the typical sample of countries is generally biased toward
highly developed nations. As a result, theoretical formulations that account for
the available data well may be criticized for the “cultural imperialism” roundly
derided by Beirne (1983). In any case, that official cross-national crime data are
confronted by threats to reliability and validity is a commonplace in the compar-
ative criminology literature; for useful reviews of the sources of error in official
cross-national data, the reader is referred to the work of LaFree (1999) and Nea-
politan (1997).
Victimization data and varieties of error. Because of the much noted prob-
lems of reliability and validity associated with official crime data, victimization
surveys have been instituted in single nations (e.g., the National Crime Victim-
ization Survey in the United States and the British Crime Survey in the United
Kingdom) and, with the advent of the International Crime Victim Survey in 1989
(van Dijk, Mayhew, & Killias, 1990; van Dijk, 1991; van Dijk & Mayhew, 1993),
globally as well. While these victimization surveys at the national and interna-
tional level avoid many of the troubles linked to official data, such as a reliance
on legal definitions of crime that typically vary from one country to another, this
measurement technique is unfortunately troubled by its own limitations (Beirne
& Perry, 1994; Neapolitan, 1997). For one, the reliability and validity of the sur-
vey data are largely dependent upon the memory of the respondents and their
willingness to report about their victimizations to social scientists. Moreover,
sensitivity toward certain types of crimes, such as sexual assault or domestic vio-
lence, may make a respondent less likely to report about certain kinds of victim-
izations (a problem, by the way, that also threatens official measures). Another
crucial threat to the reliability and validity of victimization data is the problem of
telescoping. When a respondent telescopes, she or he reports an experience of
victimization that actually occurred outside the time period of interest to the re-
searchers. Telescoping is minimized in some victimization surveys through the
use of bounded interviews; unfortunately, the International Crime Victim Survey
does not employ this procedure (Neapolitan, 1997). Still another problem with
all surveys is response rate. The danger is that those individuals who refuse to
participate in the survey may be different in crucial ways from those people who
agree to participate. While the International Crime Victim Survey has experi-
enced a range of responsiveness from about 30 percent to over 90 percent, de-
pending upon the national survey, van Dijk and Mayhew (1993) report that crim-
inal victimization does not seem to vary with responsiveness and therefore con-
clude that bias in the data is minimal. Although this is good news about the ear-
lier surveys, response bias is always a concern with successive administrations
of the survey. In short, the reliability and validity of victimization data need to be
assessed as cautiously as the reliability and validity of official data.
On triangulation. We have just offered a very brief overview of the varieties
of error associated with the two most common methods for measuring crime
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cross-nationally. This review was naturally not exhaustive, but it serves to make
an important point. While both victimization and official data sources are
plagued by threats to reliability and validity, the varieties of error are generally
different for these two general types of crime data. If the data sources have rela-
tively distinct error structures and they converge nonetheless on a similar image
of crime in a society, then we can be a bit more confident in the validity of our
crime measures. Consequently, the extent of agreement between official and vic-
timization data should speak most directly to the validity of these measures of
criminal offending. While validity is concerned with the accuracy or “truthful-
ness” of data, reliability is concerned with the consistency of similar crime mea-
sures. Because the various measures of official crime considered in this study
have similar error structures, we should expect to find that these data sources
yield a consistent image of criminal offending. Therefore, the extent of agree-
ment among the official data sources should address the reliability of these crime
figures.
3.3 Types of crime
Most comparative criminological studies have focused on homicide as the de-
pendent variable since this type of crime is generally considered the most reli-
able and valid indicator of cross-national criminal offending and serious vio-
lence is typically a phenomenon of great interest to criminologists and the public
alike (Neapolitan, 1997). While homicide has enjoyed the most criminological
interest to date, one can certainly find a number of studies that have considered
various types of property crime as well. Interestingly, as Neuman and Berger
(1988: 291) have observed, “studies that examined both homicide and property
crimes have not found both to be caused by the same factors.” LaFree (1999) has
also noted that when comparative studies of crime examine both violent and
property crimes, there is little support found for the contention that both types of
crime are produced by a common causal mechanism. In his study of the relation-
ship between development and crime, for example, Bennett (1991) has main-
tained that development serves to decrease crimes of violence but simulta-
neously acts to increase crimes of theft. In their study of violent and nonviolent
crime, Kick and LaFree (1986: 223) have concluded that “contrary to the pre-
dominant theoretical explanations in recent quantitative cross-national analyses
of crime, measures of development, inequality, and population growth generally
have opposite effects on murder and theft rates.” “Although a general explana-
tory theory is a desirable long-term goal,” counsel Neuman and Berger (1988:
292), “researchers cannot assume that homicide and property crime result from
the same causal process and should specify the link between causal processes
and each type of crime.” While we resist the tendency to pursue general theories
of crime along with Groves and Newman (1989), we agree with Neuman and
Berger as well as other researchers who have called for comparative studies that
consider violent and property crimes separately.
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Violent crime. In this study, we have examined four types of violent crime as
dependent variables. As with most prior investigations, we will consider homi-
cide along with assault, rape, and robbery. Each of these dependent variables is
measured by multiple sources so we shall be able to draw some conclusions
about the relationship between explanatory models and different types of violent
crime measured by multiple data series.
Nonviolent crime. In addition to the four types of violent crime identified
above, we have also examined four types of nonviolent crime. Traditionally, pre-
vious studies that have explored nonviolent crime have focused on theft, and we
will follow suit here as well. In addition to theft, however, we will also consider
other types of nonviolent crime, including burglary, auto theft, and drug-related
crimes. Using multiple measures for each of these dependent variables from dif-
ferent data series, we will be in a position to make conclusions about the relation-
ship between explanatory models and different types of nonviolent crime.
In short, our analysis of a variety of crime types allows us to assess whether
existing observations about the differential power of standard theoretical models
to explain violent and nonviolent crime apply to these most recent data. More-
over, by examining different forms of violent and nonviolent crime, we are able
to present evidence concerning differential theoretical efficacy in accounting for
variations in crime rates within these standard categories.
3.4 Theoretical explanations for cross-national
variations of crime rates
We do not intend to present a comprehensive review of the theoretical literature
in comparative criminology in these few pages as this task has been undertaken
at length in other venues (Howard, Newman, & Pridemore, 2000; LaFree, 1999;
Neapolitan, 1997; Neuman & Berger, 1988). Instead, we will focus on three the-
oretical camps commonly considered in published studies of comparative crimi-
nology: modernization, inequality, and opportunity. Our aim is to review briefly
the central tenants of each theoretical perspective and to summarize the available
empirical evidence related to these theories.
Modernization. This perspective draws heavily from the ideas of Durkheim
(1964; 1966), and it has been advanced most notably in comparative criminology
by Shelley (1981) and by Clinard and Abbott (1973). The central contentions of
Durkheimian-modernization theory are that the evolution of societies through
developmental stages leads to a more complex division of labor, a breakdown of
mechanical solidarity and the collective conscience, a drop in control over sav-
age material desires or anomie, and more deviant behavior. On this view, norms
and values fail in their regulative functions during periods of rapid social change,
which are linked to the collapse of traditional society as evidenced by a break-
down of the extended family, local community ties, traditional beliefs, and as-
cribed status relations. In this context, individualism is brought to the fore and,
without new controls and norms put into place, this individualism along with
conflict arising from growing cultural heterogeneity lead to crime and deviance
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(LaFree, 1999; Neuman & Berger, 1988). Organic solidarity may sprout from
the mutual interdependence of a modern society, but even Durkheim seemed torn
about whether this newfangled community control would be as effective as that
arising from mechanical solidarity. Thus, comparative researchers working in
the modernization perspective have argued that modernization and development
should be associated with increasing levels of crime and that they should also be
associated with permanently higher rates of criminal offending, especially prop-
erty crime, owing to the suspected weakness of organic solidarity (Neapolitan,
1997). According to Neapolitan (1997), modernization theory asserts that indus-
trialization and urbanization have more to say about cross-national variations in
violent and nonviolent crime than the unique characteristics of the nations being
studied.
A review of the comparative criminological literature easily reveals that mod-
ernization is the most common theory employed in cross-national studies
(LaFree, 1999; Neuman & Berger, 1988). Perhaps due to the popularity of this
theoretical perspective and the wide range of data sets used to assemble inde-
pendent variables, a number of tacks have been taken with respect to
operationalization. LaFree (1999) has listed the following as common indicators
(per capita) of economic development and modernization: gross national (or do-
mestic) product, telephones, energy consumption, industrialization and devel-
opment indexes, and proportion in agriculture. LaFree (1999) has reported that
most studies of modernization and homicide surprisingly find an inverse rather
than a positive relationship. Neuman and Berger (1988) have confirmed this gen-
eral conclusion and have contended that modernization may be positively related
to property crime.
Inequality. One of the standard accounts of the relationship between inequal-
ity and crime derives from the work of Blau (1977), in which social structure is
depicted as a function of heterogeneity (nominal parameters that divide a popu-
lation into discrete groups with no inherent rank ordering such as religion and
race) and inequality (graduated parameters that depict status through continuous
measurements such as income and wealth). In terms of interpersonal violence,
heterogeneity can lead to conflict between those who belong to a particular nom-
inal group and “outsiders” while inequality can lead to conflict as those “with-
out” try to reduce imbalances while those “with” try to maintain the status quo.
Messner (1989: 597) has also reported that “the structuring of economic inequal-
ity on the basis of ascribed characteristics is a particularly important source of le-
thal violence in contemporary societies.” In other words, an interaction between
heterogeneity and inequality, such that a particular group is disadvantaged eco-
nomically or educationally, is likely to exacerbate societal violence (Avison &
Loring, 1986). The results of these two studies are consistent with the earlier
work of Blau and Blau (1982). More generally, this perspective maintains that
economic distress associated with inequality, poverty, and unemployment leads
to crime. Given its focus on conflicts owing to material conditions and class rela-
tions, this stance is most clearly related to “radical” criminology (LaFree, 1999;
Lynch and Groves, 1986).
A positive relationship between economic inequality and homicide is one of
the most consistent findings in comparative criminology (LaFree, 1999;
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Messner, 1989). However, Neuman and Berger (1988) have reported that eco-
nomic inequality is unrelated to property crime. Lee and Bankston (1999) have
also reported support for the relationship between economic inequality and ho-
micide rates, while also presenting some evidence that economic inequality may
have an enhanced relationship to criminal violence in nations with democratic
environments. This latter claim is consistent with the results of research by
Krahn, Hartnagel, and Gartrell (1986) in which the effects of economic inequal-
ity were found to be more pernicious in more democratic nations, a result that
they argue supports relative deprivation theory.
Opportunity. Relative to the other perspectives described above, opportunity
theory is little studied (LaFree, 1999; Neuman & Berger, 1988). Neuman and
Berger (1988: 288) have said that opportunity theory “connects macro-level evo-
lution to a micro-level explanation of crime through the concept of opportuni-
ties.” “In the ‘routine activity’ version of the theory,” they continue, “attractive
‘suitable targets’become increasingly vulnerable through socioeconomic activi-
ties that are dispersed away from the home, reducing protection from ‘capable
guardians’.” Whereas modernization and inequality theory speak to motiva-
tional factors associated with criminal and deviant behavior, Cohen and Felson
(1979: 589) as well as other advocates of opportunity theory take “criminal incli-
nations as given and examine the manner in which the spatio-temporal organiza-
tion of social activities helps people to translate their criminal inclinations into
action.” Cohen and Felson (1979) have argued that development in the United
States, and presumably other nations as well, has brought changes in “routine ac-
tivities” that take people away from their homes and therefore increase opportu-
nities for certain types of crime. On this view, lower crime is associated with ac-
tive guardianship norms, decentralized populations, low youth mobility and in-
dependence, and women in homemaking roles rather than the labor force.
Neuman and Berger (1988: 288) have explained that the opportunity perspective
in cross-national studies, which they trace back to the Chicago School of Park
and Burgess, predicts the appearance of crime “where there is a mix of growing
material resources and environments which provide increased opportunities for
unsanctioned criminal behavior.” Bennett (1991) has reported qualified support
for routine activities theory, noting that the theory appears to be crime specific as it
fits property crime better than personal crime. Similarly, van Dijk (1998) has re-
viewed a series of studies conducted with the International Crime Victim Survey
and concluded that violent crime is most highly related to measures of poverty and
inequality while property crime is most associated with opportunity indicators.
We should add that these theoretical perspectives are often compatible with
one another. Neuman and Berger (1988) have maintained that modernization
and opportunity theory are similar in their evolutionary perspective, focus on ad-
aptation, and concern with industrialization, urbanization, cultural diversity, and
population growth, but they also have argued that opportunity theory stresses
material conditions (technological, organizational, and demographic) while
modernization theory highlights cultural values, normative patterns, and psy-
chological motivations. LaFree and Kick (1986) have melded modernization
theory to opportunity theory to argue that modernization will lead to decreased
homicide rates since these crimes are largely committed between intimates and
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the heightened mobility and impersonal nature of modern life diminishes these
types of relationships and therefore opportunity. Neapolitan (1999), for his part,
has added that the marriage of modernization and opportunity theory “explains
both property and violent crimes in terms of social control, motivation, and op-
portunity.” Finally, van Dijk (1998: 50) has described a useful interactionist
model, “which sees crime rates as the result of the dynamic interplay between
motivational and opportunity factors at the macro level.” While the analysis re-
ported below segregates independent variables into theoretical domains, it
should be clear to the reader that integration between the conceptual clusters is
not only possible but likely advisable for future investigations.
3.5 Method
The objective of this study is to evaluate the relative degree of empirical agree-
ment among crime measures reported by different data sources and to assess the
differential power of independent variables from three theoretical domains to ex-
plain cross-national variations in various forms of violent and nonviolent crime.
As indicated at the start of this chapter, we are concerned with three main ques-
tions:
1. Do official measures of national crime rates (United Nations, Interpol, Euro-
pean Sourcebook and, for homicide, the World Health Organization) sub-
stantially agree with one another as well as with victimization data from the
International Crime Victim Survey in their representations of criminal of-
fending?
2. Do measures of key concepts from modernization, inequality, and opportu-
nity theory differentially explain violent and nonviolent crime rates?
3. Do these measures of theoretical concepts explain more or less variation in a
crime rate, say homicide or theft, depending upon the source of crime data?
Data
This study analyzes data from nations drawn mostly from Western, Central and
Eastern Europe but also includes statistics for Canada, the United States, Israel,
and Turkey for a total of 54 countries.1 Crime statistics are provided by five dif-
ferent sources in HEUNI’s Crime Guide: (1) Sixth United Nations Survey on
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1 In order to assess whether the relationships between theoretical domains and crime rates were conditioned by the re-
gional placement of the nations included in the sample, we constructed a regional dummy variable where nations were
coded as zero if they were located in Europe or North America and one if they were listed as central independent states
in the HEUNI Crime Guide. Because these latter countries are in a period of transition as they embrace market econo-
mies and the like, explanations of criminal offending might be different in these locations then in the more stable coun-
tries further to the west. When we introduced this regional dummy variable into our regression models, we found that it
was often significant but only in the control variable only models. While the regional dummy variable did not achieve
statistical significance in the vast majority of models including inequality, modernization, and opportunity, it should
be noted that some significant coefficients in these models were rendered nonsignificant. Taken together, these results
provide further support for our general conclusion in this chapter that theoretical statements in comparative criminol-
ogy are likely to be most useful when they are tightly and narrowly specified. In other words, theoretical development
might be well-served by efforts to specify predictions about regional variation in criminal offending rates.
Crime Trends and Operations of the Criminal Justice Systems (1995–1997), (2)
International Crime Victim Surveys (collected between 1991–2000), (3) Inter-
pol International Crime Statistics (1997–1998), (4) European Sourcebook of
Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics (1995–1996), (5) and the World Health Or-
ganization (1995–1997). The study also analyzes crime indices, created by com-
bining some of the five crime sources together, developed by HEUNI’s expert
group. Additionally, data for the independent variables are provided by the
World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Develop-
ment Report (2000), United Nations Statistical Division, the International Crime
Victim Survey, and Kurian (1997).
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Variable Name Description N Mean SD Skewness
Homicide
UNHOMAVG UN average rate of recorded committed
intentional homicide, 1995-1997
39 5.25 5.18 1.45
IPHOMAVG* Interpol average homicide rate,
1997-1998
49 6.62 8.20 4.21
WHOHMAVG* WHO average homicide rate, 1995-1997 42 8.99 10.95 2.22
ESIHCAVG* European Sourcebook [ES] average rate
of completed intentional homicide,
1995-1996
31 3.51 3.79 2.33
HOMIND HEUNI Homicide Index 47 51.20 26.17 .04
Assault
UNASSAVG* UN average rate of serious assaults,
1995-1997
28 59.57 112.06 3.25
IPSASAVG* Interpol average rate of recorded major
assaults, 1997-1998
48 91.85 127.04 2.07
INC4 ICVS (national or city) assault and threat
average (%)
34 3.50 1.39 -.02
ESASAVG* ES average assault rate, 1995-1996 37 175.94 224.49 1.96
Rape
UNRAPAVG* UN average rate of recorded rapes,
1995-1997
42 9.58 14.61 4.67
IPRAPAVG* Interpol average rape rate, 1997-1998 47 7.22 6.27 2.19
INC6 ICVS (national or city) sexual assault
average (%)
34 .87 .68 1.02
ESRAPAVG* ES average rape rate, 1995-1996 36 7.50 6.40 3.00
VIOWOM HEUNI Violence Against Women Index 48 50.45 26.68 -.08
Table 1. Variable list
* Natural log ** Squared
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Variable Name Description N Mean SD Skewness
Robbery
UNROBAVG UN average rate of recorded robberies,
1995-1997
43 62.01 56.26 1.38
IPROBAVG Interpol average robbery rate,
1997-1998
48 61.17 55.34 1.46
INC16* ICVS (national or city) robbery average (%) 34 1.58 1.18 1.79
Major Theft
UNMTFAVG* UN average rate of recorded major
thefts, 1995-1997
21 559.26 912.47 2.00
IPAGTAVG Interpol average major theft rate,
1997-1998
43 725.15 732.19 1.39
ESTFTAVG ES average total theft rate, 1995-1996 35 2,444.40 2,244.85 1.16
Burglary
UNBURAVG UN average rate of recorded burglaries,
1995-1997
33 743.70 603.54 .73
IPBURAVG Interpol average burglary rate,
1997-1998
44 789.57 710.52 1.13
INC2 ICVS (national or city) burglary average
(%)
34 2.55 1.19 .58
ESBRTAVG ES average burglary rate, 1995-1996 33 948.95 692.29 1.14
BURGIND HEUNI Burglary Index 44 50.06 22.60 -.00
Drug-Related
UNDRGAVG* UN average rate of recorded drug-related
crimes, 1995-1997
43 123.01 181.33 1.81
IPDRGAVG* Interpol average drug-related crime rate,
1997-1998
47 153.19 193.32 1.83
ESDRTAVG ES average drug-related offense rate,
1995-1996
33 142.54 180.79 1.48
Auto Theft
UNATMAVG UN average rate of recorded auto thefts,
1995-1997
42 242.53 257.29 1.12
IPAUTAVG Interpol average auto theft rate,
1997-1998
47 224.81 278.57 1.49
INC10 ICVS (national or city) auto theft average
(%)
34 1.12 .70 .74
ESTFMAVG ES average car theft rate, 1995-1996 35 315.04 267.82 .99
MVCI HEUNI Motor Vehicle Crime Index 48 47.86 26.55 .08
Table 1. Variable list (continued)
* Natural log ** Squared
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Variable Name Description N Mean SD Skewness
Controls
HDRDIV98 Divorces (as % of marriages) 1998 46 35.37 20.97 .72
UNDER15* Percent of total population under age 15
(1998)
49 21.55 5.90 1.66
ETHNHOM** % Ethnic Homogeneity 32 80.47 16.90 -1.78
Macro-Structural
Economic Inequality
INC34 ICVS (national or city) satisfied with
income, averaged (4 = very satisfied,
1 = not satisfied)
33 2.57 .55 .23
TOP20 Percent of income or consumption to
upper 20%
32 39.53 4.39 1.02
Gender Inequality
GEM Gender Empowerment Measure 31 .60 .14 -.00
GDI98 Gender Development Index 42 .84 .08 -.58
GENINEQ Factor score variable (GEM & GDI98) 31 .00 1.00 -.29
Modernization
URBPOP98 Urban population (as % of total) 48 67.10 15.58 -.22
AGRICULT Percent workforce in agriculture (1990) 43 15.33 12.33 1.49
ENERGY Energy use/consumption (oil equivalent)
per capita (kg) (1994)
44 3,084.45 1,746.78 .80
SANITATE** Percent of population with access to
sanitation
34 88.65 17.89 -1.52
HDI98 HDR 2000: Human Development Index
(1998)
48 .83 .08 -.28
HDRTEL98 HDR 2000: Televisions per 1000 people 48 420.35 161.75 .05
MODERN Factor score variable (all six
modernization variables named above)
30 .00 1.00 -.47
Opportunity
INC31A ICVS (national or city) % living alone 33 8.39 6.05 .91
INC33 ICVS (national or city) evenings out, average 34 2.90 .42 -.15
LIFESTYLE Factor score variable (INC31A & INC33) 33 .00 1.00 .28
HDRFEA98 HDR 2000: Female economic activity
rate (%), 1998
48 53.10 9.18 -.97
INC36 ICVS (national or city) car ownership
(%), average
34 67.10 19.69 -.61
INC38* ICVS (national or city) handgun
ownership (%), average
34 5.36 5.35 2.34
* Natural log ** Squared
Table 1. Variable list (continued)
Dependent Variables
As summarized in Table One, violent crime is represented in this study by figures
on homicide, assault, rape, and robbery while nonviolent crime is measured by
major theft, burglary, drug-related offenses, and motor vehicle theft.2 All vari-
ables from the UN Survey, Interpol, WHO, and European Sourcebook (official
sources of data) were computed by using averaged yearly rates to offset possible
random fluctuations in the data series. However, when incomplete data series
were encountered for a given country, an average for the available subset of years
was computed or only a single data point was used to avoid losing cases. Crimi-
nal victimization statistics employ a different unit of measurement than the offi-
cial crime rates (standardized per 100,000) mentioned above. ICVS statistics, af-
ter averaging three survey sweeps, represent the percent of respondents who had
been victimized in the past five years. When national level data were not avail-
able for a specific case, city level survey data were substituted.3 Finally, HEUNI
crime indices for homicide, violence against women, burglary, and motor vehi-
cle theft are included in the analyses.4
Independent Variables
The theoretical perspectives discussed above – modernization, inequality, and
opportunity – are represented by a number of independent variables which will
be discussed below. In addition to these three popular theories of comparative
criminology, we also employ a few control variables to account for other com-
monly specified relationships.
Modernization. The modernization hypothesis is measured by a single com-
posite factor score variable, called modernization, which is composed of six
variables: urban population (as percent of total population in 1998), percent of
workforce employed in agriculture in 1991, energy consumption (oil equivalent)
per capita (in kilograms) in 1994, percent of the population with access to sanita-
tion in 1994–1995, televisions per 1000 people in 1998, and the Human Devel-
opment Index for 1998. The Human Development Index is predicated on indica-
tors of life expectancy at birth, educational attainment (combination of adult lit-
eracy rates and school enrollment rates), and standard of living (measured by real
Gross Domestic Product per capita in U.S. dollars). Table Two provides the fac-
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2 When statistical data for the United States were missing, crime rates from the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) were sub-
stituted. UCR figures for murder/nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, motor vehi-
cle theft, or burglary rates were used in the computation of UN Survey, Interpol, and European Sourcebook dependent
variables.
3 Our colleagues in the expert group conducting analyses of the Sixth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Oper-
ations of Criminal Justice Systems for HEUNI were concerned that our practice of substituting city data when national
level figures were absent might bias our results. To determine whether this was the case, we created a dummy variable
to examine the effect of our substitution on the regression models for the ICVS data reported later in the chapter. The
dummy variable was scored zero if no substitution of national level data was made and one if city figures were used in
the absence of the more desirable national level data. For the assault, burglary, and auto theft equations, the substitution
of city data seemed to make little difference. In the robbery model, income satisfaction was no longer statistically sig-
nificant. With respect to sexual assault, modernization and divorce were rendered statistically significant, although
beta coefficients over one indicated that serious problems of multicollinearity existed in the model.
4 See the introduction to this volume for a detailed discussion of the HEUNI crime indices.
tor load scores and the amount of variance explained by the unrotated compo-
nent. The factor score variable represents the relative level of modernization for
each nation. High scores represent greater levels of modernization.
Inequality. We have operationalized inequality along two dimensions re-
ferred to as economic and gender inequality. The two measures of economic in-
equality are income satisfaction and top 20 percent share of income/consump-
tion. Income satisfaction is derived from an ICVS question that asks respondents
how they feel about their level of household income (1 = not satisfied, 4 = satis-
fied); accordingly, low scores are taken to indicate greater income inequality.
Top 20 percent is a World Bank indicator representing the degree of inequality in
terms of the percentage share of income or consumption claimed by the upper 20
percent of income earners and consumers in a nation. High scores represent
greater economic disparities. Gender inequality is a composite factor score vari-
able created with two Human Development Report (2000) statistics: Gender
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Modernization Factor Loading Variance Explained
Urban population (as % of total) .69
Percent of workforce in agriculture (1990) -.85
Energy use/consumption (oil equivalent) per capita (kg) (1994) .89
Percent of population with access to sanitation (squared) .49
Human development index (1998) .94
Televisions per 1000 people .91
65.57
Lifestyle
Percent living alone (ICVS national or city) .87
Average number of evenings out (ICVS national or city) .87
75.16
Gender Inequality
Gender Empowerment Measure (HDR 2000) .97
Gender Development Index (HDR 2000) .97
93.73
Notes: This table reports the results of three separate factor analysis runs that employed a principal components extraction
method. None of the components required rotation because only one component was identified.
Table 2. Factor analysis results
Empowerment Measure and Gender Development Index. The Gender Empow-
erment Measure represents the relative empowerment of men and women in the
political and economic spheres. The measure is an index consisting of women’s
and men’s percentage shares of administrative and managerial positions and per-
centage shares of professional and technical jobs (economic participation) as
well as women’s and men’s percentage shares of parliamentary seats (political
participation). Low scores indicate a society with greater gender inequality. The
Gender Development Index represents the differences between males and fe-
males with respect to their achievements in life expectancy, educational attain-
ment, and earned income. Low scores indicate a society with greater gender in-
equality. Table Two provides the factor loading scores and the percentage of vari-
ance explained by the unrotated component.
Opportunity. Opportunity theory is tested with four different variables. The
first predictor, termed lifestyle, is a factor score variable composed of two ICVS
variables: percent of respondents living alone and the average number of eve-
nings out (see Table Two for factor load scores). The second opportunity predic-
tor, female economic activity rate, measures women’s share of the adult labor
force for those aged 15 and above. As more women enter the labor force, we as-
sume that households are less likely to be occupied on a consistent basis. Both of
these variables are intended to be proxy measures of guardianship. Finally, the
last two opportunity variables are the percent of respondents who own a handgun
and percent of respondents who own a car. These last two opportunity variables
are used only in equations predicting homicide and motor vehicle theft rates, re-
spectively.
Controls. There are also a number of control variables used for the
multivariate portion of our study. To control for the criminogenic effects of insta-
bility in family structure, we include a measure of divorces as the percentage of
marriages. Another measure, percent of total population under 15 years of age in
1998, is used to control for age structure and is provided by the United Nations
Statistics Division (United Nations, 1999). The final control variable, Kurian’s
(1997) Ethnic Homogeneity Index, is used to control for population diversity.
This index represents the homogeneity of a nation-state in terms of ethnicity, re-
ligion, and language. Countries that contain fewer ethnic groups, have fewer reli-
gious traditions, and enjoy less variety in language score higher on the Ethnic
Homogeneity Index. Descriptive statistics for all variables, prior to any transfor-
mation, are provided in Table One above.
37
3.6 Results
The results of our analyses will be presented in two main sections. First, we will
discuss findings concerning the bivariate relationships between official and vic-
timization measures of violent and nonviolent crime. As noted earlier, these cor-
relations speak to our first question about the reliability and validity of the infor-
mation about cross-national variations in crime. Next, we will consider the re-
sults of multivariate analyses. These models permit us to address our second
question regarding the differential power of competing theories to account for
violent and nonviolent crime and to pursue our third question centered on
whether theoretical conclusions are conditioned by the source of data for de-
pendent variables.
Bivariate Analyses
Zero-order correlations between the various measures of violent crime are pre-
sented in Table Three. Correlations among homicide variables, excluding
HEUNI’s homicide index, range in strength from moderate between Interpol and
European Sourcebook (r = .60, p < .001) to strong between WHO and European
Sourcebook (r = .91, p < .001). The average correlation among the four homicide
variables (.91), as measured by Cronbach’s standardized alpha, is the highest
among all violent crimes examined (see Table Five). Most measures of rape corre-
late very strongly with one another with the exception of the ICVS sexual assault
variable. Curiously, all official crime measures exhibited negative associations
with the ICVS sexual assault variable, although they were not statistically signifi-
cant. Likewise, a similar pattern emerged for the set of robbery variables. Though
most of the official crime measures correlated strongly with each other, the ICVS
measure was weakly associated with the UN Survey (r=.33, p=.077) and not sig-
nificantly associated with the other official robbery measures. Finally, correlations
between the assault measures were the weakest among all violent crime variable
clusters, ranging from a weak association between Interpol and the European
Sourcebook measures (r=.34, p=.04) to a modest association between Interpol and
the UN Survey measures (r=.68, p<.000). The ICVS measure was not statistically
significantly related to any assault variables and even produced an unexpected
negative correlation with the European Sourcebook measure.
Zero-order correlations between the various measures of nonviolent crime are
reported in Table Four. The magnitude of the relationships between official mea-
sures of nonviolent crime were, on the average, moderate to strong. Drug-related
measures exhibited the highest average correlations (.94), as measured by
Cronbach’s standardized alpha, followed by auto theft, major theft, and burglary
(see Table Five). Again, the cluster of ICVS measures correlated weakly with
variables from official data sources, generating statistically insignificant coeffi-
cients and two unanticipated negative relationships for burglary. The ICVS mea-
sure for auto theft, however, achieved statistical significance in its relationship to
the UN Survey and European Sourcebook measures, although the correlations
were weak to moderate in strength.
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UN Survey Interpol European Sourcebook ICVS HEUNI WHO
UN Survey 1.00
Interpol A
B
C
D
.73 (p = .000) (n=38)
.93 (p = .000) (n=39)
.85 (p = .000) (n=41)
.68 (p = .000) (n=26)
1.00
European
Sourcebook
A
B
C
D
.85 (p = .000) (n=26)
.97 (p = .000) (n=31)
.84 (p = .000) (n=31)
.57 (p = .008) (n=21)
.60 (p = .000) (n=30)
.92 (p = .000) (n=34)
.83 (p = .000) (n=34)
.34 (p = .040) (n=36)
1.00
ICVS A
B
C
D
na
-.05 (p = .794) (n=28)
.33 (p = .077) (n=29)
.07 (p = .766) (n=20)
na
-.07 (p = .703) (n=31)
.29 (p = .106) (n=32)
.12 (p = .512) (n=32)
na
-.04 (p = .838) (n=26)
.19 (p = .366) (n=26)
-.20 (p = .326) (n=27)
1.00
HEUNI A
B
C
D
.85 (p = .000) (n=39)
.89 (p = .000) (n=42)
na
na
.74 (p = .000) (n=46)
.87 (p = .000) (n=45)
na
na
.96 (p = .000) (n=31)
.89 (p = .000) (n=36)
na
na
na
.22 (p = .218) (n=33)
na
na
1.00
WHO A
B
C
D
.82 (p = .000) (n=34)
na
na
na
.65 (p = .000) (n=41)
na
na
na
.91 (p = .000) (n=28)
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
-.85 (p = .000) (n=42)
na
na
na
1.00
Notes: (Row A) Homicide (Row B) Rape (Row C) Robbery (Row D) Assault
Table 3. Zero-order correlations of violent crime by data source
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UN Survey Interpol European Sourcebook ICVS HEUNI
UN Survey 1.00
Interpol A
B
C
D
.76 (p = .000) (n=30)
.76 (p = .000) (n=40)
.49 (p = .033) (n=19)
.82 (p = .000) (n=41)
1.00
European
Sourcebook
A
B
C
D
.66 (p = .000) (n=24)
.97 (p = .000) (n=29)
.68 (p = .011) (n=13)
.81 (p = .008) (n=29)
.93 (p = .000) (n=29)
.79 (p = .000) (n=34)
.79 (p = .000) (n=29)
.82 (p = .000) (n=31)
1.00
ICVS A
B
C
D
-.01 (p = .971) (n=23)
.39 (p = .042) (n=28)
na
na
-.06 (p = .772) (n=30)
.23 (p = .191) (n=33)
na
na
.01 (p = .981) (n=24)
.43 (p = .024) (n=27)
na
na
1.00
HEUNI A
B
C
D
-.76 (p = .000) (n=33)
-.86 (p = .000) (n=42)
na
na
.58 (p = .000) (n=39)
.68 (p = .000) (n=46)
na
na
.72 (p = .000) (n=33)
.82 (p = .000) (n=35)
na
na
.62 (p = .000) (n=32)
.53 (p = .001) (n=33)
na
na
1.00
Notes: (A) Burglary (B) Auto theft (C) Major Theft (D) Drug-Related
Table 4. Zero-order correlations of nonviolent crime by data source
In summary, the measures of violent crime from official data sources were ei-
ther moderately or strongly related to one another. Variables from the ICVS
were, however, largely unrelated to all other measures of violent crime. Addi-
tionally, measures for assault produced the weakest correlation coefficients
among all clusters of violent crime variables. Measures of nonviolent crime pro-
duced modest relationships overall. As was the case for violent crimes, the ICVS
measures were generally weakly correlated to measures from official data
sources. The cluster of nonviolent crime measures exhibiting the strongest rela-
tionship was drug-related offenses. In short, crime variables from official
sources were related to one another in a statistically significant manner. There
was general agreement between UN Survey, Interpol, European Sourcebook,
and WHO data. This agreement evidences acceptable reliability among the offi-
cial measures of crime. ICVS variables, with the exception of automobile theft
and robbery, were not associated with official crime sources (and then weakly
and inconsistently). This lack of agreement between official and victimization
measures of crime casts some doubt on the validity of the crime data. Either the
official data or the victimization data, or both, seem to miss the mark. In any case,
the two types of crime data paint fundamentally different pictures about
cross-national variations in crime.5
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Crime N Variables Standardized Item Alpha
Homicide 22 4 .91
Rape 21 4 .71
Robbery 21 4 .83
Assault 16 4 .66
Burglary 17 4 .68
Auto Theft 22 4 .85
Major Theft 11 3 .83
Drug-related 27 3 .94
Notes: HEUNI crime indices were not included in the analysis.
Table 5. Reliability analysis
5 At a meeting of experts affiliated with HEUNI, several colleagues suggested that the well-known problem of
underreporting crimes to the police might account for the observed differences between the ICVS and official mea-
sures of crime. In order to address this possibility, we computed new dependent variables with the ICVS data that dis-
counted the percent of crimes not reported to the police. The HEUNI Crime Guide provides two reporting rate
variables with which to accomplish this end. One is crime specific, percentage of burglaries reported to the police,
while the other covers personal contact crimes, presumably sexual assault, assault, and robbery. We used the burglary
reporting rate to discount the ICVS burglary variable and the general personal contact crime reporting rate to discount
the ICVS sexual assault, assault, and robbery figures. Substituting these new dependent variables that discount the per-
cent of crimes not reported to the police, we find little convergence between the two types of data sources.
Multivariate Analyses
We estimated our models using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression tech-
niques. Because many of the independent variables were highly correlated with
one another (see Table Six), four separate regression equations were estimated in
order to avoid problems with multicollinearity. The models were defined as fol-
lows:
X Model 1 estimates an equation for only the control variables.
X Model 2 estimates an equation for the inequality measures and controls.
X Model 3 estimates an equation for the modernization measure and controls.
X Model 4 estimates an equation for the opportunity variables and controls.
Homicide. Table Seven presents the results of an OLS regression on homicide
variables. Overall, the models calculated for each data source generated a num-
ber of similar results. First, regression coefficients for all theoretical variables
were consistently in the same predicted direction. Second, the inequality models
explained the most amount of variance in the dependent variable for three of the
data sources (i.e., UN Survey, European Sourcebook, and Interpol), although the
opportunity models also posted respectable R2 statistics for all but the Interpol
data. Finally, a majority of the models tested reported income satisfaction, top
20, modernization, lifestyle, and handgun ownership to be statistically signifi-
cant predictors of homicide.
Though many similarities existed between data sources, a few conspicuous
differences appeared. First, the Interpol homicide data failed to replicate many of
the findings from the other official data sources. None of the theoretical predic-
tors tested were significantly related to Interpol homicide rates. Second, only
two data sources found female economic activity to be significantly related to
homicide (European Sourcebook and HEUNI). Finally, the relative influence for
each theoretical variable as measured by the standardized regression coefficients
varied by each data source. For instance, some sources find income satisfaction
exerts the most influence in the inequality model while other models find top 20
percent as the strongest explanatory predictor.
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X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11
X1 1.00
X2 -.36* 1.00
X3 -.26 -.29 1.00
X4 -.04 -.20 .16 1.00
X5 .27 .02 -.04 .12 1.00
X6 .09 -.18 -.05 .94** -.09 1.00
X7 .44* -.57 -.16 .72** .33 .93** 1.00
X8 .24 -.27 .00 .84** .16 .92** .84** 1.00
X9 .29 .34 -.45* -.34 .07 .03 -.21 -.10 1.00
X10 -.13 -.49** .12 .74** .08 .87** .82** .74** -.51** 1.00
X11 -.19 -.09 -.09 .06 .23 .26 .28 .15 -.07 .21 1.00
* p≤ .05 ** p≤ .01
X1 HDRDIV98 (Divorces as % of marriages)
X2 UNDER15 (% of population under 15)
X3 ETHNHOM (% ethnic heterogeneity)
X4 INC34 (ICVS income satisfaction)
X5 TOP20 (% of income or consumption to upper 20 %)
X6 GENINEQ (Gender inequality factor score variable)
X7 MODERN (Modernization factor score variable)
X8 LIFESTYLE (Opportunity factor score variable)
X9 HDRFEA98 (Female economic activity rate)
X10 INC36 (ICVS car ownership average percentage)
X11 INC38 (ICVS handgun ownership average percentage)
Table 6. Zero-order correlations of independent variables
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UN CRIME SURVEY INTERPOL (ln)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls
Divorces .51** [.04] .28 [.03] .62* [.03] .60** [.04] .32 [.01] .24 [.01] .13 [.01] .33 [.01]
% Under 15 Years (ln) .17 [4.97] .17 [7.52] .04 [3.65] -.13 [10.13] -.05 [.71] -.13 [2.16] -.32 [.87] -.22 [2.04]
% Ethnic Homogeneity (sq) -.25 [.00] .02 [.00] -.19 [.00] .04 [.00] -.43* [.00] -.20 [.00] -.51 [.00] -.35 [.00]
Inequality
Income Satisfaction -.48 [1.00] .32 [.31]
Top 20 Percent .55 [.12] .34 [.04]
Modernization
Level of Modernization -.47 * [.58] .44 [.17]
Opportunity
Lifestyle -.61** [.73] .32 [.16]
Female Economic Activity .43 [.16] .13 [.03]
% Handgun Ownership (ln) .36 [1.12] .01 [.25]
(N) 25 17 16 19 29 18 19 22
Constant -9.11 [17.00] -38.93 [22.93] .02  [11.53] -2.46 [26.86] 2.85 [2.44] 3.91 [6.90] 5.89 [2.89] 5.65 [5.58]
Adjusted R2 .37** .83*** .50* .63** .29** .23 .19 .08
Table 7. OLS regression of homicide
* p≤ .05 ** p≤ .01 *** p≤ .001
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets.
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EUROPEAN SOURCEBOOK (ln) WHO (ln)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls
Divorces .34 [.01] -.14 [.01] .31 [.02] .44* [.01] .42* [.01] .21 [.01] .71** [.01] .58** [.01]
% Under 15 Years (ln) -.10 [1.32] .19 [1.45] -.12 [2.27] -.14 [1.45] .00 [1.35] .25 [1.64] -.53* [1.37] .01 [1.71]
% Ethnic Homogeneity (sq) -.56* [.00] -.46* [.00] -.88* [.00] -.03 [.00] -.25 [.00] .03 [.00] -.24 [.00] .01 [.00]
Inequality
Income Satisfaction -.35 [.23] -.58** [.25]
Top 20 Percent .48* [.03] .43* [.03]
Modernization
Level of Modernization -.40 [.22] -.44* [.23]
Opportunity
Lifestyle -.69** [.14] -.63***[.13]
Female Economic Activity .56* [.02] .27 [.03]
% Handgun Ownership (ln) .51* [.19] .42* [.19]
(N) 17 13 11 15 25 17 17 20
Constant 4.39 [4.28] -3.61 [4.46] 6.81 [7.31] -.33 [4.55] 1.87 [4.59] -5.64 [5.21] 11.15* [4.33] -2.00 [4.37]
Adjusted R2 .46* .79** .53 .75** .19 .66 ** .54 ** .66**
Table 7. OLS regression of homicide (continued)
* p≤ .05 ** p≤ .01 *** p≤ .001
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets.
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HOMICIDE INDEX (HEUNI)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls
Divorces .28 [.19] .07 [.23] .38 [.29] .37* [.17]
% Under 15 Years (ln) .05 [24.95] .13 [47.89] -.09 [31.32] -.20 [42.24]
% Ethnic Homogeneity (sq) -.42 [.00] -.08 [.00] -.25 [.00] -.12 [.00]
Inequality
Income Satisfaction -.62**[6.91]
Top 20 Percent .41* [.82]
Modernization
Level of Modernization -.50 [5.01]
Opportunity
Lifestyle -.68***[3.33]
Female Economic Activity .45* [.69]
% Handgun Ownership (ln) .51** [5.22]
(N) 28 18 18 22
Constant 55.14 [85.08] -36.80[152.68] 83.44[99.42] 72.52[115.37]
Adjusted R2 .25* .56** .21 .57*
Table 7. OLS regression of homicide (continued)
* p≤ .05 ** p≤ .01 *** p≤ .001
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets.
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Rape. Table Eight presents the results of an OLS regression on rape variables
by source of data. There is general agreement across models. First, theoretical
predictors in official data models are consistently in the same direction. Second,
four of the five OLS regression models find gender inequality and modernization
to be significantly related to rape and three models report lifestyle to be a signifi-
cant predictor of sexual assault. Third, three of the five data sources find that the
inequality model significantly explained more of the variance in the dependent
variable than any other regression model tested.
Despite the agreement across data sources, some noticeable differences did
emerge. First, the ICVS models failed to duplicate many of the significant rela-
tionships found in the other models. In fact, none of the ICVS models found the-
oretical predictors to be significantly related to sexual assault. Finally, the ex-
planatory contribution of the controls varied by data source with divorce being
the only stable predictor of rape (control only models).
Robbery. Table Nine presents the results of an OLS regression on robbery
variables. Three of the four data sources find modernization to be positively and
significantly related to robbery. Other theoretical variables were consistent in
that they were statistically poor predictors of robbery. Although income satisfac-
tion is a significant predictor in two regression models, they have opposing va-
lences. The ICVS model finds a negative relationship while the European
Sourcebook reports a positive relationship. Lifestyle, too, in the ICVS regression
model departs from other models by generating a theoretically unexpected nega-
tive relationship in the prediction of robbery rates.
Assault. Table Ten presents the results of an OLS regression on assault. Most
theoretical variables are statistically poor predictors of assault across all data
sources. Only two variables were significantly predictive of assault in more than
a single model: divorce and modernization.
Regression equations for the European Sourcebook data generated many sta-
tistically significant models finding the theoretical variables ethnic homogene-
ity, income satisfaction, and female activity rate to be predictive of assault rates.
Surprisingly, however, ethnic homogeneity was positively related to assault.
This measure was negatively associated to all other forms of violence tested pre-
viously (i.e., homicide, rape, robbery).
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UN CRIME SURVEY (ln) INTERPOL (ln)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls
Divorces .37 [.01] -.03 [.01] .12 [.01] .19 [.01] .55* [.01] -.10 [.01] .01 [.01] .41 [.01]
% Under 15 Years (ln) -.17 [1.02] .21 [.96] .10 [.79] .09 [2.29] .00 [1.07] .24 [1.26] .13 [.91] .13 [1.99]
% Ethnic Homogeneity (sq) -.33 [.00] -.48* [.00] -.45** [.00] -.23 [.00] .14 [.00] -.10 [.00] -.33 [.00] .35 [.00]
Inequality
Gender Inequality .68*** [.13] .83** [.15]
Top 20 Percent .16 [.03] .29 [.03]
Modernization
Level of Modernization .65***[.16] .85** [.20]
Opportunity
Lifestyle .65** [.17] .52* [.14]
Female Economic Activity -.04 [.03] -.05 [.02]
(N) 27 17 18 20 27 15 17 20
Constant 4.79 [3.54] -1.51 [3.24] 1.34 [2.59] .11 [6.19] .18 [3.79] -3.23 [4.35] 1.25 [3.47] -3.131** [6.16]
Adjusted R2 .27* .67** .73*** -.43* .18 .62* .55** .50**
Table 8. OLS regression of rape
* p≤ .05 ** p≤ .01 *** p≤ .001
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets.
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EUROPEAN SOURCEBOOK (ln) ICVS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls
Divorces .65 [.01] -.09 [.01] .41 [.01] .39 [.01] .39 [.01] .05 [.01] .45 [.01] .34 [.01]
% Under 15 Years (ln) .00 [1.00] .72**[1.17] .06 [.96] .43 [1.77] .02 [1.33] .03 [1.90] -.25 [1.98] -.10 [1.57]
% Ethnic Homogeneity (sq) .11 [.00] -.11* [.00] -.32 [.00] .36 [.00] .08 [.00] .09 [.00] -.15 [.00] .09 [.00]
Inequality
Gender Inequality .57* [.12] -.18 [.16]
Top 20 Percent -.06 [.02] .51 [.03]
Modernization
Level of Modernization .54* [.21] -.15 [.20]
Opportunity
Lifestyle .35 [.15] -.21 [.12]
Female Economic Activity .08 [.02] .19 [.02]
(N) 21 13 14 17 22 16 15 22
Constant .51 [3.39] -11.84* [3.65] 1.65 [3.26] -8.70 [5.36] -.06 [4.21] -2.23 [6.04] 4.15 [5.85] .86 [4.44]
Adjusted R2 .27* .78** .64** .40 .00 -.02 -.20 -.05
Table 8. OLS regression of rape (continued)
* p≤ .05 ** p≤ .01 *** p≤ .001
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets.
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Violence against women index (HEUNI)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls
Divorces .41* [.21] .11 [.21] .11 [.30] .19 [.21]
% Under 15 Years (ln) -.04 [25.14] .45*[28.18] .20 [27.77] .08 [50.97]
% Ethnic Homogeneity (sq) -.21 [.00] -.17 [.00] -.27 [.00] .04 [.00]
Inequality
Gender Inequality .58* [3.85]
Top 20 Percent .09 [.83]
Modernization
Level of Modernization .57* [5.51]
Opportunity
Lifestyle .49* [4.03]
Female Economic Activity .25 [.79]
(N) 29 17 19 22
Constant 61.50 [86.55] -152.841[95.12] -13.71[91.79] -50.42 [144.42]
Adjusted R2 .18* .50* .37* .26
Table 8. OLS regression of rape (continued)
* p≤ .05 ** p≤ .01 *** p≤ .001
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets.
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UN CRIME SURVEY INTERPOL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls
Divorces .56** [.37] .24 [.57] .09 [.56] .54* [.47] .65***[.37] .52* [.65] .25 [.52] .80***[.45]
% Under 15 Years (ln) -.14 [41.46] .13 [117.70] .03 [51.95] -.23 [125.34] -.15 [44.59] .02 [134.01] -.03 [48.37] .11[110.88]
% Ethnic Homogeneity (sq) -.32 [.00] -.40 [.00] -.40 [.00] -.28 [.01] -.10 [.00] -.10 [.01] -.15 [.00] -.10 [.00]
Inequality
Income Satisfaction .18 [16.99] .37 [19.34]
Top 20 Percent .42* [2.01] .35 [2.29]
Modernization
Level of Modernization .49* [10.32] .60**[9.60]
Opportunity
Lifestyle .13 [8.95] .27 [8.74]
Female Economic Activity .26 [1.97] -.35 [1.81]
% Handgun Ownership (ln) .36 [14.01] .20 [13.70]
(N) 27 18 18 20 29 18 19 22
Constant 163.28
[143.78]
-332.91
[375.23]
79.83
[171.32]
257.69
[326.55]
141.53
[153.50]
264.31
[427.24]
77.22
[159.88]
-30.06
[302.86]
Adjusted R2 .52*** .53* .35* .50* .47*** .46* .46* .52**
Table 9. OLS regression on robbery
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EUROPEAN SOURCEBOOK ICVS (ln)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls
Divorces .57* [.49] .09 [.88] -.08 [.64] .62* [.65] .22 [.01] .06 [.01] .36 [.01] .25 [.01]
% Under 15 Years (ln) -.02 [68.43] .10[163.11] .17 [51.72] .05[155.47] -.06 [1.69] -.17 [1.59] -.19 [2.42] -.34 [1.54]
% Ethnic Homogeneity (sq) -.17 [.01] -.65 [.01] -.64* [.01] -.26 [.01] -.43 [.00] -.37 [.00] -.44 [.00] -.35 [.00]
Inequality
Income Satisfaction .62*[26.39] -.59** [.23]
Top 20 Percent .14 [3.03] .21 [.03]
Modernization
Level of Modernization .91**[11.30] -.48 [.24]
Opportunity
Lifestyle .35 [15.34] -.64** [.12]
Female Economic Activity -.24 [2.42] .41 [.03]
% Handgun Ownership (ln) .17 [20.41] .27 [.19]
(N) 21 14 14 17 22 18 15 22
Constant 57.26
[231.27]
-193.85
[504.27]
94.81
[175.21]
58.18
[479.95]
2.22
[5.32]
5.25
[5.06]
4.48
[7.15]
4.91
[4.20]
Adjusted R2 .34* .41 .73** .32 .12 .44* .09 .49**
Table 9. OLS regression on robbery (continued)
* p≤ .05 ** p≤ .01 *** p≤ .001
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets.
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UN CRIME SURVEY (ln) INTERPOL (ln)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls
Divorces .30 [.01] .05 [.03] -.01 [.02] .53* [.01] .09 [.01] -.02 [.02] -.19 [.02] .20 [.02]
% Under 15 Years (ln) -.07 [1.77] .36 [8.59] .32 [2.29] .07 [3.45] .04 [1.61] .38 [3.84] .51* [1.74] .50 [3.89]
% Ethnic Homogeneity (sq) .45 [.00] .63 [.00] .54 [.00] .36 [.00] -.01 [.00] .00 [.00] .00 [.00] .01 [.00]
Inequality
Income Satisfaction .13 [1.02] .47 [.55]
Top 20 Percent .18 [.15] .09 [.07]
Modernization
Level of Modernization .47 [.37] .63* [.35]
Opportunity
Lifestyle .35 [.24] .18 8 [.31]
Female Economic Activity -.59* [.05] -.31 [.06]
% Handgun Ownership (ln) .38 [.37] .04 [.48]
(N) 18 12 13 14 29 18 19 22
Constant 2.67 [5.93] -19.16 [25.77] -5.19 [7.29] 3.73 [9.79] 2.67 [5.56] -14.11[12.25] -7.64 [5.77] -11.44[10.62]
Adjusted R2 .09 -.23 .13 .55 -.11 .04 .29 -.11
Table 10. OLS regression on assault
* p≤ .05 ** p≤ .01 *** p≤ .001
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets.
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EUROPEAN SOURCEBOOK (ln) ICVS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls
Divorces .49* [.01] .51* [.02] .23 [.02] .45* [.01] .29 [.01] -.31 [.02] -.27 [.03] .10 [.02]
% Under 15 Years (ln) -.01 [1.88] .09 [2.80] .27 [1.29] .26 [2.63] .11 [3.38] .53 [4.04] .61 [4.44] -.12 [4.06]
% Ethnic Homogeneity (sq) .51* [.00] .22 [.00] .25 [.00] .38 [.00] -.05 [.00] -.04 [.00] -.17 [.00] -.04 [.00]
Inequality
Income Satisfaction .76** [.45] -.30 [.58]
Top 20 Percent -.17 [.05] .34 [.07]
Modernization
Level of Modernization .77** [.28] -.25 [.44]
Opportunity
Lifestyle .65** [.26] -.11 [.32]
Female Economic Activity -.34 [.04] .47 [.07]
% Handgun Ownership (ln) .15 [.34] .03 [.50]
(N) 21 14 14 17 22 18 15 22
Constant .39 [6.36] 5.81 [8.64] -4.64 [4.36] -6.47 [8.10] -1.28 [10.65] -18.99  [12.87] -19.10[13.13] 2.91 [11.08]
Adjusted R2 .18 .72 .77 .69 -.04 .10 .19 -.05
Table 10. OLS regression on assault (continued)
* p≤ .05 ** p≤ .01 *** p≤ .001
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets.
54
Burglary. Table Eleven presents the results of an OLS regression on burglary.
First, among the theoretical variables, modernization and lifestyle were signifi-
cantly related to burglary in three out of five regression models from different
data sources. Income satisfaction was significant in two models. Second, all of
the significant predictors exhibited a positive relationship. Third, divorce
emerged as a significant control variable in several equations calculated for the
European Sourcebook and Interpol regression series. Again, the ICVS regres-
sion series produced no significant models or predictors of burglary.
Auto Theft. Table Twelve presents the results of an OLS regression on auto
theft. There was a high degree of consistency between data sets. First, the in-
equality model explained the most amount of variance among all regression
models tested. Income satisfaction and modernization were significant predic-
tors of auto theft for four data series.6 Lifestyle was also a significant predictor
but for only one model. Finally, the ICVS models failed to duplicate the robust
relationships observed in other data series tested.
Major theft. Table Thirteen below presents the results of an OLS regression on
major theft. The UN Survey and Interpol data converge on most models finding
no significant relationships between the independent variables and theft with the
exception of modernization (for the Interpol model only). Results from the Euro-
pean Sourcebook depart from other official data sources finding divorce, ethnic
homogeneity, income satisfaction, and lifestyle to be significant predictors of
major theft.
Drug-Related Offenses. Table Fourteen presents the results of an OLS regres-
sion on drug-related offenses. There is a remarkable amount of agreement
among the three official data sources. All three data series find income satisfac-
tion, modernization, and lifestyle to be statistically significant predictors of
drug-related offenses. Among all crimes analyzed in this study, the greatest level
of agreement between data series exists with the prediction of drug-related of-
fenses.
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6 The standardized coefficient for modernization in the European Sourcebook model is above 1.00 in value indicating a
problem with collinearity. Caution is warranted in interpreting this statistic because collinearity increases the chance
of committing a Type I error (failure to find a statistically significant relationship when one exists) and renders com-
parisons between beta coefficients, to determine relative explanatory strength, impossible.
UN CRIME SURVEY INTERPOL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls
Divorces .44 [7.69] .32 [5.71] .01 [8.18] .20 [5.65] .47* [5.82] .39** [3.82] .08 [5.66] .28* [3.63]
% Under 15 Years (ln) -.06 [1025.93] -.24 [1625.20] .07[807.07] -.14 [1616.53] -.17 [698.46] -.31* [1003.67] .07[535.31] -.03[1055.40]
% Ethnic Homogeneity (sq) .31 [.08] .26 [.05] .30 [.06] .31 [.05] .32 [.06] .18 [.03] .33* [.04] .29* [.04]
Inequality
Income Satisfaction .83** [206.85] .88*** [113.39]
Top 20 Percent .13 [37.22] .01 [13.21]
Modernization
Level of Modernization .82**[127.49] .84***[98.34]
Opportunity
Lifestyle .79**[99.49] .78***[65.30]
Female Economic Activity .09 [29.23] -.09 [13.41]
(N) 18 13 14 14 26 17 18 20
Constant 506.18
[3,323.31]
2,633.28
[5,446.85]
-560.77
[2,565.20]
2,914.10
[4,463.87]
1,321.99
[2,383.79]
5,574.14
[3,079.19]
-725.71
[1,788.52]
1031.13
[3,039.59]
Adjusted R2 .00 .74 .52 .68 .21 .84 .69 .76
Table 11. OLS regression on burglary
* p≤ .05 ** p≤ .01 *** p≤ .001
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets.
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EUROPEAN SOURCEBOOK ICVS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls
Divorces .63* [5.59] .81* [6.90] .15 [15.58] .43* [4.43] -.12 [.01] -.10 8 [.02] -.04 [.03] -.02 [.01]
% Under 15 Years (ln) .06 [974.50] .04 [1,460.29] .72 [2,612.26] .14 [1,201.17] -.14 [3.02] -.16 [4.04] -.17 [4.97] -.38 [3.34]
% Ethnic Homogeneity (sq) .50 [.08] .44 [.08] .85 [.19] .29 [.07] -.39 [.00] -.38 [.00] -.33 [.00] -.37 [.00]
Inequality
Income Satisfaction .55 [258.62] -.24 [.58]
Top 20 Percent -.33 [23.23] .24 [.07]
Modernization
Level of Modernization .35 [177.29] .04 [.49]
Opportunity
Lifestyle .64** [125.27] -.24 [.26]
Female Economic Activity -.05 [15.24] .44 [.05]
(N) 18 12 12 15 22 18 15 22
Constant -1,603.11
[3,200.77]
-1,814.21
[4,109.28]
-11,182.11
[8,407.76]
-2,277.07
[3,740.39]
8.58
[9.52]
9.84
[12.87]
9.97
[14.72]
12.57
[9.46]
Adjusted R2 .27 .70 .58 .68 .00 -.06 -.28 .07
Table 11. OLS regression on burglary (continued)
* p≤ .05 ** p≤ .01 *** p≤ .001
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets.
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BURGLARY INDEX (HEUNI)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls
Divorces .20 [.24] .05 [.34] -.26 [.33] -.02 [.27]
% Under 15 Years (ln) .04 [35.93] .20 [70.42] .36 [33.93] .10 [63.01]
% Ethnic Homogeneity (sq) -.10 [.00] -.09 [.00] .07 [.00] .01 [.00]
Inequality
Income Satisfaction .43 [10.19]
Top 20 Percent .07 [1.23]
Modernization
Level of Modernization .71**[5.51]
Opportunity
Lifestyle .26 [5.11]
Female Economic Activity .36 [.97]
(N) 25 17 17 21
Constant 31.77 [117.74] -119.68 [226.89] -86.29[107.10] -68.13  [178.86]
Adjusted R2 -.07 -.11 .30 -.01
Table 11. OLS regression on burglary (continued)
* p≤ .05 ** p≤ .01 *** p≤ .001
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets.
58
UN CRIME SURVEY INTERPOL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls
Divorces .18 [2.73] .03 [2.05] -.29 [2.17] -.07 [2.07] .07 [2.45] -.04 [2.46] -.40* [2.77] -.12 [2.50]
% Under 15 Years (ln) -.12 [299.83] .00 [443.16] .26 [203.44] -.04 [445.34] -.04 [303.63] -.04 [506.42] .28 [258.83] -.17 [505.36]
% Ethnic Homogeneity (sq) .19 [.03] .02 [.02] .04 [.02] .13 [.02] .11 [.03] -.13 [.02] -.11 [.02] -.02 [.02]
Inequality
Income Satisfaction .90***[65.90] .84***[73.09]
Top 20 Percent .03 [11.65] .03 [8.66]
Modernization
Level of Modernization .95***[40.42] .83***[51.39]
Opportunity
Lifestyle .73*[66.79] .67 [83.73]
Female Economic Activity .13 [7.50] .21 [8.73]
% Own Car .17 [3.95] .07 [4.97]
(N) 26 17 18 19 28 18 19 22
Constant 462.22
[1,041.84]
-941.37
[1,526.13]
-658.76
[670.96]
100.39
[1,304.68]
247.43
[1,043.80]
318.80
[1,614.51]
654.13
[855.44]
924.46
[1,583.45]
Adjusted R2 -.05 .74*** .68*** .69*** -.10 .59** .51** .42*
Table 12. OLS regression on auto theft
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* p≤ .05 ** p≤ .01 *** p≤ .001
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets.
EUROPEAN SOURCEBOOK ICVS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls
Divorces .31 [2.76] .05 [3.17] -.50 [5.12] -.08 [2.57] -.03 [.01] .06 [.01] -.01 [.01] -.08 [.01]
% Under 15 Years (ln) -.03  [448.78] .02[590.02] .11 [342.30] -.13 [570.02] -.35 [1.61] -.55 [1.90] -.52 [2.23] -.43 [1.99]
% Ethnic Homogeneity (sq) .41 [.04] .01 [.04] .18 [.05] .21 [.03] -.43 [.00] -.46 [.00] -.38 [.00] -.43 [.00]
Inequality
Income Satisfaction .87**[95.44] .13 [.27]
Top 20 Percent -.04 [10.96] .10 [.03]
Modernization
Level of Modernization 1.14**[93.95] .21 [.22]
Opportunity
Lifestyle .76 [96.85] -.09 [.33]
Female Economic Activity .24 [9.78] .11 [.03]
% Own Car -.04 [6.09] -.07 [.02]
(N) 19 14 13 17 22 18 15 22
Constant -150.84
[1,477.68]
-822.43
[1,824.10]
-377.94
[1,166.32]
613.90
[1,895.43]
8.41
[5.07]
11.63
[6.07]
10.99
[6.60]
9.50
[6.22]
Adjusted R2 .02 .63 .51 .56 .00 .05 -.05 -.16
Table 12. OLS regression on auto theft (continued)
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* p≤ .05 ** p≤ .01 *** p≤ .001
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets.
Motor Vehicle Theft Index (HEUNI)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls
Divorces .10 [.23] -.15 [.22] -.41* [.27] .11 [.24]
% Under 15 Years (ln) -.26 [27.51] -.07 [44.68] .19 [25.63] -.26 [48.78]
% Ethnic Homogeneity (sq) .02 [.00] -.20 [.00] -.14 [.00] -.07 [.00]
Inequality
verflowIncome Satisfaction .79***[6.45]
Top 20 Percent .15 [.76]
Modernization
Level of Modernization .83***[5.09]
Opportunity
Lifestyle -.07 [8.08]
Female Economic Activity .51 [.84]
% Own Car .80 [.48]
(N) 29 18 19 22
Constant 137.09
[94.70]
14.92
[142.45]
1.68
[84.70]
49.82
[152.84]
Adjusted R2 -.03 .56** .50** .36*
Table 12. OLS regression on auto theft (continued)
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* p≤ .05 ** p≤ .01 *** p≤ .001
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets.
UN CRIME SURVEY (ln) INTERPOL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls
Divorces .26 [.02] .27 [.15] -.01 [.05] .11 [.03] .38 [4.64] .28 [8.09] .01 [7.51] .48 [5.14]
% Under 15 Years (ln) -.32 [2.72] -.07 [36.65] .11 [9.69] -.08 [9.21] -.33 [604.77] -.33[2025.39] -.12 [856.28] -.07[1341.78]
% Ethnic Homogeneity (sq) .12 [.00] .23 [.00] .28 [.00] .16 [.00] -.09 [.05] -.16 [.07] -.08 [.06] -.22 [.06]
Inequality
Income Satisfaction .65 [1.55] .53 [267.84]
Top 20 Percent -.09 [.49] .20 [26.87]
Modernization
Level of Modernization .44 [.80] .63* [140.30]
Opportunity
Lifestyle .56 [.56] .33 [113.83]
Female Economic Activity .30 [.10] .49 [21.44]
(N) 14 8 10 10 25 15 16 19
Constant 11.26
[9.20]
5.59
[92.67]
-.53
[28.58]
13.10
[26.71]
3352.12
[2,062.69]
5591.60
[6,177.44]
2041.68
[2,746.36]
4124.32
[4,061.95]
Adjusted R2 .00 -.83 -.38 -.03 .25* .16 .30 .36
Table 13. OLS regression on major theft
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* p≤ .05 ** p≤ .01 *** p≤ .001
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets.
EUROPEAN SOURCEBOOK
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls
Divorces .50* [20.51] .16 [46.21] -.01 [47.22] .08 [15.41]
% Under 15 Years (ln) -.11 [2,908.39] .23 [8,626.16] .23 [3,654.86] -.01 [3,985.48]
% Ethnic Homogeneity (sq) .52* [.28] .14 [.53] .00 [.62] .38 [.23]
Inequality
nIncome Satisfaction .78*[1,414.88]
Top 20 Percent -.08 [124.96]
Modernization
Level of Modernization .87 [1,243.31]
Opportunity
Lifestyle .65*** [351.55]
Female Economic Activity .28 [53.47]
(N) 20 13 13 16
Constant -97.18
[9,775.40]
-25,157.53
[26,147.69]
-5,581.50
[10,718.59]
-5,380.92
[11,843.65]
Adjusted R2 .25 .50 .36 .74**
Table 13. OLS regression on major theft (continued)
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* p≤ .05 ** p≤ .01 *** p≤ .001
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets.
UN CRIME SURVEY (ln) INTERPOL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls
Divorces .08 [.02] .10 [.02] -.12 [.02] .11 [.01] .22 [.01] .20 [.01] .04 [.01] .21 [.01]
% Under 15 Years (ln) .09 [1.80] .24 [3.66] .22 [1.66] .46 [3.81] -.04 [1.60] .15 [2.61] .09 [1.39] .14 [2.91]
% Ethnic Homogeneity (sq) -.04 [.00] .03 [.00] -.13 [.00] .08 [.00] .09 [.00] .08 [.00] -.05 [.00] .17 [.00]
Inequality
Income Satisfaction .78***[.53] .87***[.38]
Top 20 Percent .18 [.06] .15 [.04]
Modernization
Level of Modernization .82***[.33] .82***[.28]
Opportunity
Lifestyle .69** [.27] .73** [.23]
Female Economic Activity -.46 [.06] -.21 [.05]
% Handgun Ownership (ln) .19 [.43] .15 [.36]
(N) 27 18 18 20 29 18 19 22
Constant 1.21 [6.26] -17.94[11.66] -1.41 [5.47] -12.95[[9.94] 3.84 [5.52] -11.56 [8.31] 1.96 [4.60] -.67 [7.95]
Adjusted R2 -.11 .52* .53** .45 -.06 .69*** .59** .50**
Table 14. OLS regression of drug-related offences
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* p≤ .05 ** p≤ .01 *** p≤ .001
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets.
EUROPEAN SOURCEBOOK
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls
Divorces .33 [.02] .02 [.02] -.30 [.04] .28 [.02]
% Under 15 Years (ln) .16 [3.03] .31 [3.65] .40 [6.34] .25 [4.12]
% Ethnic Homogeneity (sq) .53 [.00] .09 [.00] .02 [.00] .43 [.00]
Inequality
Income Satisfaction .85***[.59]
Top 20 Percent .22 [.07]
Modernization
Level of Modernization .99** [.49]
Opportunity
Lifestyle .57* [.41]
Female Economic Activity -.17 [.06]
% Handgun Ownership (ln) .22 [.54]
(N) 20 14 13 17
Constant -6.41 [9.96] -24.82 [11.28] -10.32[20.23] -11.35[12.71]
Adjusted R2 .07 .69** .58* .48*
Table 14. OLS regression of drug-related offences (continued)
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* p≤ .05 ** p≤ .01 *** p≤ .001
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets.
3.7 Discussion and conclusions
In this chapter, we were concerned with answering three main questions. First,
concerned about the reliability and validity of popular cross-national measures
of crime, we inquired whether official measures of national crime rates substan-
tially agree with one another and with victimization data from the ICVS in their
representations of criminal offending. Second, owing to observations reported in
the extant comparative criminological literature concerning the unique causal
mechanisms linked to violent and nonviolent crime, we asked whether key con-
cepts from modernization, inequality, and opportunity theory differentially ex-
plain violent and nonviolent crime rates. Finally, because previous studies in the
vein of comparative criminology have used a variety of data sources with which
to construct dependent variables, we examined whether measures of theoretical
concepts explained more or less variation in crime rates depending upon the
source of the crime data.
Turning to the first question, we learned generally that official measures of
crime are mostly consistent in their depictions of crime rates while official mea-
sures and victimization measures were typically in disagreement. For violent
crime, we saw that the official measures of rape were correlated strongly (r=.92
to r=.97) while measures of robbery were moderately associated (r=.83 to r=.85)
and measures of homicide were modestly to strongly related (r=.60 to r=.91).
Among the official measures of crime, the poorest measures of association were
obtained for indicators of assault (r=.34 to r=.68), which probably results from
the variation with which assault is defined and treated by police cross-nationally.
With respect to the association between official and victimization measures, we
observed that there was little agreement between the two types of data. The only
significant correlation results from the UN Survey and ICVS measures of rob-
bery, although this coefficient was rather weak. As for nonviolent crime, we once
again found significant consistency among the official measures, although for
these crime types the measures of association were less robust. Official measures
of drug-related crimes were correlated moderately (r=.81 or r=.82) while auto
theft (r=.76 to r=.97), burglary (r=.66 to r=.93), and major theft (r=.49 to r=.79)
displayed more range in the resulting coefficients. While the ICVS measures of
auto theft were modestly related to those derived from the UN Survey (r=.39,
p=.04) and European Sourcebook (r=.43, p=.02), suggesting that official and
victimization sources are in agreement with respect to their renderings of this
form of crime, no such relationship was uncovered for official and victimization
measures of burglary. In conclusion, we can say that the official measures dem-
onstrate a reasonable degree of reliability. However, this finding says nothing
about their accuracy. As every introduction to methodology textbook reports ear-
nestly, data may be consistently wrong in their depiction of “reality.” That so lit-
tle agreement is found between the official and victimization measures leads us
to suspect the validity of standard measures of cross-national crime. While it is
true that one type of crime data may be more accurate than the other, it is almost
impossible to know for sure from only two types of data series. Indeed, a firmer
answer to the question of validity will have to await a more complete application
of the notion of triangulation, and as the name suggests this exercise will require
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at least three different types of crime data, each with their own sources of error.
Perhaps a robust effort to implement rigorous cross-national self-report studies
of crime will help to resolve this problem in the future.
With respect to the second question, we found that homicide rates tend to be
negatively related to income satisfaction, modernization, and lifestyle while the
other measures of violent and nonviolent crime tend to be positively related to
these same variables. In other words, homicide rates seem to be highest in those
nations where people are generally dissatisfied with their income (a measure of
inequality for purposes of this study), modernization has not been achieved fully,
and folks tend to live with others and stay at home in the evenings. However,
other forms of violent crime, such as rape and robbery, as well as nonviolent
crimes are more likely to occur in nations where people are satisfied with their in-
comes (or in the rape models where gender equality is high), modernization has
occurred,7 and folks tend to live alone and go out in the evenings. These out-
comes are consistent with the reports of previous studies in which the causal
pathways for violent and nonviolent crime seem to be different (Bennett, 1991;
LaFree, 1999; LaFree and Kick, 1986; Messner, 1986). In conclusion, these re-
sults lend support to the injunction of Groves and Newman (1989) against gen-
eral theory in comparative criminology and should serve to encourage the devel-
opment of more tightly and narrowly specified theoretical accounts for cross-na-
tional variations in criminal behavior.
Looking finally at our third question, we have seen that the relationships be-
tween key explanatory variables and measures of crime are dependent in impor-
tant ways on the data source for the dependent variables. Generally speaking,
few of the theoretical variables explained much of the variance in cross-national
criminal offending reported by the ICVS data series and when these variables
achieved statistical significance, their valences were in the opposite direction of
those returned in the models using official data. Even within the official mea-
sures, however, depending upon the data source that one chose to employ, one
might reach fundamentally different conclusions regarding the efficacy of par-
ticular theoretical indicators. Consider, for example, the regressions of homicide
measures. While the UN Survey models show divorce (+), income satisfaction
(-), top 20 percent in income/consumption (+), modernization (-), and lifestyle
(-) to be significant predictors of cross-national variations in homicide rates,
none of these variables emerge as significant in the models using Interpol data.
Or consider, for another example, the regression of burglary measures. Exam-
ining the UN Survey models, we see that income satisfaction (+), modernization
(+), and lifestyle (+) are significant predictors of cross-national variations in bur-
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7 On the suggestion of our colleagues in the HEUNI expert group, we included a measure of the rate with which crimes
are reported to the police taken from the ICVS (i.e., percent reporting contact crime to the police for the rape/sexual as-
sault, robbery, assault models or percent reporting all crime to police for all other dependent variables) as well as a
measure of police efficiency (i.e., conviction rates per 100,000 for each type of crime divided by police personnel rates
per 100,000) in order to see whether the observed relationships between modernization and cross-national variations
in crime rates might be washed away. While the number of cases available for the regression models was reduced dras-
tically in some cases and multicollinearity was an obvious problem, these two measures did mediate the relationship
between modernization and crime rates in a number of models. As indicated by our colleagues, these findings suggest
that the modernization-crime relationship may be spurious, attributable perhaps to the better reporting practices of po-
lice agencies in modernized nations. Of course, this possibility deserves more refined attention in further analyses.
glary rates while the European Sourcebook models yield significant coefficients
for divorce (+) and lifestyle (+). In conclusion, the results of the present study in-
dicate that the choice of data source from which dependent variables are gleaned
can have a measurable impact on the support, or lack thereof, for different theo-
retical stances in comparative criminology.
We began this chapter by indicating that our purpose in carrying out the re-
ported analyses was to understand cross-national variations of crime rates in Eu-
rope and North America during the middle of the 1990s. Addressing three main
questions, we have concluded: (1) while official measures of cross-national
crime rates seem to be reliable, there is little evidence to support the validity of
either the official or victimization measures; (2) theoretical accounts of cross-na-
tional variation in crime rates need to take account of the types of crime that are
examined since some crimes seem to have distinct causal mechanisms at work;
and (3) theoretical accounts of cross-national variation in crime rates may yield
different pictures depending upon the source of crime data deployed. Taken to-
gether, these conclusions suggest that comparative criminologists should be es-
pecially careful when engaging in quantitative analyses and, further, that they
should pursue theoretical models that are more narrowly specified.
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4 Crime Trends: Europe and
North America
Kauko Aromaa and Seppo Leppä
4.1 Constructing indices of different types
of crime
In chapter one (section 1.6) the construction of crime indices was briefly de-
scribed. In this present chapter, the national scores on the indices are presented.
As reported previously, indices were constructed by averaging rank numbers on
the source variables. The procedure resulted in rank numbers for all countries
which responded to the relevant items. One advantage of making use of the indices
approach is that it enables a time series comparison of the results of both the Fifth
United Nations Survey, covering the time period 1990 to 1994 (see van Dijk, Block
and Ollus, 1998) and those of the Sixth Survey, covering the time period 1995 to
1997. As also explained in section 1.6 above the indices are based on a variety of
source variables. A list of these variables is found in annex B of this report.
As delineated in section 1.6 above the calculation of the indices results in a
scale of scores from 1 to 100. Comparison of score values should be strictly lim-
ited to analysing them over time, i.e. only horizontal examination is recom-
mended, not vertical one, involving comparison between countries. These cau-
tionary recommendations are based on the inherent problems related to the ques-
tionable quality of crime statistics, as already discussed in chapter one. This is
also the reason why only eight crime categories have been selected for the fol-
lowing time series analysis. The categories of crime settled upon are: burglary,
motor vehicle crime, petty crime, violent crimes (homicide, serious violence,
non-fatal violence, violence against women), and corruption.
4.2 The crime indices per country and
per crime category
As mentioned, the focus is on the possible change over time, particularly in cases
where remarkable changes in the score points can be observed1. A change of only
71
1 The national scores were not always available for the time periods in question, in which case the entry n.a. has been
written in the relevant column. This factor, naturally, renders the comparative effort impossible. In some cases the
score values may be based only on information on officially recorded crimes, i.e. responses to the United Nations Sur-
veys. Accordingly, in the context of coming excercises of this kind they should be checked against more reliable data,
based for example on future ICVS results.
a few score points can also be of relevance, for example at the extremely low end
of the scale, when at the opposite end only really marked changes of score points,
say more than fifteen units, ought to be taken as significant. In the tables of this
chapter, the mean values of the scores for the countries of the Central and Eastern
European region2, Western European region3, for the countries of North Amer-
ica, for the member states of the European Union, and also, for the time period of
1995-1997, for the applicant states of the EU are presented, as well. These aggre-
gated score values have been calculated with the idea in mind to look at the devel-
opments within larger regional areas.
4.3 Burglaries
Household burglaries can be viewed – more so than other types of crime – as a
cross-cultural phenomenon. The prevalence of burglary is apparently not to any
considerable extent influenced by country-specific opportunity structures. The
availability of targets is roughly the same everywhere. Previous analyses of the
ICVS data have shown that burglary rates are the best predictors of overall crime
victimization rates. If burglary rates in a country are high, the overall victimiza-
tion rate of the public also tends to be relatively high in that country (van Dijk,
1998a). It has also been established that national household burglary rates corre-
late highly with national burglary rates of business premises (van Dijk and
Terlouw, 1996).
Regionally, no great variations can be observed between the time periods
studied. When one looks at the national scores, the most significant downward
changes are found in Albania, with 48 points down, France (28 points down),
Latvia (26 points down), and Bulgaria and Italy (each approx. 20 points down).
These descending trends are balanced by the ascending tendencies in Switzer-
land (up 30 points), Germany and Lithuania (25 points), Norway (23 points), and
Scotland and Northern Ireland (approx. 20 points). On the other hand, the start-
ing positions of, for example, both Norway and Switzerland are very low if com-
pared with those of Bulgaria, Estonia and USA, which also show a downward
curve.
72
2 The accronym CEE is used in the tables for the countries of the Central and Eastern European region, which consists of
former socialist block states, including the former Soviet Union republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; as previously mentioned these countries have been included for reasons of comparison
with previous United Nations Survey analyses. The abandonment of these states should, however, be considered in the
future, since they geographically belong to the Central Asian region.
3 Also in this regional group reconsideration in terms of the countries included should perhaps be given some though. An
idea might be, in the future excercises of similar kind, to form an Estern Mediterranian sub-regional group consisting
of Cyprus, Israel and Turkey. The United Kingdom, on the other side, which consists of England and Wales, Northern
Ireland and Scotland, is in this analysis divided into those three constituent parts, owing to fact of different criminal
justice systems of their own The accronym WE stands for the countries of the Western European region, while NA de-
notes the North American countries, and EU, naturally the European Union member states. The EU applicant countries
are as follows: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia.
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Fig. 1. Burglary index
4.4 Motor vehicle crime
The average scores for motor vehicle crime – theft of or from a car – are quite
unsurprisingly higher in North America and the Western European region than in
the Central and Eastern European countries. In addition, the score points de-
creased in the Central and Eastern Europe, but increased in Western Europe. One
of the conclusions might be that an increasing number of cars have been stolen in
the West and taken over to the East, as confirmed by Liukkonen (1997).
A more detailed analysis reveals that when national scores over time are ex-
amined, some modifications seem to have taken place in this trafficking. In most
of the Central and Eastern European countries, a decreasing tendency seems to
be predominant, with Bulgaria in the lead with a drop of 36 score points, fol-
lowed by the Russian Federation (23 points). For the Western European region, a
more confused picture emerges. A steep downward trend is evident in several
countries, particularly in Denmark and Spain (down 31 and 27 score points re-
spectively), while in Germany, for example, which is regarded as one of the main
sources of the cars trafficked to the East, the decrease is fairly small, only six
points. At the same time an upward trend can be observed in the British Isles, the
Scandinavian countries except Denmark, and Switzerland. Improved theft-pre-
vention technology installed in new cars may serve as a partial explanation for
the developments.
4.5 Petty crimes
In the ICVS, the respondents who report victimizations are asked to assess the
seriousness of their own victimization on a three-point scale (very serious, some-
what serious, not very serious). The ranking of the types of crime in terms of seri-
ousness shows marked similarity across countries (van Dijk, 1998a). Car vandal-
ism, theft from garages, theft from a car, bicycle theft, indecent behaviour, at-
tempted burglary, personal theft and threats are considered least serious. It
should be noted that theft from cars is included in the index for motor vehicle
crime (see section 4.4 above). Our index for petty crimes consists of the percent-
age of respondents victimized by at least one of the five less serious types of
crime, i.e. car vandalism, theft of bicycle, theft of personal belongings, sexual of-
fensive behaviour (no assault), threats or of theft of a motorcycle (a type of crime
rated as moderately serious by the victims). Since police figures for less serious
crime are notoriously unreliable owing to widely varying legal definitions and
national reporting patterns, no attempt has been made to include official statis-
tics in the petty crimes index.
Excepting a few countries like England and Wales, and France where an up-
ward tendency is quite clear (France 25 score points, England and Wales 20
points), and Canada, Switzerland and USA where a downward trend is discern-
ible (Switzerland 23 score points, Canada 16 points and USA 14 points) no large
scale alterations are seen. The same holds true for the regional averages, natu-
rally. We see that the North American mean is down 15 score points, consistent
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Fig. 3. Petty crimes index
with the Canadian and US trends. A more detailed analysis of trends within indi-
ces could disclose important developments on this dimension as “petty crime”
admittedly is quite a non-analytical concept; there is no good reason to expect
that the different items included in the petty crime index would behave in a uni-
form manner over time.
4.6 Violent crimes
Four different indices were constructed for types of violent crime: non-fatal vio-
lent crime, homicide, serious violent crime and violence against women (includ-
ing serious sexual violence). Since the first three indices are strongly correlated
(see van Dijk, 1998b), only the national scores for serious violence and violence
against women indices are presented here. The data on non-fatal violence and
homicide are summarized below. (the index distributions as regards these
sub-categories of crime are presented in annex C).
The upward trend has been the most remarkable in Andorra and France, with
rise of 32 and 30 score points respectively. A more modest increase can be ob-
served in some of the CEE countries (Albania and Belarus, up 20 points, Mace-
donia and Moldova, up 17 points), but also for example in England and Wales (up
15 points), and Scotland (up 19 points). Some of the Western European countries
show the opposite trend, with Luxembourg (down 28 points), Norway (down 20
points), Sweden (down 18 points), Northern Ireland (down 16 points) and Spain
(down 15 points) as the lead countries. In the CEE region the greatest drop oc-
curred in Armenia (down 18 points), followed by Poland (down 13 points). Of
particular interest is the US development in this sector, with the downward
course of 11 points.
Homicide (for index distribution, see annex C, fig. I), as already disclosed, is
strongly correlated with the serious violence index. If the homicide index is used
as a separate individual analysis tool, it is worth remembering that when coun-
tries with no more than a few million inhabitants are considered, the homicide in-
dex is strongly influenced by the annual fluctuations in actual numbers of com-
mitted homicides. Two contrasting cases might illustrate the point: during the
time period in question, the homicide index of Northern Ireland dropped 53
score points, while in Scotland, there was an increase of 25 points. In Scotland,
the main factor behind the upward trend is quite probably the Dunblade mass
murder case in March 1996 with 18 people killed. For Northern Ireland, the on-
going peace negotiations during the latter part of the 1990s were quite probably
apt to decrease the number of homicides in that part of the United Kingdom. It is
more complicated, however, to try to find explanations for why the index goes up
32 score points in Andorra, 30 points in the Netherlands, 27 points in Belarus, 24
points in France, 23 in Macedonia, and 20 points in England and Wales, not to
mention the many minor upward changes. The downward trend, after Northern
Ireland, is steepest in Sweden, with 41 score points down, followed by Luxem-
bourg (28 points down), Belgium (24 points down), Malta (21 points down),
Switzerland (18 points down), Denmark and Italy (both 16 points down), and
Austria (15 points down). Should this result be interpreted to mean, for example,
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Fig. 4. Serious violence index
that the potential murderers kept on moving from Belgium and Luxembourg to
the Netherlands in the second half of the 1990s? On an aggregate level these
changes mean that in the Western European region the mean over time dropped 4
score points. At the same time the European mean dropped only one point, obvi-
ously mainly owing to the fact that the German score went up 14 points. In the
Central and Eastern European region, the downward tendency was most evident
in Armenia (18 score points down), in Georgia and in the Czech Republic (both
13 points down).
The non-fatal violence variable (for index distribution, see annex C, fig. II) is
based on the ICVS victimization rates for assaults and threats and for robbery.
The main “climbers” are France (35 score points up), and England and Wales (12
points up), whilst the United States leads the “descendig” group (16 score points
down), followed by Spain (11 points down) and Poland (9 points down). The sta-
tus of the United States also explains much of the downward trend of the North
American region (11 points down).
The 1990s trend in violence against women seems to be, with some excep-
tions, an increasing one in the Western European region, and the opposite one in
the CEE countries, while in North America, a relatively stable state of affairs pre-
vails.
It is a well-known fact that police statistics are not a reliable source of infor-
mation when determining the annual figures of actually committed offences in
this crime category (see e.g. Johnson, 1996). As a matter of fact, only those coun-
tries where the ICVS has been undertaken should qualify for the current analysis.
In a few of the countries, the figures are based on mere official rape statistics, and
would need further scrutiny. This is the case particularly with the four countries
ranked with the lowest indices. But since the analyses of the previous United Na-
tions Survey results are based on similar data, it was considered apposite for con-
tinuity’s sake to review the phenomenon also in this context. In the United King-
dom as a whole the upward tendency seems to be the most manifest (Northern
Ireland 59 score points up, England and Wales 26 points up, and Scotland 13
points up). Also France (29 points up), Belgium (24 points up), and Norway (22
points up) show a steep ascending course. The more remarkable downward
trends, perhaps with the exception of Denmark (28 points down), are more or less
questionable and would need more detailed examination.
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Fig. 5. Violence against women index
4.7 Corruption (taking of bribes by government
officials)
The corruption index is based on information from three independent sources
(cf. the list of variables, annex B). Somewhat surprisingly it was found that even
the ICVS ranking of street level corruption of public officials was strongly corre-
lated with the Transparency International ranking of corrupt practices as per-
ceived by the business sector (r=.86; n=11; p=0.001). This finding suggests that
corruption at different levels of society is somehow intercorrelated. Corruption
of the highest echelons seems to go hand in hand with street-level corruption.
The aggregated indices point to the fact that the region splits into two parts: in
the East, the phenomenon is considered to be quite widespread and to be rather
on the increase. In the West and in North America, the scores that are already
fairly low seem to be decreasing. More or less the same picture emerges when
changes in the indices over time of separate countries are studied. The only nota-
ble exceptions from this overall impression are the downward trend in Hungary
(down 17 score points) and, to a minor degree, the upward orientation of Den-
mark (up 14 points – although here we should take into account the quite low ini-
tial point of departure of that country). Correctly positioned, at the far ends of the
dimensions are on one side Ukraine (up 18 points), and Belgium (down 35
points), on the other, followed by Portugal, and England and Wales (17 points
down). It should perhaps also be pointed out that in this crime dimension, the
lack of data is fairly manifest.
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5 The Operation of Criminal Justice
Systems
Pat Mayhew
5.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses a variety of indicators relating to the operation of criminal
justice systems across a wide range of countries in Western and Central Europe
and North America. The data mainly comes from countries’ replies to the Sixth
United Nations Survey (the Sixth Survey hereon), but use is also made of addi-
tional material from the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS hereon). Use
is made of three indices derived from the (analysis of the Fifth Survey results)
Sixth Survey: the Gender Balance Index, the Citizen Evaluation of Police Perfor-
mance Index, and the Corruption Index (see: Kangaspunta, Joutsen and Ollus,
1998). (Each of these indices has been adapted slightly by the author, and they
are described more in due course.)
Much of the analysis in this chapter mirrors that done by Ineke Haen Marshall
(1998) when she looked at equivalent data from the Fifth United Nations Survey.
For instance, use is made of simple summary measures for two groupings of
countries: (i) Central and Eastern Europe;1 and (ii) countries in Western Europe
(including Israel and Turkey), to which are added the USA and Canada.2 For con-
venience, the latter group are called ‘Western’ countries. Obviously, there are
important differences between individual countries within the two groups, but
the classification nonetheless proves to be discriminating.3 Other analysis of the
material from the UN Surveys on criminal justice resources was done by
Newman and Howard (1999b) in the Global Report on Crime and Justice. This
was based on all countries that responded to the survey, not just those in Europe
and North America.
Section 2 describes resourcing in terms of criminal justice personnel, looking
at police, prosecutors, judges, and correctional staff. Some attention is also paid
to the gender balance in personnel. Section 3 takes up various indicators of the
productivity of these personnel – for instance, how many suspects the police
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1 The Central and Eastern European countries covered are: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Ukraine. Data are
not available for all topics. No data are available for Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Yugoslavia.
2 The Western European countries comprise: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland Ireland, Israel, Italy, and Liechtenstein. Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the three UK countries. Again, data are not available for all topics.
3 Marshall also used means for two groupings of countries: (i) the European Union countries, and (ii) Central and East-
ern Europe countries. North America (the USA and Canada) and non EU Western countries were included in her total
means.
catch, and how many prosecutions and convictions are achieved. Section 4 looks
at other indicators of performance: citizen satisfaction with the police, and indi-
cators of corruption that may also spill over to criminal justice personnel. Section
5 brings the previous data together in terms of an overall measure of perfor-
mance. Section 6 provides a summary.
It should be emphasized that the comparability of indicators on the operation
of criminal justice systems is a major problem that could potentially compromise
many of the analyses in this chapter. The main difficulties are referred to at ap-
propriate points below. Highlighting them does not solve them of course, and
while some issues of comparability can be identified, there are no doubt many
others that cannot. The difficulties of international comparisons have been very
well rehearsed (see among many others, Newman and Howard, 1999a, and
Killias and Rau, 2000). Discussion of the material here in the main simply
touches again on the known problems.
5.2 Criminal justice resources
5.2.1 General points
The focus here is limited to four counts of criminal justice resources: police,
prosecutors, judges/magistrates, and correctional staff. Of course, crime control
can be seen as in the hands of a much wider range of people: for instance, private
security, policy makers, politicians, local authorities, community crime preven-
tion groups, probation officers, and other youth justice teams. The UN Survey
did not attempt to collect any information on total resources committed to crime
control – and indeed it is difficult to see how reliable information here would be
forthcoming. One important omission is private security: companies offering se-
curity services on a commercial basis. The numbers employed in private policing
are substantial: using data for selected countries from a survey by the Dutch Min-
istry of Justice, Marshall (1998) showed per capita rates to be about a third the
level of that of the police – a ratio which might now be conservative (see, e.g.
Sarre and Prenzler, 2000: Bayley, 1994).
Although the Sixth Survey collected budgetary information in relation to the
police, prosecution services, courts and correctional institutions, there is no
analysis of this here. There was much missing information, and the data are in lo-
cal currencies, making conversion to a standard unit tedious (and somewhat
problematic insofar as currency rates fluctuate across the counting period). Pur-
chasing power will also vary over time and from place to place. Of course, the
majority of criminal justice budgets will be spent on personnel, so the numbers of
staff involved will give a fair indication of the financial resources being set aside.
The count of criminal justice personnel was asked for from 54 countries in Eu-
rope and North America. Figures for 1995 and 1997 were requested. Some coun-
tries supplied data for both years, although some did so only for one of the two
(and this could vary according to category of personnel). Where data for both
years were available, the average has been taken in all analyses reported here. For
some countries not providing data for either 1995 or 1997, available information
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for 1994 from the Fifth Survey was used instead to increase the number and
range of countries for analysis.4 Some data for 1990 for the Netherlands and
Switzerland was also used. Table I in Annex B provides details of the year(s) to
which the data analysed in this chapter refers. There was least complete data on
prosecutors (15 countries missing). For each of the other three sectors, informa-
tion was missing for nine of the 54 countries.
It is important to note that what is counted within respective categories of per-
sonnel may differ somewhat across country, reflecting differences in the organi-
sation of law enforcement. More important still is that counts of personnel are
simply the most basic and tangible resource measure. They leave aside anything
to do with training, available technological support, or the quality of service staff
provide in terms of professionalism, equity, or moral integrity. How far these
other resource elements would alter the picture of investment in criminal justice
is impossible to say, though they certainly would to some degree.
5.2.2 The police
The Sixth Survey questionnaire defines police or law enforcement personnel as
those whose principal functions are the prevention, detection and investigation
of crime and the apprehension of alleged offenders. In some countries, these
functions are performed by paramilitary/military forces or by national security
forces. For this reason, the person completing the UN questionnaire is asked to
...try to focus your replies as much as possible on the civil police rather than on
the national guard or local militia. The questionnaire also specifies that …...if
there are many local forces, please provide data on those forces if possible. It
also asks that data concerning support staff (secretaries, clerks etc) should be ex-
cluded.5 Information was asked for by gender, as was the case for the three other
categories of criminal justice personnel.
Inspection of national responses to the question on police personnel suggests
caution is needed.
• Although countries were asked to exclude support staff, it may be that some
civilian staff remain included if there is no separate count of them, or they are
seen as performing the policing functions specified (e.g., crime laboratory
technicians). Employing civilians to perform some policing duties is, in fact,
an increasing trend in many developed countries.
• Some countries have complex policing systems which make a summary mea-
sure of ‘total police’difficult. There are particular problems in some countries
in differentiating between police and military personnel, with a substantial
overlap of function between them. The treatment of regulatory personnel
(e.g., those who investigate fraud) may also differ (cf. Nalla and Newman,
1993).
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4 The countries for which 1994 data were exclusively or mainly used were: Armenia, Austria, France, Hungary, Luxem-
bourg, Macedonia (FYR), Malta, Norway, and the Russian Federation.
5 The 1994 return asked for data on police personnel (sworn/uniform and civilian). For just under half the countries with
figures for 1994, as well as 1995 and 1997, the 1994 per capita policing rates were much higher. For the other countries
1994 rates were similar or even lower than in 1995 and 1997.
Table 1 shows the number of police per 100,000 population in 45 countries,
rank ordered. (Table II in Annex B shows further details.) The highest rates are in
the Russian Federation (1,225 police per 100,000 population, 1994 value) and
Kazakhstan (788). (Newman and Howard (1999b) reported a policing rate in be-
tween these for Singapore, well known for a high policing level.) The lowest rate
was in Finland (156), albeit this is a lower figure than in 1994 (232), so data qual-
ity may be an issue.
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Russian Federation 1,225 Macedonia 318
Kazakhstan 788 Germany 309
Northern Ireland 714 Ireland 300
Italy 544 Hungary 293
Cyprus 527 Luxembourg 276
Malta 507 Sweden 269
Lithuania 481 Poland 260
Ukraine 468 USA 253
Portugal 453 England & Wales 244
Croatia 427 Romania 240
Israel 424 Norway 231
Latvia 417 Iceland 226
Czech Rep. 415 Slovenia 224
Albania 408 Turkey 216
Armenia 405 Andorra 214
Scotland 370 Switzerland 202
Greece 370 Netherlands 196
Austria 367 Denmark 193
Slovakia 352 Liechenstein 190
France 349 Canada 183
Belgium 344 Moldova, Rep. of 164
Spain 338 Finland 156
Estonia 318
Police per 100,000 population
Median Mean Standard
deviation
CEE countries 405 424 249
Western countries 288 320 134
All countries 318 359 190
25% quartile 231
Median 318
75% quartile 417
Note
1 In most cases the average of 1995 and 1997 (see Table I in Annex B for details).
Table 1. Number of police per 100,000 population (1)
Some broad conclusions about policing levels are:
• Policing rates are generally higher in Central and Eastern European (CEE
hereon) countries, consistent with their having historically relied heavily on
state security forces to maintain order (cf. Bayley, 1985). Eleven of the 17
CEE countries have policing rates above the median.
• Italy, Cyprus, Malta, Portugal, and Israel are other countries with apparently
high policing rates. The same applies to Northern Ireland, although special
circumstances apply.
• Finland and Denmark have relatively low rates of police per capita; the rate in
Sweden and Norway (1994 value) were also below the Western Europe aver-
age. There were also three CEE countries with low rates: Moldova, Slovenia,
and Romania.
For the 45 countries all told, the median value was 318 police officers per
100,000 people – or one police employee for every 314 people. (Medians are
mainly used hereon as averages can be distorted by extreme values. Where
means are used, each country is given equal weight.) The median for CEE coun-
tries was 405, or one police employee for every 247 people. (Excluding the Rus-
sian Federation still gives a CEE median of 379.) In Western countries, the me-
dian was 288 (one police employee for every 347 people).
One explanation for differences in policing levels will be country differences
in the functions that police officers are expected to perform. But other factors
may also play a part. The level of development is one fairly commonly used cor-
relate. With the current selection of countries, there was a weak negative rela-
tionship between policing rates and the United Nations 1998 Human Develop-
ment Index (r =-0.27, p<0.10; n = 42). In other words, countries that scored lower
on the HDI tended to have rather more police officers per capita. This relation-
ship goes in the opposite direction to that found by Newman and Howard
(1999b) on a broader range of countries. It is also was somewhat fragile. For in-
stance, simply excluding the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan reduced the
correlation (to –0.11) to a non-statistically significant level.
There are three premises as regards the relationship between policing levels
and crime. The first is that a higher policing level curbs crime. The second –
working in the opposite direction – is that more police will be employed when
crime levels are high. The third premise (going in the same direction as the sec-
ond) is that more police officers increase the amount of crime recorded simply
because there is greater official capacity to record. On the basis of the present se-
lection of countries, assessing police per capita alongside the various Sixth Sur-
vey crime indices shows little support for either ‘more police equals less crime’,
or ‘more police equals more crime” – although the direction of the association
slightly more often supported the second position. The strongest relationship
was that higher policing levels were significantly associated with higher homi-
cide rates. Marshall also found the same, as did Newman and Howard (1999b) on
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the basis of a worldwide selection of countries. With the current data, the associ-
ation was boosted in particular by high levels of both police and homicide in the
Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Albania.6
5.2.3 Prosecutors
Comparing prosecutorial resources is arguably even more difficult than the po-
lice, as there can be markedly different arrangements for the organisation of
prosecutorial work. The majority of countries examined here have a civil law tra-
dition in which – to generalise broadly – the prosecution process involves the ju-
dicial police, prosecutors (or procurators), and examining magistrates/judges
(Reichel, 1994). In some instances the functions of prosecutors and judges are
the same. Essentially, a prosecution is brought on behalf of the state, and the
prosecutorial agencies tend to play more part in the investigation of cases. In
countries with a common law tradition, offenders are prosecuted on behalf of the
victim rather than the state. Of the 39 countries for which there was information
on numbers of prosecutors, five have a common law tradition.7 Within them,
though, there are differences. In England and Wales, for instance, the Crown
Prosecution Service instigates the prosecution, while in the United States the
prosecutor is a district attorney – an elected official.
The Sixth Survey offered advice for completing the questionnaire as follows:
Prosecution personnel may be understood to mean a government official
whose duty is to initiate and maintain criminal proceedings on behalf of the
state against persons accused of committing a criminal offence. In some coun-
tries, a prosecutor is a member of a separate agency; in others, a prosecutor is
a member of the police or judiciary. Please indicate the title of the agency in
your country under which the prosecutor functions. If more than one criminal
justice system operates in your country (e.g. federal/provincial systems or ci-
vilian/martial systems) please provide separate information about prosecuto-
rial functions in each system. Data concerning support staff (secretaries,
clerks etc) should be excluded.
The median number of prosecutors per 100,000 population, seven, is as one
would expect very much smaller than the median number of police – 45 timers
lower. Rates vary from three or less in Spain, the Netherlands, Austria and Ire-
land to nineteen or more in Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan and the Russian Fed-
eration (1994 data). Fifteen of the twenty countries in the top two quartiles are
CEE countries, and all but one (the USA) operate under civil law. The CEE coun-
tries have a median of 11 prosecutors per 100,000 – over double that in Western
ones (5). Newman and Howard (1999b) speculate that the higher figure may be
partly because prosecutors have a wide role in the processing of cases, and partly
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6 The correlation between homicide and per capita police levels overall was r = 0.36 (n = 42, p<0.02). Without the four
countries mentioned however, there was no statistical relationship (r = 0.02).
7 The common law countries are: England & Wales, Ireland, Israel, Scotland and the USA. Cyprus has an amalgam of
common and civil law (Reichel, 1994).
because prosecutors are career public servants and more likely to be reliably
counted. Table 2 shows the number of prosecutors per 100,000 population, rank
ordered. (Table III in Annex B shows further details.)
There tended to be more prosecutors per capita in countries classified as ‘me-
dium development’ on the HDI scale (the median was 12 per 100,000) than in
‘high development’ countries (6 per 100,000).
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Latvia 24 Slovenia 7
Lithuania 20 Bulgaria 7
Kazakhstan 20 Israel  (2) 7
Russian Federation 19 Luxembourg 7
Georgia 17 Croatia 7
Azerbaijan 16 Germany 6
Belarus 15 Cyprus 6
Sweden 14 Macedonia, FYR 5
Kyrgyzstan 12 Iceland 5
Moldova, Rep. of 12 Scotland 5
Hungary 11 Andorra 5
Slovakia 10 Finland 5
Estonia 10 Turkey 5
Portugal 10 England & Wales 4
Denmark 9 Greece 4
USA 9 Spain 3
Armenia 9 Netherlands 3
Romania 8 Austria (3) 2
Czech Rep. 8 Ireland 2
Belgium 7
Prosecutors per 100,000 population
Median Mean Standard
deviation
CEE countries 11 13 5
Western countries 6 6 3
All countries 9 9 5
25% quartile 5
Median 7
75% quartile 12
Notes
1 In most cases the average of 1995 and 1997 (see Table I in Annex B for details).
2 Israel: the figure includes police prosecutors.
3 Austria: total prosecutors do not include district prosecutors (the ‘Bereichsanwalt’).
Table 2. Number of prosecutors per 100,000 population (1)
5.2.4 Judges
Information was requested on both professional and lay judges and magistrates
(called ‘judges’ hereon). The advice for providing the information was as fol-
lows:
Professional judges or magistrates may be understood to mean both full and
part-time officials authorised to hear civil, criminal and other cases, includ-
ing in appeal courts, and make dispositions in a court of law. Please include in
that category associate judges and magistrates, who may be authorised as
above.
Lay judges and magistrates may be understood to mean persons who per-
form the same functions as professional judges or magistrates but who do re-
gard themselves, and are not normally considered by others, as career mem-
bers of the judiciary. Data concerning support staff (secretaries, clerks etc.)
should be excluded.
Lay judges
In some countries (and particularly so in Africa), the participation of lay people
in the justice process is notable. But the unpaid and sometimes informal role they
play may be one reason why statistical information is scarce. Only about a third
of countries here provided information on lay judges. Of the rest, few indicated
whether there were no lay judges to count, or no data available.
For the present countries, lay judges were more common in CEE countries
with a civil law tradition. (Estonia stands out in particular.) In countries making
comparatively high use of lay judges, they outnumbered professionals by around
a factor of five, although the ratio of lay judges to professionals was much higher
than this in Estonia, Scotland, and England and Wales. (Details are in Table IV in
Annex B).
Professional judges
There are large variations in the number of professional judges per capita (see
Table 3 and Table V in Annex B). At the low end, there were five or under per
100,000 population in Armenia, Ireland, Azerbaijan, Northern Ireland, the USA,
the Ukraine, and the UK. At the high end, there were over 25 in Switzerland,
Slovenia, Andorra, Croatia, Luxembourg and Germany. The rate in Switzerland
(70) was appreciably higher than elsewhere, although this was based on 1990 in-
formation. Unlike prosecutors, there was no marked difference between the CEE
countries and others, with the median rate of professional judges in the former
group (11) close to the rest (12). The majority of countries being compared here
operate under civil rather than common law, but all countries with judicial rates
around or above the median were civil law countries – in line with Newman and
Howard’s (1999b) worldwide analysis.
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Switzerland 70 Latvia 10
Slovenia 37 Norway 10
Andorra 32 Belarus 9
Croatia 28 Turkey 9
Luxembourg 27 Cyprus 9
Germany 26 Russian Federation 9
Macedonia, FYR 24 Spain 8
Czech Rep. 22 Netherlands 8
Slovakia 22 Malta 8
Hungary 21 Georgia 7
Greece 20 Kazakhstan 7
Austria 20 Israel 7
Finland 18 Kyrgyzstan 7
Iceland 17 Moldova, Rep. of 6
Italy 15 Scotland (2) 5
Estonia 14 England & Wales 4
Sweden 13 Ukraine 4
Romania 13 USA (3) 4
Lithuania 13 Northern Ireland 3
Bulgaria 12 Azerbaijan 3
Denmark 12 Ireland 3
Portugal 12 Armenia 3
Belgium 12
Judges and magistrates per 100,000 population
Median Mean Standard
deviation
CEE countries 11 13 9
Western countries 12 15 14
All countries 12 14 12
25% quartile 7
Median 12
75% quartile 20
Notes
1 In most cases the average of 1995 and 1997 (see Table I in Annex B for details).
2 Scotland: the number of professional judges and magistrates includes judges, magistrates,
sheriffs and stipendiary magistrates.
3 USA: includes judges from federal and state courts, but not from the lower courts
(e.g. municipal and police courts).
Table 3. Number of professional judges and magistrates per 100,000 population (1)
5.2.5 Correctional staff
The UN questionnaire asks for data on prison staff, who are defined as:
… all individuals employed in penal or correctional institutions, including
management, treatment, custodial and other (maintenance, food service etc)
personnel.
Information was requested for adult and juvenile establishments separately.
Some countries indicated that there was no separate juvenile correctional sys-
tem. Other countries simply did not provide information, which may mean that
no juvenile institutions existed, or that no information was available. Table 4 is
based on figures in which adult and juvenile staff are added together if separate
figures were given; otherwise, total prison staff is assumed to equal adult staff
(see also Table VI in Annex B). An additional measure of investment in the
prison system is the staff/inmate ratio: countries where the staff/inmate ratio is
low (close to one staff member per one inmate) might be assumed to devote more
resources to corrections than countries where the ratio is high. The data on in-
mate levels used here are taken from the Sixth Survey.
There are wide variations in the number of correctional staff per 100,000 pop-
ulation among the countries providing information. At one end, the highest fig-
ures are in Northern Ireland (189), Estonia (163), the Russian Federation (154)
and the USA (147); these reflect high imprisonment levels, although less so in
Northern Ireland where special factors apply. At the other end of the scale, there
are less than 30 staff per 100,000 in Greece, Macedonia, Kyrgystan, Armenia,
and Cyprus. There is large international variation, and the median for the CEE
Europe countries (49) is not dissimilar to that for Western ones (53). Table 4
shows the countries rank ordered in terms of correctional staff (see also Table VI
in Annex B).
The most obvious factor that should affect the number of correctional person-
nel is the actual number of people in prison. (This, incidentally, seems little to do
with crimes rates (Aebi and Kuhn (2000)). The statistical relationship goes in
that direction on the basis of all countries for which there was data (r = 0.483; n =
42). However, there were many exceptions. (Estonia for instance had a high
staffing level relative to its imprisonment rate, while the reverse was true in
Belarus). And simply omitting the four countries with the highest correctional
staff rates reduced the correlation considerably (r = 0.191; not significant).
It is also plausible that economic development is a factor – with lower correc-
tional staffing rates in the least well-developed countries. This was broadly en-
dorsed (using HDI values for 1998), although more strongly after omitting two
outliers with very high staffing rates but relatively low values on the HDI index
(Estonia and the Russian Federation). The bottom five countries in terms of cor-
rectional officers per 100,000 population were all representative of either least
developed or emerging economies. Newman and Howard (1999b) found similar
results with global data from the Sixth Survey.
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Thirdly, higher correctional staffing rates might mean that there are better
conditions in prison – i.e., a lower staff/inmate ratio. There was little support for
this, however, in line with Marshall’s previous results from the Fifth Survey.8
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Northern Ireland 189 Spain 50
Estonia 163 Ukraine 50
Russian Federation 154 Croatia 49
USA 147 Switzerland 47
Canada 94 Azerbaijan 46
Lithuania 88 Luxembourg 46
Czech Rep. 87 Belgium 45
Slovakia 85 Slovenia 45
Scotland 84 Germany 44
Italy 82 Austria 44
Netherlands 80 Turkey 40
Latvia 79 Georgia 37
England & Wales 69 Bulgaria 35
Ireland 69 Belarus 35
Hungary 65 Iceland 35
Denmark 64 Malta 33
Israel (2) 64 Romania 32
Sweden 62 Cyprus 28
Portugal 56 Armenia 28
Finland 54 Kyrgyzstan 23
Norway 53 Macedonia, FYR 23
Andorra 51 Greece 20
Moldova, Rep. of 50
Correctional staff per 100,000 population
Median Mean Standard
deviation
CEE countries 49 62 37
Western countries 53 63 36
All countries 50 63 37
25% quartile 40
Median 50
75% quartile 79
Note
1 In most cases the average of 1995 and 1997 (see Table I in Annex B for details).
Table 4. Correctional staff per 100,000 population (1)
8 r = -0.19; ns; n = 37
The countries with the least favourable staff/inmate ratios (i.e., in the bottom
quartile) are Belarus, Romania, Latvia, Moldova, Georgia, Lithuania, the USA,
Bulgaria, Greece, and Kyrgystan.9 Most of these were characterised by high
prison populations rather than comparatively low per capita staffing level.
With the exception of the U.S. and Greece, all the countries in the bottom
(‘worst’) quartile as regards inmate/staff ratio were in Eastern and Central Eu-
rope. In the CEE countries, the median was 3.1 inmates per correctional em-
ployee – over double the figure in the other countries (1.4). Finland, Cyprus, It-
aly, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Ireland, Slovenia, and North-
ern Ireland ranked in the highest (‘best’) quartile as regards the staff/inmate ratio
with one or less than one inmate for each staff member.
In sum, then, higher correctional staffing rates are very broadly associated
with higher economic development and – less strongly – with higher imprison-
ment rates. However, there are many deviations, with some countries having
high prison populations but low staffing rates, and others having high staffing
relative to prisoners.
5.2.6 Total criminal justice personnel
Table 5 presents the rate of criminal justice personnel per 100,000 for the 33
countries for which data are available for all four sectors (see also Table VII in
Annex B). Of these countries, the Russian Federation has the highest rate of
criminal justice personnel per capita (1,407), and Moldova and Finland the low-
est (233). The overall median was 401 criminal justice personnel per 100,000
population – or one for every 249 persons. The figure in the CEE countries was
469 (one for every 213 person). This was higher than the 379 in the Western
countries for which data were available (one for every 264 person). As a corol-
lary, the rate of personnel in countries classified as medium on the HDI was
higher (an average of 518 personnel per 100,000) than in ‘high’ HDI countries
(401).
The distribution of resources
Although there are significant international differences in the number of people
working in criminal justice, the distribution of resources across the four sectors
is not dissimilar. Figure 1 shows that in all countries by far the highest proportion
criminal justice personnel are police officers. The mean is 78.5%, with a small
standard deviation (8%). The United States ranks lowest with 61% of the crimi-
nal justice personnel in the police, followed by Estonia (reflecting the fact that
the proportion of correctional staff is high). At the other end of the scale, the po-
lice in Cyprus, Armenia, Greece and the Russian Federation form the highest
proportion of criminal justice personnel. Despite the fact that there are about a
third more people employed as criminal justice personnel in the CEE countries
than in Western ones, there is a striking similarity in distribution among police,
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9 The Fifth survey showed similar results with a high ratio also for the Russian Federation (4.3) and the Ukraine (3.9).
court and prison staff. The proportion of police (78.5%) is the same, while court
staff comprise only slightly more (6.6%) in the CEE countries than elsewhere
(5.5%).
The numerical importance of court staff (prosecutors, judges and magistrates)
is fairly low: taken together they account for 6% of all criminal justice staff (with
a standard deviation of 3%). At the high end were Slovenia, Andorra, Finland
and Luxembourg – where more than 9% of the criminal justice work force con-
sists of court staff.
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Russian Federation 1,407 Hungary 390
Lithuania 603 Germany 386
Cyprus 570 Ireland 373
Czech Rep. 532 Macedonia, FYR 370
Portugal 531 Sweden 358
Latvia 530 Luxembourg 356
Croatia 511 England & Wales 322
Estonia 505 Slovenia 313
Israel 502 Andorra 302
Slovakia 469 Romania 294
Scotland 464 Netherlands 287
Armenia 444 Iceland 284
Austria 433 Denmark 279
Greece 414 Turkey 269
USA 414 Moldova, Rep. of 233
Belgium 408 Finland 233
Spain 401
Total criminal justice staff per 100,000 population
Median Mean Standard
deviation
CEE countries 469 508 291
Western countries 379 379 92
All countries 401 430 202
25% quartile 313
Median
75% quartile 502
Note
1 In most cases the average of 1995 and 1997 (see Table I in Annex B for details).
Table 5. Total criminal justice staff per 100,000 population: police officers, prosecu-
tors, judges and magistrates and staff in correction institutions (1)
The proportion of resources in prisons is 16% overall (standard deviation of
8%). The United States and Estonia appear to employ almost one-third of all
criminal justice personnel in correctional services, and a quarter or so are thus
employed in the Netherlands, Finland and Denmark. At the other extreme, less
than 10% of criminal justice staff are employed in corrections in Greece, Cyprus,
Macedonia, Armenia and Croatia.
The picture appears to be clear. The bulk of criminal justice personnel in all
countries for which there are complete data are police officers. These are fol-
lowed some way behind by prison staff; only a rather small proportion of all
criminal justice personnel are judges and prosecutors. The predominance of the
police is not of course surprising given their much broader range of functions.
5.2.7 The gender balance in criminal justice personnel
Information was collected again in the Sixth Survey on the extent to which
women participate in the criminal justice workforce. Results for each sector are
taken up below.
Police
In three countries, about a third of police officers were female: the Russian Fed-
eration, Sweden, and Norway. But the median was much lower – 9% (data for 41
countries). A number of countries had very low figures: 5% or less. There was
large variability in the proportion of female officers within the country group-
ings, and the medians were similar between the CEE countries and the rest (see
Figure 2).
Prosecutors
Compared to police officers, prosecutors were generally more likely to be
women: about a third were (data for 29 countries). The highest proportion was in
Estonia, with the lowest in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Armenia (all 5% or
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Correctional
staff
15.5%
Prosecutors,
judges and
magistrates
5.9%
Police
78.5%
Figure 1.  Distribution of personnel in the criminal justice workforce (33 countries)
less). The median proportion in the CEE countries (31%) was slightly lower than
in the other countries (39%), but as with the police figures there was a large de-
gree of variability within the country groupings.
Judges
Again, about a third of judges were female taking together all the countries pro-
viding information (40 countries). But the proportion ranged from 60% or more
in Kyrgystan, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Romania, to
around 10% or less in Malta, Azerbaijan and the UK. Here, the CEE median was
appreciably higher (57%) than for Western ones (27%).
Correctional staff
Overall, about a fifth of staff in correctional institutions was women (data for 34
countries). Although the USA had a comparatively high proportion (30%), the
highest figures were mainly in CEE countries. Reflecting this, the CEE median
was higher (25%) than the other countries (12%).
5.2.8 The gender balance index
Since not all countries provided information on all four sectors, a Gender Bal-
ance Index (GBI) was constructed to minimize the effect of incomplete data, but
at the same time reflect the male: female staff ratios in the various sectors for
which results were available. Details of the construction of the Index are in Annex
B. Forty-eight countries were ranked on the GBI, and quartile positions are shown
in Table 6. CEE countries mainly had the best representation of female staff (see
the top, fourth quartile), although this was also true of the USA, Sweden, and Can-
ada. CEE countries were distributed somewhat irregularly in the other quartiles.
In the bottom quartile, women featured least often in criminal justice staffing in
France, Liechtenstein, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Northern Ireland.
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31%
57%
25%
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39%
27%
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Police Prosecutors Judges / magistrates Corrections
CEE countries Other countries
Figure 2.  Proportion of the criminal justice workforce that were female (median)
In sum, criminal justice is still fairly male dominated. Table 7 gives another
summary picture, additional to that from the GBI. It relates to the 31 countries
with the most complete data: namely, those with a value for the percentage of po-
lice officers who were women, and at least two out of three of the other indicators
(prosecutors, judges/ magistrates and correctional staff). The picture differs
somewhat from the GBI, since the absolute number of different types of person-
nel is taken, which weights the figure towards the proportion of females in the
police (the biggest sector). In Table 6 (based on the GBI), each sector was given
equal weight.
In all but four countries, less than one in five criminal justice workers were fe-
male. With the countries covered here, there was little association between the
1998 UN Gender-related Development Index and the percentage of women in
the criminal justice workforce, no doubt because some of the countries with the
highest levels of female CJS penetration were not particularly well-developed in
other socio-economic terms.
It was also clear that the penetration of women depends somewhat on func-
tion. The proportion of female workers was greatest for prosecution and judicial
staff – whose work is probably seen as less dependent on ‘heavier-weight’ mas-
culine skills. The proportion was lowest overall for police officers, although a
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Low gender balance Medium High gender balance
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
France (48)
Leichenstein (47)
Turkey (46)
Azerbaijan (45)
N. Ireland (44)
Georgia (43)
Kazakhstan (42)
Moldova (41)
Iceland (40)
Malta (39)
Belgium (38)
Germany (37)
Italy (36)
Austria (35)
Greece (34)
Cyprus (33)
Armenia (32)
Portugal (31)
Macedonia (30)
Kyrgyzstan (29)
Andorra (28)
Finland (27)
Ireland (26)
Spain (25)
Scotland (24)
Ukraine (23)
Israel (22)
Poland (21)
Eng & Wales (20)
Norway (19)
Slovenia (18)
Denmark (17)
Romania (16)
Netherlands (15)
Slovakia (14)
Switzerland (13)
Croatia (12)
Canada (11)
Belarus (10)
Lithuania (9)
Czech Rep. (8)
Russian Fed (7)
Sweden (6)
Bulgaria (5)
Hungary (4)
USA (3)
Latvia (2)
Estonia (1)
Notes
1 Figures in parentheses are ranks: (1) having the most equal gender balance; (48) having the least.
2 The proportion of women in each sector (police, prosecutors, judges and correctional staff) is in effect
given equal weight (see Annex A for more detail).
Table 6. Categorisation of countries according to the Criminal Justice Practitioner Gender Bal-
ance Index (CJPGBI)
few countries seemed to draw more on women – either reflecting a tradition of
female participation in military activities (eg, Russia, Estonia, and Armenia), or
fairly higher levels of social development (eg, Sweden and the USA). As a broad
generalization, countries that reported a high rate of female participation in one
arena also reported high rates in the others. (Full details by sector for each coun-
try are in Table VIII in Annex B.)
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Russian Federation 33 Finland 10
Estonia 26 Northern Ireland 9
Scotland 23 Greece 9
Latvia 20 Macedonia, FYR 9
Netherlands 18 Cyprus 8
Israel 17 Moldova, Rep. of 8
England & Wales 16 Ukraine 7
Armenia 16 Belgium 7
Czech Rep. 16 Ireland 7
Lithuania 15 Spain 7
Austria 14 Iceland 6
Romania 13 Italy 6
Slovenia 12 Portugal 5
Croatia 12 Turkey 4
Andorra 10 Kazakhstan 2
Denmark 10
Proportion of women in criminal justice workforce
Median Mean Standard
deviation
CEE countries 13 15 8
Western countries 9 10 5
All countries 10
25% quartile 7
Median 10
75% quartile 16
Notes
1 In most cases the average of 1995 and 1997 (see Table I in Annex B for details).
2 Countries with a value for the percentage of police officers who were women, and
at least two out of the three other indicators (prosecutors, judges/magistrates, and
correctional staff).
Table 7. Proportion of women in the the criminal justice workforce
5.3 The productivity of criminal justice personnel
5.3.1 General points
The measures of staff capacity discussed so far have addressed the resources
available for criminal justice in different countries, but they say little about how
well different systems might be performing. The Sixth UN survey is, frankly,
limited in how much it can offer here – and bear in mind that this will be a diffi-
cult issue to judge anyway. Nonetheless, the data collected can be manipulated in
various ways to provide some pointers – at least as regards productivity of per-
formance, though not of course its quality. The productivity indicators presented
in this and the next section will necessarily be broad-brush because of uncer-
tainty about how far ‘like for like’ is being measured by the information submit-
ted in the country returns. With this caution, this section turns to a set of produc-
tivity indicators. Again, the approach taken mirrors in many ways that taken by
Marshall (1998) in her analysis of the previous UN survey results. The following
indicators are addressed in this section:
a. Police recording productivity. This looks at what variation there is as regards
the extent to which the police record crimes reported to them by victims.
This productivity measure is obtained by linking results from the Interna-
tional Crime Victimisation Survey (ICVS) with the Sixth Survey returns on
crimes recorded by the police. Since not all countries have taken part in the
ICVS, this measure is available for 34 countries. (There is further discussion
below.)
b. Police productivity. This looks at how many suspects the police deal with per
capita, and how many convictions they produce.
c. Prosecutors’productivity. This looks at how many prosecutions prosecutors
achieve per capita, and how many convictions they produce.
The information on police recording productivity – (a) above – also presents the
opportunity to see whether the ICVS gives a different picture of relative crime
levels in different countries to figures of crimes recorded by the police. Although
not central to the issue of police productivity, results are shown for interest at the
end of the section. Also, the information on how many suspects the police ‘pro-
duce’, and how many convictions prosecutors secure, can be presented not only
as measures of productivity, but also to describe the process of ‘attrition’ be-
tween recording offences, catching suspects, and prosecuting and convicting
them. Results on attrition are also presented at the end of the section, although at
broad brush level and with some strong reservations.
5.3.2 Police recording productivity
It is a truism that the number of crimes the police record is substantially less that
the number of crimes experienced by victims. The first reason is non-reporting.
A multitude of victim surveys have shown that many crimes are not reported to
the police – albeit with the proportion varying by type of offence. Briefly here,
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non-reporting is primarily because victims feel that what has happened is not se-
rious enough to warrant formal attention, or that the police will not, or cannot do
much about it (eg, Skogan, 1984; Mayhew, 1993). What victims feel about how
far the police are likely to help is returned to shortly when measures of confi-
dence in the police are considered. The ICVS has done a great deal to chart varia-
tions in reporting rates in different countries, even though the samples taken in
different countries have been relatively small (see van Kesteren, Mayhew and
Nieuwbeerta, 2000 for further details).
The second reason for the gap between police and survey estimates is the
shortfall between the estimated number of crimes reported to the police and the
number recorded by them. This recording proportion needs explaining. Many
people might assume that the police record all crimes they come to know about.
In fact, though, a number of studies have testified that this is not the case (see e.g.,
Burrows et al., 2000). The police may not record a complaint of crime if they do
not think there is sufficient evidence; some incidents may go unrecorded because
of police compliance with victims’wishes not to proceed; other incidents may be
regarded by the police as too trivial to warrant a formal investigation; or the po-
lice may feel that the report is mistaken or disingenuous. In addition, though, it is
plausible to suppose that when the police fail to record incidents drawn to their
attention, this denotes some lack of responsiveness to victims, or at least less effi-
cient systems for capturing victim complaints. In essence, then, the recording
proportion can stand as a measure of police ‘energy’such that the police in coun-
tries in which a relatively high proportion of reported crimes are recorded can be
considered the most energetic and efficient. The pertinent issue for present pur-
poses, then, is not variations in reporting rates in different countries evidenced
by the ICVS, but rather the indicative measure it provides as to the recording pro-
portion. (Variations in reporting rates are considered later as part of a measure of
citizen satisfaction with the police.)
In the interests of simplicity, the comparison here is between (i) all crimes
measured by the ICVS, and (ii) all crimes recorded by the police (see below for
further details). One difficulty is that this is not comparing ‘like with like’. For
one, the ICVS coverage of crime differs from that of the police. (The ICVS only
covers crimes against householders and their property, whereas police figures
also cover victimless crimes as well as those targeted on institutional victims for
instance.) Another difficulty is that the breadth of the ‘total ‘ police crime count
will obviously be important, in that those countries which include a broader
range of illegal behaviour could appear to have lower recording productivity.
Nonetheless, linking the ICVS and police counts in the way that has been done is
likely to give a broad indication of recording differentials.
The first ICVS measure taken is the percentage of respondents who said they
had been victim of one or more on the eleven main types of crime measured by
the ICVS.10 (The total ICVS crime count is taken mainly to maximise the reli-
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10 For convenience, a ‘prevalence’ measure is taken from the additional information added to the database for the Sixth
Survey - i.e, the percentage of people victimised once or more by any of the crimes covered by the ICVS. The alterna-
tive would have been the more complete incidence risk, taking into account multiple victimisation. It is unlikely that
results would have differed.
ability of the ICVS figures, since the relatively small samples taken in each coun-
try means that there is inevitably large sampling error attached to the ICVS esti-
mates of specific offences).11 As many results as are available from the last three
sweeps of the ICVS are taken, and averaged. There is a further adjustment to ac-
count for city as against national surveys.12
This ICVS estimate of crime is next adjusted to take account of the percentage
of crimes said to have been reported to the police.13 This provides an indication
of the proportion of people in a country who have experienced a crime that has
been reported to the police. This proportion is then set against the average
1995-1997 per capita rate of the total number recorded by the police as reported
in the Sixth Survey.14 The ratio of the second (police) measure to the first (ICVS)
one is the indicator of recording productivity.
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Lowest ratio of recorded
crime to ICVS crime
0.192 or less
Medium
0.193 – 0.270
Medium
0.271 – 0.53
Highest ratio of recorded
crime to ICVS crime
0.54 or more
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Georgia (34)
Slovakia (33)
Ukraine (32)
Slovenia (31)
Macedonia (30)
Latvia (29)
Lithuania (27)
Romania (27)
Kyrgyzstan (26)
Spain (25)
Malta (23)
Croatia (23)
Russian Fed. (22)
Czech Republic (21)
Bulgaria (20)
Poland (19)
Estonia (18)
Belarus  (17)
Switzerland (16)
Northern Ireland (14)
USA (14)
Italy (13)
Netherlands (12)
France (11)
Hungary (10)
Eng & Wales  (9)
Portugal (8)
Belgium (7)
Scotland (6)
Canada (5)
Austria (4)
Denmark (3)
Finland (2)
Sweden (1)
Note
1 Figures in parentheses are ranks. Some countries are in joint position.
Table 8. Police recording productivity based on ratio between all recorded crime rate and ICVS
measure of victimisation (all ICVS crimes), adjusted to exclude offences not reported to the police
11 Marshall (1998), for instance, took what was on the face of it a useful route in comparing ICVS levels of residential
burglary with police figures of residential and non-residential burglary. However, results were rather unclear and this
may well have been because of the greater sampling error on the ICVS rates and more missing police information from
countries which do not record burglary as a separate category.
12 Overall victimisation levels were adjusted for countries with city surveys only to take account of higher victimisation
rates in more densely populated areas. To do this, the average differential (0.78) between national and city rates in 21
countries was applied to reduce the values for countries with city surveys only. This adjustment applied to Belarus,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Macedonia, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, and the Ukraine.
13 Victims are asked whether they reported the incident to the police. Those who experienced any particular type of crime
more than once are asked whether they reported the last incident. There was no adjustment made for national or city
ICVS coverage since there was no evident pattern of reporting rates differing.
14 Recorded crime figures for 1994 were used for Austria, France, Macedonia, and Malta.
Table 8 groups the 34 countries into quartiles according to the ratio of po-
lice-recorded crime to the estimate of victim-reported crime. (Only quartile po-
sitions are shown to avoid giving the impression of spurious accuracy.) In the top
quartile (quartile 4), the ratio was 0.55 or more (ie, the per capita rates of all re-
corded crime was 55% or more the rate of offences said to have been reported to
the police, as measured by the ICVS). The highest figure was in Sweden. In the
lowest quartile, the ratio was about 0.20 in all countries, suggesting less ener-
getic and/or efficient police recording. The lowest ratio was in Georgia. All but
two countries in the bottom two quartiles were CEE ones.
5.3.3 Police productivity: suspects
The following few measures link manpower capacity with criminal justice out-
put in various ways. This is done cognisant of the difficulties of making compari-
sons. For one, data on case output (suspects, prosecutions, and convictions) are
typically collected by different agencies using independent data systems, with
no cross checking between them, and no necessary linkage as regards crime cov-
erage, or methods of case counting.15 Moreover, suspects, prosecutions and con-
victions do not necessarily mean the same thing in all countries even if the same
terminology is used.
This said, the first measure links the number of police officers to the number
of suspects (see Table 9).16 On the face of it, police officers dealt with the greatest
number of suspects in Finland (nearly 2,700 suspects per 100 officers in a year),
the USA and Canada. At the other extreme, in Armenia, the Russian Federation,
Kazakhstan, Latvia and Spain, each officer appeared to deal with one suspect or
less a year. The differences are hard to believe. Variability in the count of police
officers may be one issue, but probably more important are differences in how
suspects are defined in different countries. This, for one, may reflect variations in
pre-arrest procedures, in particular whether offenders are diverted away from
‘suspect’ status by the use of informal cautioning for example. On the face of it,
though, the median number of suspects per 100 officers was just over 200 per
year in the CEE countries (two suspects per officer), and just over 500 in the oth-
ers (5.2 suspects per officer). Neither of these figures might seem high to a lay au-
dience, although in fact they will simply reflect the diverse nature of policing
work, which will be largely concerned with routine order maintenance and the
provision of services that are not directly offender-related.
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15 Cases can mean individuals, incidents, or processing decisions, There is also a timing problem. Annual data is used,
but suspects, for instance, may be prosecuted or convicted a year later than they were caught. Thus in linking cases it
needs to be assumed that the numbers remain largely stable year-on-year.
16 The Sixth Survey questionnaire asked for information on persons brought into formal contact with the police .... where
formal contact might include being suspected, arrested, cautioned etc. The term ‘clearance rate’ would not be con-
stant, and is not used here. In the US, for instance, it means a suspect being charged and turned over for prosecution. In
other countries, it simply means that the police have identified an offender, irrespective of whether any further action is
taken.
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Finland 2,692 Israel 360
USA 2,260 Macedonia, FYR 353
Canada 1,043 Slovenia 332
Germany 872 Slovakia 251
Netherlands 845 Italy 249
Greece 769 Estonia 225
Austria 684 Moldova, Rep of 201
Norway 684 Croatia 173
England & Wales 558 Cyprus 137
Portugal 475 Lithuania 132
Hungary 415 Ukraine 122
Poland 404 Spain 102
Romania 404 Latvia 100
France 385 Kazakhstan 82
Sweden 371 Russian Federation 79
Ireland 366 Armenia 53
Number of suspects per 100 police officers
Median Mean Standard
deviation
CEE countries 201 222 131
Western countries 516 714 705
All countries 360 490 577
25% quartile 137
Median 360
75% quartile 558
Note
1 In most countries the average of 1995-1997. Figures for Armenia, Austria, France,
Macedonia, Slovakia, and the Russian Federation are for 1994.
Table 9. Productivity of the police: suspects per 100 police (1)
5.3.4 Police productivity: convictions
One can also look at the productivity of the police in terms of convictions. In line
with previous UN survey results, the police in Western countries produced more
convictions (a median of 225 per 100 officers, as against 108 in CEE countries).
Finland stood out with the most convictions per 100 officers (over 1,000), and
there were also high figures in Denmark, Canada, Andorra and Turkey. Some
countries had very low figures, and while these tended to be CEE ones, Cyprus,
Northern Ireland, Italy and Portugal were among them.
5.3.5 Prosecutors’ productivity: prosecutions
The most pertinent measure of productivity here is the number of prosecutions
per prosecutor – albeit this is particularly problematic because of differences in
inputs (have the police already had the discretion to drop cases?) and outputs (do
prosecutors have to prosecute?) – cf. Jehle (2000).17,18 In any event, there was a
very wide range in the figures – from over 500 prosecutions per prosecutor in the
USA, Turkey, Ireland and the Netherlands, to less than 30 per prosecutor in
Georgia, Armenia, Latvia, Cyprus, and Moldova (Table 10). By and large, prose-
cutors in CEE countries – although more numerous as seen – processed far fewer
prosecutions (the median was 56 per prosecutor) than in the other countries
(270). At country level, though, there was a particularly large variation in the fig-
ures in CEE countries (denoted by a much smaller median (56) than mean (73)).
The productivity of prosecutors in general (106 prosecutions per prosecutor all
told) is higher than that of the police in relation to suspects (under 4 suspects per
police officer), though this is to be expected given the respective nature of their
work.
Using data from thirteen counties in the European Sourcebook project, Jehle
(2000) observed that where a prosecution authority had a low workload of cases
(measured by prosecutions per capita), the rate of cases brought to court was
higher, suggesting that prosecutors in some countries may have more time for
case preparation. With the current data for a larger number of countries, the rela-
tionship went in the same direction.19
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17 The Sixth survey says that ‘persons prosecuted’ may be understood to mean alleged offenders prosecuted by means of
an official charge, initiated by the public prosecutor, or the law enforcement agency responsible for prosecution.
18 Linking the number of prosecutions to the number of suspects produces unreliable results, for one because in nearly
half of the countries for which there was both suspect and prosecution data, the number of prosecutions was greater or
virtually the same as suspects. This might imply that there is no separate prosecution stage. Also, the prosecutions to
suspects ratio is likely to reflect pre-trial diversion programmes.
19 Jehle’s measure of cases that came to court was rather different from that available from the Sixth Survey in that he put
all cases coming to court (irrespective of outcome) over the base of all disposed cases (including dropped cases, cases
brought to court, and other disposals). Here, the correlation between prosecutions per 100,000 population and the ratio
of convictions to prosecutions was –0.561; n = 31; <0.001).
5.3.6 Prosecutors’ productivity: convictions
There is further attrition between prosecutions and convictions, although this
will be influenced, for one, by what filtering has been done by police or prosecu-
tors before cases get to court.20 In CEE countries, the median number of convic-
tions per prosecutor was 33; in Western counties it was 198 (see Table 11). This
again denotes greater productivity in more economically developed countries,
although it might also signify of course that there is more court capacity with
which to process offenders. The highest number of convictions achieved by
prosecutors seemed to be in Finland, Austria, and Romania – where there were
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USA 571 Israel 102
Turkey 553 Iceland 100
Ireland 551 Portugal 96
Netherlands 532 Hungary 93
Andorra 383 Estonia 70
Finland 347 Slovakia 68
Scotland 307 Belarus 45
England & Wales 233 Kazakhstan 35
Macedonia, FYR 191 Russian Federation 32
Croatia 156 Moldova, Rep. of 28
Slovenia 127 Cyprus 27
Czech Rep. 127 Latvia 24
Germany 124 Armenia 21
Sweden 110 Georgia 9
Prosecutions per prosecutor
Median Mean Standard
deviation
CEE countries 56 73 57
Western countries 270 288 202
All countries 106 181 182
25% quartile 43
Median 106
75% quartile 252
Note
1 In most countries the average of 1995-1997. Figures for Denmark, and the Russian
Federation are for 1994.
Table 10. Productivity of prosecutors: prosecutions per prosecutor (1)
20 The Sixth Survey says that ‘persons convicted’ may be understood to mean persons found guilty by any legal body
duly authorised to pronounce them convicted under national law, whether the conviction was later upheld or not.
about 300 or more convictions per prosecutor. The lowest figures were in Geor-
gia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Cyprus, Armenia and Latvia – where there were
fewer than 20.
The figures for the number of prosecutions per prosecutor and the number of
convictions per prosecutor are closer together in the CEE countries, implying
that more cases prosecuted are taken forward to court. However, system differ-
ences are likely to be more the issue here rather than any ‘real’differences in how
well prosecutors achieve convictions. In many CEE countries it might be that
there is little scope for prosecutors to drop cases at their own discretion.
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Finland 333 Croatia 46
Austria 331 Slovakia 43
Romania 298 Bulgaria 41
Turkey 254 Belarus 39
Scotland 248 USA 39
Andorra 244 Portugal 39
Denmark 230 Kyrgyzstan 34
Netherlands 223 Poland 33
Greece 208 Slovenia 33
Spain 198 Russian Federation 29
England & Wales 152 Moldova, Rep. of 27
Israel 99 Lithuania 24
Germany 97 Latvia 19
Hungary 75 Armenia 18
Czech Rep. 67 Cyprus 17
Macedonia, FYR 64 Kazakhstan 14
Estonia 56 Azerbaijan 11
Belgium 52 Georgia 8
Sweden 48
Nunber of convictions per prosecutor
Median Mean Standard
deviation
CEE countries 33 49 62
Western countries 198 165 105
All countries 48 102 102
25% quartile 33
Median 48
75% quartile 198
Note
In most countries the average of 1995–1997. Figures for Austria, Denmark, and the Russian
federation are for 1994.
Table 11.  Productivity of prosecutors: convictions per prosecutor (1)
5.3.7 In parenthesis: relative crime levels according to
the police and the ICVS
The issue of whether the ICVS gives a different picture of relative crime levels in
different countries to figures of crimes recorded by the police is essentially tan-
gential here, as mentioned. The answer may be of interest nonetheless. Of the 34
countries with both an ICVS and a police measure of crime, 11 fell into the same
quartile on both crime measures (see Table 12A). (Of these, England & Wales
and the Netherlands were in the top quartiles with the highest crime rates on both
measures. Belarus, Croatia, Georgia and Macedonia, in contrast, were in the bot-
tom quartiles on both measures). The largest discrepancies were Finland (which
was in the ‘worst’quartile as regards police crime rates, but the ‘best’one for the
ICVS measure), and the Russian Federation and the Ukraine where the opposite
applied (with the lowest police rates and the highest ICVS ones).
Of further interest is whether the two crime measures correspond more
closely when ICVS figures are adjusted to reflect only crimes reported to the po-
lice. There was indeed more correspondence, as one would expect. Compared to
the 11 countries in the same quartiles on the two initial crime measures, there were
21 in the same quartiles when overall recorded crime was set against the ICVS esti-
mate of reported crime. The quartile positions also came closer together for a fur-
ther eight countries (see Table 12B). In other words, then, police figures seem a fair
guide to the level of reported crime, but a much less good one as to the level of ev-
eryday experience of crime in different countries, much of which remains be-
yond police knowledge. By the same token, these results confirm the validity of
the ICVS for the purpose of international comparisons of crime levels.
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Table 12A. Quartile positions on all police-recorded crime (Sixth UN Survey) and the Interna-
tional Crime Victimisation Survey (unadjusted figures)
5.3.8 In parentheses: attrition
The above indicators all bear in their way on the process of attrition, or the pro-
gressive funnelling away of the number of crimes the police know about to the
number of convictions in court. Attempts to look at attrition in criminal justice
processing have grown somewhat in popularity as a means of better illustrating
the limited scope of the criminal justice system in dealing with crime (see, e.g.,
Marshall (1998); Farrington, Langan and Wikström (1994); Langan and
Farrington (1998); Mukherjee and Reichel (1999); Barclay and Tavares (1999);
Tonry and Farrington (forthcoming)). The most complete measure of attrition
starts by using victim survey results to provide the initial count of crimes experi-
enced by victim, then follows these through to crimes reported by victims,
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Table 12B. Quartile positions on all police-recorded crime (Sixth UN Survey) and the International
Crime Victimisation Survey (adjusted to exclude offences not reported to the police)
crimes recorded by the police, offences for which an offender is caught, con-
victed, and – in some analyses – sent to prison. No use is made here of the victim
survey measure provided by the ICVS for the Sixth Survey. For one, it reduces
the number of countries that could be included in analysis (particularly CEE
ones). Also, as discussed earlier, the ICVS total count of crime can only be
loosely aligned the total count of offences recorded by the police.
Even with a more reduced focus, assessing differential attrition rates is very
problematic due simply to procedural difference.
• First, for instance, the number of suspects per 100 crimes will be heavily de-
pendent on the number of crimes recorded in the first place. Some countries
will tend only to record when there is a suspect.21 Other countries will record
crimes across a much broader range than that to which suspect information
might apply, or at least a different coverage to the coverage of suspects (the
USA is an example).22
• Second, differences in prosecutorial arrangements will also affect the link be-
tween suspects and convictions, while convictions themselves may be differ-
ently counted.
• Third, the attrition assessment sets offences recorded against offenders sus-
pected, prosecuted or convicted: one offence could have more than one of-
fender, and one offender could be responsible for more than one offence.
• Fourth, the respective annual measures will be gathered independently.
Crimes in one year may not lead to suspects being caught and dealt with in the
same year, and thus the assumption needs to be made that the respective case-
loads remain fairly stable year-on-year.
The following analyses, therefore, are tentative. (Information on per capita rates
of recorded crime, the number of suspects, prosecutions and convictions in each
country are shown in Table IX in Annex B.)
There is a clear difference between CEE and Western countries as regards at-
trition. As Figure 3 shows, the volume of crimes recorded by the police per
100,000 population is much greater in Western countries – although this may
well be because of more complete recording of criminal incidents. The average
(median) rate of suspects, prosecutions and convictions, however, is much more
similar between the two groups of countries. The result is that the higher level of
crime in Western countries means that the fall-off at suspect stage is particularly
substantial.
Figure 4 shows the process of attrition for the two sets of countries by indexing
to 100 the per capita rate of recorded crimes. Rather more than half of offences
recorded resulted in a suspect being counted in the CEE countries, whereas it was
about three in ten in the other countries. The attrition at the prosecution stage was
again less pronounced in the CEE countries than in other countries where the
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21 Cyprus, the USA and Turkey actually reported more suspects than recorded crimes.
22 A potentially more reliable assessment would come from examining differential attrition in relation to particular types
of offences - as Barclay (2000) did with data from the European Sourcebook, for instance. Here, this would have re-
duced the number of countries that could be examined. And substantial problems of interpretation would still remain,
as Barclay found.
number of prosecutions was only two-thirds the number of suspects. The rate of
fall-off between prosecutions and convictions was similarly smaller in the CEE
countries than in others, where again only two out of three prosecutions led to a
conviction.
Comparing overall attrition (recorded crime to convictions), the median for
CEE countries was about three convictions per ten crimes. In Western countries
is was just over one conviction per ten crimes. Thus, attrition was in general
greatest in more developed countries, although as mentioned this is probably
much less an indication of poor system performance than a reflection of more
complete recording of minor crimes (especially minor property crimes for which
the police are unlikely to catch offenders). In addition, the greater fall-off be-
tween crimes and convictions in some countries may also indicate a deliberate
funnelling of cases away from the courts through the use of less formal case pro-
cessing alternatives.
For all countries for which there were data, for each 100 crimes, there were 41
suspects, 28 prosecutions and 21 convictions.
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Figure 4.  Attrition in the criminal justice process
5.3.9 Country differences
The attrition values vary widely by country at each of the attrition stages. (Table
X in Annex B shows the data for all countries for which attrition could be at least
partially tracked from recorded crimes.) Not all countries provided information
on all four measures (crime, suspects, prosecutions and convictions), so no com-
plete picture is possible. This said, on the face of it, the results suggest:
• Crimes to suspects. There is most attrition in England & Wales, Spain,
France, Canada and the Netherlands, where there is only about one suspect or
less for every five crimes recorded. At the other end of the scale, there was
marginal attrition at this stage in Greece and Azerbaijan: there were nearly as
many suspects as crimes.
• Suspects to prosecutions. For many countries, the suspect and prosecution
figures were the same or very similar, suggesting that suspects are counted
only when a prosecution is made. Attrition was most marked in Germany, Fin-
land, Portugal and Israel: in each, less than half of suspects were prosecuted.
In contrast, the least pronounced attrition was in Canada, Macedonia, and the
USA – where about 90% of suspects appeared to be prosecuted.
• Prosecutions to convictions. This segment of attrition might be thought to
vary less than others, since one would assume that a common objective of all
justice systems would be to secure a conviction for cases that had passed the
prosecution hurdle. In fact, though, there was still much country variation.
The fall-off between prosecutions and convictions appeared greatest in
Slovenia, Macedonia, and Norway – where only around one in three prosecu-
tions led to a conviction.23 There was least fall-off in Israel, Finland, Moldova,
and Georgia – where more than nine in ten prosecutions led to a conviction.
On average, about two in three prosecutions secured a conviction.
• Overall attrition (crimes to convictions). Overall attrition levels for different
countries ranged widely from about one or less convictions per ten crimes in
Belgium, Norway, England & Wales, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and
Portugal, to five or more convictions per ten crimes in Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.
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23 In the USA, the gap was so pronounced as to suggest the basis of the data on convictions did not match prosecutions.
5.4 Other indicators
The Sixth survey offers a few other ways forward to assess aspects of police per-
formance. The measures presented here cover two main components:
a. Public satisfaction with policing, using responses from the ICVS;
b. Corruption among the police.
5.4.1 Citizen satisfaction with the police
Three measures can be used from the ICVS to assess aspects of the public’s re-
sponse to the police. They are relatively modest indicators in some ways (based
on relatively small samples, and using simple questions), but they have the
unique advantage of being internationally comparable, and wide in coverage
(there was information for 35 countries). The three measures are:
a. The level of reporting to the police. Reporting levels are taken for ‘contact
crime’(robbery, assaults and sexual assaults) since this is arguably less influ-
enced by pragmatic considerations such as insurance claims.24 The assump-
tion is that higher reporting levels denote more confidence in the willingness
and ability of the police to deal with crimes brought to their attention. For the
35 countries for which results were available, on average (median) 31% of
contact crimes were reported to the police. The median for CEE countries
was lower at 25% than for other countries (34%). By country, the highest
level of reporting (about 40% or more) was in the USA, Scotland, the Neth-
erlands, and the UK. The lowest (about 20% or less) was in Kyrgyzstan, Aus-
tria, Croatia, the Russian Federation, Latvia, Belarus, Georgia, and Roma-
nia.25
b. For victims who did bring in the police: how satisfied were they with the way
they felt the police handled their report? On average, nearly half of victims of
contact crime were satisfied. The median for CEE countries was appreciably
lower (36% were satisfied on average) than in the other countries (68%). By
country, the highest level of satisfaction (about 75% of victims or more being
satisfied) was in Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Canada.
The lowest (about 30% or less) was in Kyrgyzstan, the Ukraine, Georgia, the
Russian Federation, and Lithuania.
c. The satisfaction of all country respondents (victims and non-victims) with
police performance in their local area. This taps more general attitudes to-
wards the adequacy of policing. On average, just over half of those in all
countries were satisfied, with the median in CEE countries again being ap-
preciably lower (36%) than in other countries (76%). By country, the highest
level of satisfaction (80% or more satisfied) was in Canada, Scotland, the
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24 However, substituting a measure of reporting of all crimes measured by the ICVS by the Citizen Evaluation of Police
Performance Index (CEPPI) made little difference to the results.
25 Some of the differences in reporting, it should be noted, may reflect the different makeup of contact crimes, since re-
porting rates for the component parts differs somewhat
USA, Denmark, and Switzerland. The lowest (about 20% or less) was in the
Russian Federation, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, and Estonia.
These three measures are combined into an Index of Citizen Evaluation of Police
Performance (CEPPI), the construction of which is described in Annex A.
(There was a fair degree of correlation between them). Table 13 shows the quar-
tile groupings. Countries with the highest CEPPI scores are Scotland, the USA,
Canada, Denmark, and England and Wales – all with scores of nearly 90 or more
out of 100 (the maximum value). Countries with the poorest assessment of police
performance were Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Georgia and Latvia –
with scores of 11 or less. The median value for CEE countries (27) was about a
third less than for other countries (77) – denoting a marked difference in po-
lice-public relations. All countries in the lowest quartile were CEE ones, as were
most of those in the next quartile. These results are in line with those from the
Fifth UN Survey and are not altogether surprising given the status of the police in
the Soviet system – perhaps not quickly forgotten (cf. Zvekic, 1998).
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Poor evaluation Medium High evaluation
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Kazakhstan (1)
Russian Fed. (2)
Georgia (3)
Latvia (4)
Romania (5)
Ukraine (5)
Estonia (5)
Belarus (8)
Lithuania (9)
Bulgaria (10)
Croatia (11)
Hungary (12)
Poland (13)
Czech Rep. (14)
Italy  (15)
Portugal (16)
Austria (16)
Albania (16)
Spain (19)
Macedonia  (20)
Slovakia (21)
Malta (22)
Slovenia (23)
Finland (24)
Belgium (25)
Switzerland (26)
France (27)
N. Ireland (28)
Netherlands  (29)
Sweden (30)
Eng & Wales (31)
Denmark (31)
Canada (33)
USA (34)
Scotland (35)
Median Mean Standard deviation
CEE countries 27 29 19
Western countries 77 74 18
All countries 46 51 30
Table 13. Categorisation of countries according to the Citizen Evaluation of Police Performance
indicator (CEPPI)
5.4.2 Corruption
Use was made of an Index of Corruption to look at another aspect of the per-
formance of criminal justice workers. The Index was derived from three inde-
pendent sources.26
a. The first was a measure from the ICVS pertaining to what might be seen as
‘low level’ corruption by public officials.27
b. The second was the Transparency International Corruption Ranking, based
on corrupt practices as perceived by the business sector..
c. The third was the World Economic Forum measure on whether improper
practices (bribery/corruption) prevailed in the public sphere.
Clearly, all three are slightly tangential measures of the behaviour of criminal
justice personnel. For instance, in the ICVS a “police officer” is only one of the
examples given of officials who might have asked for a bribe, and for those who
admitted having been subject to this form of corruption, there is no way of saying
whether it involved a police officer (or indeed another criminal justice worker).
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that such corruption as exists at country
level is also likely to spill over to those within the criminal justice sector. The
high correlations between the three indicators also suggest some underlying pro-
clivities.28
The mean scores of the Corruption Index varied considerably by region: from
27 in the CEE countries, to 74 in the remainder (highest scores denoted less cor-
ruption). Although there was more variation in the CEE countries (indicated by a
higher standard deviation relative to the mean), the ‘worst’ quartile nonetheless
comprised all CEE countries, with the exception of Turkey. In the second quar-
tile CEE also predominated, although Italy, Greece and Malta also featured.
There was a strong negative association between the Corruption Index and citi-
zens’ evaluations of the police as captured in CEPPI (0.83; n= 35). In other
words, countries where corruption seems more rife are generally those where the
public also seem to have less confidence and support for the police. Table 14
shows the quartile groupings on the Corruption Index.
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26 The Corruption Index was computed by the author, not taken from the UN Database.
27 In its last two sweeps, the ICVS has included the following question: “In some countries, there is a problem of corrup-
tion among government or public officials, During [year], has any government official, for instance a customs officer,
a police officer or inspector in your country asked you, or expected you to pay a bribe for his service?” Data were avail-
able for 33 countries.
28 The correlation between the ICVS measure and the Transparency Index was 0.78 (n = 29); between the ICVS and the
World Economic Forum (WEF) data was 0.83(n =18); and between the TI and the WEF data, r = 0.91 (n = 30).
5.5 Combining the indicators
For reasons described, the measures presented so far are all rather problematic as
sound indicators of the performance of criminal justice systems in different
countries. But in truth they are as good as any likely to be available. Seven mea-
sures are combined below to produce an overall picture. They give some indica-
tion of what police and prosecutors do, and how much they do; what people think
of the police; and what people’s exposure to corruption might be. The seven mea-
sures are:
a. Police recording productivity – the extent to which the police appear to re-
cord crimes reported to them by victims.
b. The number of suspects generated by police officers
c. The number of prosecutions that prosecutors generate
d. The number of convictions relative to prosecutors
e. The number of convictions relative to the number of police – additional to (d)
as differences in prosecutorial arrangements may influence (d) as much as
productivity.
f. The Citizen Evaluation of Police Performance Index (CEPPI)
g. The Corruption Index
Each of these seven measures has a quartile value. An average of the quartile val-
ues is used as a broad overall indicator of performance. It needs to be kept in
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Higher corruption Medium Low corruption
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Azerbaijan (1)
Georgia (2)
Kyrgyzstan (3)
Kazakhstan (4)
Russian Fed. (5)
Armenia (6)
Moldova (7)
Albania (8)
Croatia (9)
Bulgaria (10)
Turkey (11)
Czech Rep. (12)
Ukraine (13)
Slovakia (14)
Latvia (15)
Lithuania (16)
Romania (17)
Macedonia (18)
Belarus (19)
Italy (20)
Greece (21)
Poland (22)
Malta (23)
Ireland (24)
Hungary (25)
Estonia (26)
Spain (27)
Portugal (28)
Belgium (29)
Slovenia (30)
France (31)
Israel (32)
Austria (33)
USA (34)
Germany (35)
Luxembourg (36)
Switzerland (37)
Canada (38)
Netherlands (39)
Eng & Wales (40)
Iceland (41)
Norway (42)
N. Ireland (43)
Denmark (44)
Scotland (45)
Sweden (46)
Finland (47)
Median Mean Standard deviation
CEE countries 27 26 18
Western countries 74 69 24
All countries 51 50 30
Table 14. Categorisation of countries according to the Corruption Index (CI)
mind that some countries could be assessed on more measures than others.29 No
attention is paid to the earlier measures of criminal justice staff capacity in differ-
ent countries (e.g., the number of police per capita). There is no clear relationship
between resourcing levels and the volume of crime dealt with – indeed as regards
the police at least, more police is likely to be associated with more crime – proba-
bly because of a greater capacity to record it. Likewise, the number of prosecu-
tors and judges seemed to be largely a function of different procedural arrange-
ments (with the CEE countries having higher per capita rates). Correctional
staffing levels also seemed simply related to economic development.
Table 15 presents the average of the quartile values for the seven measures
used. (Table XI in Annex B shows the full details). For each measure, quartile 4
represents the ‘best’performance – e.g., the closest correspondence between the
level of crime recorded by the police and the ICVS, or the highest number of
prosecutions per prosecutor. Quartile 1 represents the poorest performance. The
potential ‘top score’ is four; with the bottom score one. Because assessment is
sounder the more measures available, Table 14 shows the average quartile scores
taking into account the number of measures on which the average is based. The
main points are:
• There are eleven ‘best performing’ countries with average quartile scores of
3.4 or more. However, this assessment is based on only one measure for Lux-
embourg, and on a still modest three measures for Andorra and Norway. Of
the remaining countries, the full seven measures produced high scores for
Finland, the Netherlands, England and Wales and Sweden. Five or six mea-
sures produced high scores for Scotland, Canada, and Denmark. Four mea-
sures did the same for Switzerland,
• In the next band down (scores of 2.7 to 3.3) were the USA, Hungary (on the
basis of seven measures), Austria and Spain (six measures), Belgium (five
measures), France, Germany, Turkey and Northern Ireland (four measures)
On less data, Greece, Ireland and Iceland were also in this group.
• The worst performing countries (scores under 2.0) were, with the exception of
Cyprus, all in CEE: Croatia, Latvia, the Russian Federation, Georgia, Lithua-
nia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Armenia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Kyrgyzstan, Albania
and Azerbaijan. Countries performing slightly better were also mainly CEE
ones – although Portugal, Israel, Italy and Malta were among them.
There was no clear association between this overall performance measure and
the level of crime in different countries. There was a positive correlation with the
Conventional Crime Index constructed from the UN Sixth Survey (which was
based on both police and ICVS crime measures) – indicating that comparatively
well performing systems are also those with the highest level of crime.30 There
was no association with the Petty Crime Index (based on ICVS values only)31
while the correlation between performance and the Serious Violence Indices was
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29 Thirteen countries had seven measures; nine had six measures; ten had five measures; seven countries had four; six had
three measures, and three countries had two measures. Luxembourg had a measure only for corruption.
30 The correlation was 0.449; n = 45; p <001.
31 The correlation was 0.075; n = 30; ns.
negative – with better performance going alongside lower violent crime.32 How-
ever, since the measurement of violent crime across country can be considered
more problematic than conventional property crime, the relationship between vi-
olence and performance will be more tenuous. The fact, then, that systems which
appear to be performing comparatively well have higher property crime rates
may simply reflect, for one, higher general recording productivity. It is also the
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Best performers Medium Worst performers
Average of
quartiles:
3.4 or more 2.7 to 3.3 2.00 to 2.6 Under 2.0
Scores based on 7 measures
Finland,
Netherlands, Eng &
Wales, Sweden
USA, Hungary Portugal, Estonia,
Slovenia, Slovakia,
Croatia. Latvia,
Russian Federation
Scores based on 6 measures
Scotland Austria, Spain Czech Rep.,
Macedonia,
Romania
Georgia, Lithuania,
Kazakhstan
Scores based on 5 measures
Canada, Denmark Belgium Israel, Poland,
Belarus, Italy
Moldova, Armenia,
Ukraine
Scores based on 4 measures
Switzerland France, Germany,
Turkey, N. Ireland
Bulgaria, Cyprus
Scores based on 3 measures
Andorra, Norway Greece, Ireland Malta Kyrgystan
Scores based on 2 measures
Iceland Albania, Azerbaijan
Scores based on 1 measure
Luxembourg
Note
1 Based on the average of quartile positions for (i) police recording productivity; (ii) suspects / police officers;
(iii) prosecutions / prosecutors; (iv) convictions / prosecutions; (v) convictions / police; (vi) CEPPI; and
(vii) the Corruption Index. Table XI in Annex B shows full details of the quartiles.
Table 15. Overall assessment of performance (based on quartile positions with regard to a maxi-
mum of seven measures)
32 The correlation was -0.561; n = 47; p <001.
case of course that crime rates are largely determined by social, political and eco-
nomic dynamics, against which the performance of the criminal justice system is
a minor influence.
5.6 Summary and conclusions
This chapter has drawn on data from 54 countries in Europe and North America
who replied to the Sixth United Nations Survey as regards the level of criminal
justice personnel and indicators of output, such as suspects known, and convic-
tions achieved. (Information for 1995 and 1997 was asked for.) Use is also made
of additional material from the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS). Prob-
lems with the data on personnel centre mainly on the fact that what is counted in
occupational categories may differ according to the organisation of law enforce-
ment. (Comparison of prosecutorial resources may be the most problematic.)
The problems with data on outputs (suspects, prosecutions, and convictions) are
partly a function of differences in procedures and terminology (suspects, prose-
cutions and convictions do not even necessarily mean the same thing in all coun-
tries). Another difficulty is the way data on outputs are collected and organised –
typically collected within independent statistical systems, with no cross check-
ing between them, or common counting methods. (Cases can mean individuals,
incidents or processing decisions.) The ICVS also is not without problems, in
particular with respect to the fragility of sample sizes in some of the country
sweeps carried out.
Issues of comparability severely undercut the reliability of the comparisons of
how the criminal justice system operates in different countries. Still, nothing
ventured, nothing gained on the comparative front – and this would be unfortu-
nate as most other analyses have focused less on resources and operations than
on differences between countries in crime levels (eg, Killias and Rau, 2000), or
imprisonment rates (e.g., Walmsley, 1997;Tkachuk and Walmsley, 2001).
A number of indicators were developed to measure performance productivity.
They do not bear on the quality of performance (in terms of fairness, profession-
alism or moral integrity). Nor do they bear on the effectiveness of performance in
reducing crime and deterring offenders. Both quality and effectiveness will de-
pend, as Newman and Howard (1999b) say, more on intangible resources to do
with educational level, the sophistication of organisational structures, training,
leadership, technological support, and the political culture in which the criminal
justice system operates. There is no way of assessing these intangibles here.
One merit of the UN Survey data is the breadth of its coverage of countries –
indeed wider than the countries concentrated on here. The only other equivalent
dataset is that in the European Sourcebook (Council of Europe, 1999). This tack-
les fewer countries and does not set out to collect quite the same criminal justice
system information as here. This said, though, it is fair to say that the Sourcebook
probably attends more to comparability and reliability of the data it collects –
helped perhaps by its more restricted scope.
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The focus here has been on two groupings of countries: (i) Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE); and (ii) countries in Western Europe (including Israel and Tur-
key), to which are added the USA and Canada. For convenience, the latter group
are called ‘Western’ countries. Much of the analysis in this chapter mirrors that
done by Ineke Haen Marshall (1998) when she looked at equivalent data from the
Fifth United Nations Survey.
The police
As regards the police, the main results were:
• It is clear – and not surprising – that in all countries police officers form by far
the highest proportion of criminal justice personnel. The mean was just under
80%. The police share was the same in CEE countries as in Western ones de-
spite the per capita rate of criminal justice personnel as a whole being about a
third higher.
• Policing rates are generally higher in CEE countries, consistent with their
having historically relied heavily on state security forces to maintain order.
The Scandinavian countries tended to have comparatively low per capita po-
licing levels. For 45 countries all told, there was one police employee for ev-
ery 314 people. For CEE countries the figure was one every 247 people, and in
Western ones it was one employee for every 347.
• The police appear more productive in Western countries. This is endorsed by a
closer correspondence between recorded crime figures and an ICVS count of
crime, indicating more responsiveness to victims and perhaps more efficient
systems for recording victims’ reports. Another pointer is the higher number
of suspects dealt with per officer in a year (five) than in the CEE countries
(two). There were also more convictions per officer in Western countries (2.3)
than in CEE ones (1.1).
• The very wide variations in the number of suspects dealt with by the police are
hard to believe. The issue of how suspects are defined and dealt with may be
even more problematic than the count of police officers.
• There was no very clear support for either of two competing explanations of
policing levels: one being that ‘more police equals more crime’ (because of
greater capacity to record crime), the other being ‘more policing equals less
crime’ (because the police are an effective deterrent). The amount of crime
that is counted, irrespective of how much there may ‘really’be, could well be a
compromising factor.
• Pertinent to this was that the results provided the opportunity to look very
roughly at whether the ICVS gives a different picture of relative crime levels
to figures of crimes recorded by the police. This was possible for 34 countries.
A third (11) fell into the same quartile on both crime measures (ie, they might
have been in the ‘worst’ quartile as regards both the ICVS and police figures,
or in both of the ‘best’ ones.) England & Wales and the Netherlands fared
poorly with high crime on both measures. Belarus, Croatia, Georgia and Mac-
edonia, in contrast, fared well with low crime on both. The largest discrepan-
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cies were for Finland (faring poorly on police figures but well on the ICVS),
and the Russian Federation and the Ukraine where the opposite applied.
• When ICVS results were restricted to crimes reported to the police there was
much more correspondence between the survey measure and police figures.
Broadly, then, crime recorded by the police may be a fair guide to the level of
reported crime, but a less good one as regards everyday experience of crime,
much of which remains beyond police knowledge. These results were seen as
confirming the validity of the ICVS for the purpose of international compari-
sons of crime levels.
• Three ICVS measures were harnessed to form an Index of Citizen Evaluation
of Police Performance (CEPPI). (They centred on reporting to the police, vic-
tims’ satisfaction and general attitudes to police performance.) The median
CEPPI value for CEE countries (27) was about a third less than for Western
ones (77) – denoting a very marked difference in police-public relations.
Prosecutors
As regards prosecutors, the main results were:
• In CEE countries, the median number of prosecutors (11 per 100,000) was
over double that in Western countries. This may be because prosecutors have
a much wider role in the processing of cases, and / or because they are more
likely to be career public servants and thus more systematically counted
(Newman and Howard, 1999b). As a corollary, there tended to be more prose-
cutors per capita in countries classified as ‘medium development’on the HDI
scale than in ‘high development’ countries.
• There was a very wide range as regards the number of prosecutions per prose-
cutor, although this is likely to reflect both arrangements for passing on cases
for prosecution, and for what prosecutors can do with them. By and large, the
greater number of prosecutors in CEE countries processed far fewer prosecu-
tions (the median was 56 per prosecutor) than in Western countries (270).
There was diversity in the CEE countries however.
• As a corollary, the CEE countries produced fewer convictions per prosecutor
(33) than Western ones (198). How much this might have to do with the extent
of court capacity is unknown.
• The number of prosecutions and convictions per prosecutor are closer to-
gether in the CEE countries. This might imply that more cases prosecuted are
taken forward to court, although system differences in the scope for prosecu-
tors to drop cases may be a firmer explanation.
Judges
As regards judges, the main results were:
• There are large variations in the number of professional judges per capita. (In-
formation was rather incomplete on lay judges).
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• Unlike prosecutors, there was no marked difference between the CEE coun-
tries as a whole (11 judges per 10,000) and Western ones (12). The majority of
countries compared here operate under civil rather than common law, but all
countries with judicial rates around or above the median were civil law coun-
tries.
Correctional staff
As regards correctional staff, the main results were:
• The proportion of resources in prisons (16% taking all countries together) was
highest after the police. One-third of all criminal justice personnel were in
correctional services in the United States and Estonia, and about a quarter in
the Netherlands, Finland and Denmark.
• There was also wide variation in per capita rates of correctional staff, but
again there was no marked difference between the CEE countries as a whole
(49 corrections officer per 100,000) and Western ones (53). Nonetheless, less
well-developed countries tended to have lower correctional staffing rates.
• The countries with the very highest correctional staff rates had high imprison-
ment levels (Estonia, the Russian Federation, and the USA), but generally
there was only a modest tendency for there to be more correctional staff where
there were more prisoners to look after. (Special factors may explain the very
high rate of correctional staff in Northern Ireland.)
• In the CEE countries, there were 3.1 inmates per correctional employee – over
double the figure elsewhere 1.4). In the countries with the least favourable
staff/inmate ratios, this was more because of high prisoners numbers than be-
cause of particularly low staffing rates comparatively. With the exception of
the U.S. and Greece, all the countries with the worst inmate/staff ratios were
CEE ones.
Overall, in the countries in this analysis, there was one criminal justice system
employee for every 249 people. The figure in the CEE countries was one for ev-
ery 213 people, and one for every 264 people elsewhere.
Gender balance
Some attention was paid to how far the gender balance of criminal justice person-
nel differed across country. Since not all countries provided information on all
four sectors, a Gender Balance Index (GBI) was constructed to minimize the ef-
fect of incomplete data.
• It is clear that criminal justice is still fairly male dominated. Women were
least well represented in the police: overall, 9% of officers were women. A
number of countries had much lower figures. There was large variability in
the proportion of female officers within the two country groupings, but the
medians in each. A few countries seemed to draw more on women – either re-
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flecting a tradition of female participation in military activities (eg, Russia,
Estonia, and Armenia), or fairly higher levels of social development (eg, Swe-
den and the USA).
• Women were better represented among prosecutors and judges, whose work
is probably seen as less dependent on ‘heavier-weight’ masculine skills.
Overall, about a third of prosecutors and judges were women. For judges, the
CEE median was appreciably higher (nearly 60%) than the other countries
(just over a quarter).
• Overall, about a fifth of staff in correctional institutions was women. The
highest figures were mainly in CEE countries.
• There was little association between the 1998 UN Gender-related Develop-
ment Index and the percentage of women in the criminal justice workforce.
This could well be because some of the countries with the highest levels of fe-
male CJS penetration were not particularly well-developed in other
socio-economic terms
• On the Gender Balance Index, CEE countries mainly had the best representation
of female staff, although this was also true of the USA, Sweden, and Canada.
Attrition
The productivity indica tors discussed above – e.g. how many suspects the police
‘produce’, and how many convictions prosecutors secure – was also used to as-
sess the process of attrition, or the progressive funnelling away of the number of
crimes the police know about to the number of convictions in court. The analysis
of differential attrition rates was done mindful of the substantial problems that
follow from the wide range of procedural arrangements, and the lack of linkage
within countries between respective measures of crimes, suspects, prosecutions
and convictions. (The attrition analysis, it should be noted, compares offences
recorded against offenders suspected, prosecuted or convicted. Thus, it does not
provide an exact measure of how many crimes lead (for example) to a conviction
– since one offence could have more than one offender, and one offender could
be responsible for more than one offence. Moreover, there is no linkage between
individuals, but rather simply a count of the different constituencies.) The main
results were:
• The volume of crime is much greater in Western countries, and this may well
because of more complete recording. In any event, though, the fall-off be-
tween recorded crime and suspects is much more marked in Western coun-
tries (29 suspects for every 100 crimes) than in the CEE ones (53 suspects for
100 crimes).
• There was also less attrition at the other stages in the CEE countries.
Three-quarters of suspects were prosecuted (or more accurately there were
0.75 times the number of prosecutions as suspects), and three-quarters of
prosecutions led to a conviction. In Western countries, about two-thirds of
suspects were prosecuted and about two-thirds of prosecutions led to a con-
viction.
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• Taking all countries together, for every 100 crimes, there were 41 suspects, 28
prosecutions and 21 convictions. In the CEE countries, there were 53 sus-
pects, 40 prosecutions and 30 convictions. For Western countries, the figures
were 29 suspects, 19 prosecutions and 12 convictions.
Corruption
Three corruption measures were used to create a Corruption Index which – tak-
ing some licence – it was assumed reflected the behaviour of criminal justice per-
sonnel as well as that of other public officials. There was much more corruption
in the CEE countries, although there was variation within them. Not surprisingly,
there was a strong negative association between the Corruption Index and
CEPPI: countries where corruption seems more rife are generally those where
the public also seem to have less confidence and support for the police.
An overall assessment
Five measures of productivity as well as CEPPI and the Corruption Index were
combined to produce an overall measure of performance. It is a fairly blunt mea-
sure, but better than nothing as a summary tool. For some countries, there were
too few of the seven measures to produce useful conclusions. For countries with
a reasonable number of measures, the best performers were Finland, the Nether-
lands, England and Wales, Sweden, Scotland, Canada, Denmark and Switzer-
land. The next best performers were the USA, Hungary, Austria, Spain, Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Turkey and Northern Ireland. The worse performers
were, with the exception of Portugal, Israel, Italy, Malta and Cyprus, all in CEE
countries.
There was no clear association between the overall performance measure and
the level of crime in different countries. This may reflect the fact that countries
that appear to be performing badly in terms of the volume of crime simply have
more capacity to record it, or more opportunities for it provided by compara-
tively affluent conditions (e.g., van Dijk, 1999). It may also signify that criminal
justice systems play a minor part in determining crime levels compared to social,
political and economic dynamics.
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Annex A
The Indices
Each of the three Indices used is available on the UN Sixth Survey data. How-
ever, the Indices used were reconstructed by the author after a process of tidying,
correcting and adding some data. The Indices were constructed as follows:
(i) Countries were ranked-order on the basis of values for each of the measures
available.
(ii) For the Gender Balance Index and the Corruption Index, these ranks were
adjusted to take account of the fact that the number of countries with values
on each measure differed. (This was done as any simple averaging of the
ranks would give undue weight to measures for which more countries had
values). For CEPPI, the three measures were available for all countries in-
cluded.
(iii)These adjusted ranks were summed and then averaged according to the num-
ber of measures available.
(iv) These averages were then rank ordered.
(v) Then these ranks were scaled to 100.
Gender Balance index
The four possible measures were the proportion of staff who were female among
(i) the police; (ii) prosecutors; (iii) judges; and (iv) correctional staff. Only one
measure was available for: Bulgaria (correctional staff), Canada (police); France
(police), Liechtenstein (police) and Poland (police). Values for these countries,
therefore, are problematic. There was missing data for: Albania, Luxembourg,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Yugoslavia
Citizen Evaluation of Police Performance Index (CEPPI)
All countries had the three measures from the ICVS on (i) the percentage of con-
tact crimes reported to the police; (ii) the percentage of reporting victims who
were satisfied with police performance after reporting a crime (any crime); and
(iii) the percentage of all ICVS respondents satisfied with police performance in
the local area. No adjustment was made for differences between national and city
surveys, since there was no clear pattern that attitudes differed. There was miss-
ing data for: Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Israel, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Moldova, Norway,
Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. There was data for Yugosla-
via, but this is omitted because there are no data on other measures. (Attitudes on
the three dimensions were rather below the average in Yugoslavia.)
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The Corruption Index
The first of the three measure from the ICVS question on ‘low level’ corruption
by public officials. Data was available for 33 countries. Those in countries with
city survey were rather more likely to have experienced corruption than in the na-
tional surveys and therefore city values were downgraded by the median of the
difference in victimisation rates (1.7). There were 43 countries with 1999 data
available on the Transparency International Corruption Ranking, based on cor-
rupt practices as perceived by the business sector. The third was the World Eco-
nomic Forum measure on whether improper practices (bribery/corruption) pre-
vailed in the public sphere (see World Competitiveness Yearbook 1999, pub-
lished by the Institute of Management Development. The values for 1999 were
taken. Data were used for 23 countries.
There was missing data for: Andorra, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, and Yugoslavia.
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Police Prosecutors Judges Correctional staff
Albania 97 na na na
Andorra 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Armenia 94 94 94 94
Austria 94 94 94 94
Azerbaijan na 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Belarus na 94 95, 97 94
Belgium 94 95 95 95, 97
Bulgaria na 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Canada 95, 97 na na 95, 97
Croatia 97 95, 97 95, 97 94
Cyprus 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Czech Rep. 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Denmark 95, 97 95, 97 97 95, 97
England & Wales 95, 97 95, 97 97 97
Estonia 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Finland 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
France 94 na na na
Georgia na 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Germany 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97 97
Greece 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Hungary 94 94 94 95, 97
Iceland 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Ireland 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Israel 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Italy 95, 97 na 95, 97 95, 97
Kazakhstan 97 95 94 na
Kyrgyzstan na 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Latvia 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Liechtenstein 94 na na na
Lithuania 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Table I. Availability of data for analyses (year)
131
Police Prosecutors Judges Correctional staff
Luxembourg 94 94 94 94
Macedonia, FYR 94 94 95, 97 94
Malta 94 na 94 94
Moldova, Rep. of 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Netherlands 95, 97 94 90 95, 97
Northern Ireland 95, 97 na 95, 97 95, 97
Norway 94 na 94 94
Poland 95, 97 na na na
Portugal 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Romania 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Russian Federation 94 94 94 94
Scotland 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Slovakia 94 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Slovenia 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Spain 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Sweden 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Switzerland 95, 97 na 90 95, 97
Tajikistan na na na na
Turkey 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97 95, 97
Turkmenistan na na na na
Ukraine 95, 97 na 95, 97 95, 97
USA 95, 97 97 97 95, 97
Uzbekistan na na na na
Yugoslavia na na na na
Missing data (na) 9 15 9 9
1995 & 1997 data 30 28 32 34
1997 only 3 1 2 2
1995 only 2 1
1994 data 12 8 8 9
1990 data 2
Total countries 54 54 54 54
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Police per
100,000
(1)
Total
police
numbers
Quartile Rank
(1 =
highest)
Albania 408 15,216 3 14
Andorra 214 152 1 38 Police per 100,000 population
Armenia 405 15,191 3 15 Median Mean Standard
Austria 367 29,474 3 18 deviation
Belgium 344 34,712 3 21 CEE countries 405 424 249
Western countries 288 320 134
Canada 183 54,864 1 43 Total 318 359 190
Croatia 427 19,227 4 10
Cyprus 527 3,949 4 5 25% quartile 231
Czech Rep. 415 42,845 4 13 Median 318
Denmark 193 10,160 1 41 75% quartile 417
England & Wales 244 126,835 2 32
Estonia (2) 318 4,681 3 23
Finland 156 7,984 1 45
France 349 201,132 3 20
Germany 309 252,626 2 25
Greece 370 38,790 3 17
Hungary 293 30,041 2 27
Iceland 226 609 1 35
Ireland 300 10,897 2 26
Israel 424 24,137 4 11
Italy 544 312,492 4 4
Kazakhstan 788 132,701 4 2
Latvia 417 10,387 4 12
Liechenstein 190 59 1 42
Lithuania 481 17,844 4 7
Luxembourg 276 1,100 2 28
Macedonia 318 6,807 3 24
Malta 507 1,845 4 6
Moldova, Rep. of 164 7,121 1 44
Netherlands 196 30,440 1 40
Table II. Levels of policing
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Police per
100,000
(1)
Total
police
numbers
Quartile Rank
(1 =
highest)
Northern Ireland
(3)
714 11 492 4 3
Norway 231 10,042 2 34
Poland 260 100,283 2 30
Portugal 453 44,680 4 9
Romania 240 54,242 2 33
Russian
Federation
1,225 1,812,344 4 1
Scotland 370 18,985 3 16
Slovakia 352 18,834 3 19
Slovenia 224 4,453 1 36
Spain (4) 338 132,658 3 22
Sweden 269 23,757 2 29
Switzerland 202 14,261 1 39
Turkey 216 135,571 1 37
Ukraine 468 238,425 4 8
USA 253 672,640 2 31
Notes
1 In most cases, the average of 1995 and 1997 (see Table I in Annex B for details).
2 Estonia: security police board personnel are excluded. The 1994 figure was much higher.
3 Northern Ireland: total police personnel includes full-time reserve figures (c. 3,000 in each year).
These were excluded from the Fifth Survey.
4 Spain: figures include the gendarme, the three corps of the autonomic regions.
Figures for local forces are not available.
Table II. (continued)
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Prosecutors
per 100,000
(1)
Total
prosecutor
numbers
Quartile Rank
(1 =
highest)
Andorra 5 4 1 31
Armenia 9 327 3 17 Prosecutors per 100,000 population
Austria (2) 2 200 1 38 Median Mean Standard
Azerbaijan 16 1,223 4 6 deviation
Belarus 15 1,495 4 7
CEE countries 11 13 5
Belgium 7 753 3 20 Western countries 5 6 3
Bulgaria 7 606 2 22
Croatia 7 307 2 25 Total 7 9 5
Cyprus 6 47 2 27
Czech Rep. 8 855 3 19 25% quartile 5
Median 7
Denmark 9 481 3 15 75% quartile 12
England & Wales 4 2,151 1 34
Estonia 10 151 3 13
Finland 5 250 1 32
Georgia 17 896 4 5
Germany 6 5,293 2 26
Greece 4 429 1 35
Hungary 11 1,153 3 11
Iceland 5 14 2 29
Ireland 2 57 1 39
Israel (3) 7 406 2 23
Kazakhstan 20 3,133 4 3
Kyrgyzstan 12 567 4 9
Latvia 24 603 4 1
Lithuania 20 758 4 2
Luxembourg 7 27 2 24
Macedonia, FYR 5 113 2 28
Moldova, Rep. of 12 528 4 10
Netherlands 3 417 1 37
Portugal 10 953 3 14
Table III. Levels of prosecutors
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Prosecutors
per 100,000
(1)
Total
prosecutor
numbers
Quartile Rank
(1 =
highest)
Romania 8 1,906 3 18
Russian
Federation
19 28,514 4 4
Scotland 5 254 1 30
Slovakia 10 563 3 12
Slovenia 7 146 2 21
Spain 3 1,227 1 36
Sweden 14 1,280 4 8
Turkey 5 2,835 1 33
USA 9 24,040 3 16
Note
1 In most cases, the average of 1995 and 1997 (see Table I in Annex B for details).
2 Austria: total prosecutors do not include district prosecutors (the ‘Bereichsanwalt’).
3 Israel: the figure includes police prosecutors.
Table III. (continued)
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Lay judges Professional judges Ratio of lay judges to
professionals
Estonia 373 14 27
Slovenia 192 37 5
Croatia 151 28 5
Macedonia, FYR 131 24 5
Hungary 120 21 6
Czech Rep. 111 22 5
Slovakia 108 22 5
Scotland (2) 80 5 16
Finland 74 18 4
Sweden 69 13 5
England & Wales 58 4 13
Germany 37 26 1
Belgium 22 12 2
Spain 20 8 2
Italy 8 15 1
Latvia 7 10 1
Northern Ireland 3 3 1
Malta 2 8 <1
Cyprus 1 9 <1
USA (3) <1 4 <1
Note
1 In most cases, the average of 1995 and 1997 (see Table I in Annex B for details).
2 Scotland. The number of professional judges and magistrates includes judges, magistrates, sheriffs and
stipendiary magistrates.
3 USA. Includes judges from federal and state courts, but not from the lower courts (e.g. municipal and
police courts).
Table IV. Lay and professional judges and magistrates (per 100,000 population) (1)
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Judges /
magistrates
per 100,000
(1)
Total
numbers
Quartile Rank
(1 =
highest)
Andorra 32 23 4 3
Armenia 3 95 1 45
Austria 20 1,589 4 12
Azerbaijan 3 210 1 43 Judges / magistrates per 100,000 population
Belarus 9 932 2 26 Median Mean Standard
deviation
Belgium 12 1,242 3 23 CEE countries 11 13 9
Bulgaria 12 1,038 3 20 Western countries 12 15 14
Croatia 28 1,276 4 4
Cyprus 9 65 2 28 Total 12 14 12
Czech Rep. 22 2,243 4 8
25% quartile 7
Denmark 12 653 3 21 Median 12
England & Wales 4 2,262 1 39 75% quartile 20
Estonia 14 202 3 16
Finland 18 935 3 13
Georgia 7 387 2 33
Germany 26 21,567 4 6
Greece 20 2,119 4 11
Hungary 21 2,198 4 10
Iceland 17 47 3 14
Ireland 3 95 1 44
Israel 7 379 1 35
Italy 15 8,343 3 15
Kazakhstan 7 1,142 2 34
Kyrgyzstan 7 299 1 36
Latvia 10 259 2 24
Lithuania 13 483 3 19
Luxembourg 27 107 4 5
Macedonia, FYR 24 498 4 7
Malta 8 29 2 32
Moldova, Rep. of 6 271 1 37
Netherlands 8 1,204 2 31
Northern Ireland 3 46 1 42
Norway 10 422 2 25
Table V. Levels of judges and magistrates
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Judges /
magistrates
per 100,000
(1)
Total
numbers
Quartile Rank
(1 =
highest)
Portugal 12 1,216 3 22
Romania 13 2,968 3 18
Russian
Federation
9 12,577 2 29
Scotland (2) 5 254 1 38
Slovakia 22 1,162 4 9
Slovenia 37 737 4 2
Spain 8 3,196 2 30
Sweden 13 1,164 3 17
Switzerland 70 4,296 4 1
Turkey 9 5,512 2 27
Ukraine 4 5,684 1 40
USA (3) 4 10,021 1 40
Note
1 In most cases, the average of 1995 and 1997 (see Table I in Annex B for details).
2 Scotland: the number of professional judges and magistrates includes judges, magistrates, sheriffs
and stipendiary magistrates.
3 USA: includes judges from federal and state courts, but not from the lower courts
(e.g. municipal and police courts).
Table V. (continued)
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Correctional
staff
per 100,000
population(1)
Total
number of
staff
Quartile Rank
(1 =
highest)
Staff /
inmate
ratio
Quartile Staff /
inmate rank
(1 =
highest)
Andorra 51 36 3 22 1.3 3 12
Armenia 28 1,064 1 42 na na na
oAustria 44 3,514 2 33 2.1 2 23
Azerbaijan 46 3,479 2 28 na na na
Belarus 35 3,611 1 37 15.8 1 38
Belgium 45 4,536 2 30 1.8 3 18
Bulgaria 35 2,925 1 36 3.3 1 31
Canada 94 28,026 4 5 1.3 3 13
Croatia 49 2,185 2 26 1.4 3 15
Cyprus 28 213 1 41 1.1 4 9
Czech Rep. 87 8,999 4 7 2.3 2 25
Denmark 64 3,370 3 16 1.0 4 6
England & Wales 69 35,746 3 13 1.6 3 16
Estonia 163 2,394 4 2 1.9 2 20
Finland 54 2,756 3 20 1.1 4 10
Georgia 37 2,028 1 35 4.5 1 34
Germany 44 36,148 2 32 1.9 3 19
Greece 20 2,066 1 45 2.8 1 30
Hungary 65 6,621 3 15 2.0 2 22
Iceland 35 94 1 38 1.1 3 11
Ireland 69 2,495 3 14 0.9 4 3
Israel (2) 64 3,623 3 17 2.3 2 26
Italy 82 46,966 4 10 1.1 4 8
Kyrgyzstan 23 1,056 1 43 2.8 1 29
Latvia 79 1,968 3 12 5.0 1 36
Lithuania 88 3,278 4 6 4.1 1 33
Luxembourg 46 185 2 29 na na na
Macedonia, FYR 23 500 1 44 na na na
Malta 33 120 1 39 na na na
Moldova, Rep. of 50 2,183 2 23 4.7 1 35
Netherlands 80 12,369 4 11 1.0 4 7
Northern Ireland 189 3,040 4 1 0.6 4 1
Norway 53 2,281 3 21 0.9 4 4
Portugal 56 5,485 3 19 2.5 2 28
Romania 32 7,318 1 40 6.2 1 37
Table VI. Levels of correctional staff
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Correctional
staff
per 100,000
population(1)
Total
number
of staff
Quartile Rank
(1 =
highest)
Staff /
inmate
ratio
Quartile Staff /
inmate
rank (1 =
highest)
Russian Federation 154 228,495 4 3 na na na
Scotland 84 4,302 4 9 1.4 3 14
Slovakia 85 4,581 4 8 1.7 3 17
Slovenia 45 885 2 31 0.8 4 2
Spain 50 19,765 2 24 2.3 2 27
Sweden 62 5,438 3 18 1.0 4 5
Switzerland 47 2,867 2 27 2.1 2 24
Turkey (2) 40 25,100 2 34 1.9 2 21
Ukraine 50 25,645 2 25 na na na
USA 147 391,204 4 4 4.0 1 32
Median Mean Standard
deviation
Median Mean Standard
deviation
CEE countries 49 62 37 3.1 4.0 3.7
Western countries 53 63 36 1.4 1.6 0.8
All countries 50 63 37 1.9 2.5 2.6
25% quartile 40 1.1
Median 50 1.9
75% quartile 79 2.8
Note
1 In most cases, the average of 1995 and 1997 (see Table I in Annex B for details).
2 The inmate:staff ratio for Turkey is from 1994 data.
Table VI. (continued)
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Staff per
100,000
population(1)
Quartile Rank
(1 = highest)
% police %
Prosecutors,
judges and
magistrates
%
correctional
staff
Andorra 302 1 26 70.9 12.3 16.8
Armenia 444 3 12 91.2 2.5 6.3
Austria 433 3 13 84.7 5.1 10.2
tBelgium 408 3 16 84.2 4.8 11.0
Croatia 511 4 7 83.7 6.8 9.6
Cyprus 570 4 3 92.4 2.6 5.0
Czech Rep. 532 4 4 78.0 5.6 16.4
Denmark 279 1 30 69.4 7.7 22.9
England & Wales 322 2 24 76.0 2.6 21.4
Estonia 505 4 8 63.0 4.8 32.2
Finland 233 1 33 67.0 9.9 23.1
Germany 386 2 19 80.0 8.5 11.5
Greece 414 3 14 89.4 5.9 4.8
Hungary 390 2 18 75.1 8.4 16.5
Iceland 284 1 29 79.8 8.0 12.2
Ireland 373 2 20 80.5 1.1 18.4
Israel 502 4 9 84.6 2.7 12.7
Latvia 530 4 6 78.6 6.5 14.9
Lithuania 603 4 2 79.8 5.5 14.7
Luxembourg 356 2 23 77.6 9.5 12.9
Macedonia, FYR 370 2 21 85.9 7.9 6.2
Moldova, Rep. of 233 1 32 70.5 7.9 21.6
Netherlands 287 1 28 68.3 3.7 28.0
Portugal 531 4 5 85.4 4.1 10.5
Romania 294 1 27 81.6 7.3 11.0
Russian Federation 1,407 4 1 87.1 2.0 10.9
Scotland 464 3 11 79.8 2.1 18.1
Slovakia 469 3 10 75.0 6.8 18.2
Slovenia 313 1 25 71.6 14.2 14.2
Spain 401 3 17 84.6 2.8 12.6
Table VII. Levels of total criminal justice staff (police officers, prosecutors, judges and
magistrates, and staff in correctional institutions)
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Staff per
100,000
population(1)
Quartile Rank
(1 =
highest)
% police %
Prosecutors
, judges and
magistrates
%
correctional
staff
Sweden 358 2 22 75.1 7.7 17.2
Turkey 269 1 31 80.2 4.9 14.9
USA 414 3 15 61.3 3.1 35.6
Median(rate) Mean(rate) Standard
deviation
Mean (%) Mean (%) Mean (%)
CEE countries 469 508 291 78.5 6.6 14.8
Western countries 379 379 92 78.5 5.5 16.0
All countries 401 430 202 78.5 5.9 15.5
25% quartile (of rate) 313
Median 401
75% quartile 502
Note
1 In most cases, the average of 1995 and 1997 (see Table I in Annex B for details).
Table VII. (continued)
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Female share of criminal justice staff (%)
Police Prosecutors Judges Corrections All sectors (2)
Andorra 9 57 15 11 10
Armenia 17 5 23 na 16
Austria 14 16 19 13 14
Azerbaijan na 3 10 13 na
Belarus na 19 58 32 na
Belgium 6 34 31 7 7
Canada 10 na na na na
Croatia 7 na 56 25 12
Cyprus 8 55 21 4 8
Czech Rep. 12 56 63 21 16
Denmark 6 46 50 na 10
England & Wales 15 46 13 21 16
Estonia 21 64 64 29 26
Finland 6 38 30 na 10
France 3 na na na na
Georgia na 3 16 24 na
Germany na 28 26 na na
Greece 6 24 50 10 9
Hungary 10 na na 34 na
Iceland 4 na 19 13 6
Ireland 8 52 14 na 7
Israel 19 na 41 3 17
Italy 4 na 30 14 6
Kazakhstan 1 20 34 na 2
Kyrgyzstan 15 78 10 na
Latvia 14 55 70 32 20
Liechenstein 3 na na na na
Lithuania 10 38 44 32 15
Luxembourg na na na na na
Macedomia 5 31 47 13 9
Malta 13 na 4 12 na
Moldova, Rep. of 2 16 28 23 8
Netherlands 14 31 31 27 18
Northern Ireland 10 na 4 9 9
Norway 31 na 16 na na
Table VIII. Female criminal justice personnel (percentages) (1)
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Female share of criminal justice staff (%)
Police Prosecutors Judges Corrections All sectors (2)
Poland 9 na na na na
Portugal 3 41 31 na 5
Romania 9 40 63 16 13
Russian Federation 33 33 57 30 33
Scotland 24 na 8 17 23
Slovakia na 44 58 13 na
Slovenia 4 na 63 24 12
Spain 3 43 32 23 7
Sweden 33 na 36 na na
Switzerland 10 na 39 na na
Turkey 3 5 27 5 4
Ukraine 5 na na 26 7
USA 23 na na 30 na
Median Median Median Median Median
CEE countries 9 31 57 25 13
Western countries 8 39 27 12 9
All countries 9 34 31 19 10
Note
1 In most cases, the average of 1995 and 1997 (see Table I in Annex B for details).
2 Shown only for those countries which provided information for the police and at least two of the other sectors.
Table VIII. (continued)
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Offences recorded
by the police
Suspects Prosecutions Convictions
Andorra 2,854 na 1,890 1,204
Armenia 314 217 180 160
Austria 6,283 2,512 na 824
Azerbaijan (2) 238 191 na 184
Belarus 1,260 654 569
Belgium 7,472 na na 397
Bulgaria (2) 2,574 1,162 na 296
Canada 9,037 1,911 1,773 1,112
Croatia 1,290 740 1,064 315
Cyprus (3) na 721 167 105
Czech Rep. 3,792 na 1,054 556
Denmark 10,135 3,166 1,611
England & Wales 9,463 1,364 966 629
Estonia (4) 2,630 718 718 580
Finland 7,366 4,194 1,691 1,623
France 6,787 1,343 na na
Georgia 259 139 150 136
Germany 8,103 2,689 804 628
Greece 3,359 2,843 na 853
Hungary 4,849 1,224 1,048 853
Iceland na na 522 na
Ireland 2,703 1,099 866 na
Israel 5,744 1,527 727 705
Italy 4,141 1,356 1,051 433
Kazakhstan 1,094 644 660 257
Kyrgyzstan 859 484 na 418
Latvia 1,527 414 571 452
Lithuania 1,839 636 na 491
Luxembourg 5,254 na na na
Macedonia, FYR 1,124 1,037 346
Malta 2,114 na na na
Moldova, Rep. of 871 331 345 329
Netherlands 7,777 1,656 1,429 598
Northern Ireland 4,133 na 660 512
Norway 6,740 1,567 1,067 397
Table IX. Criminal Justice processing information (cases per 100,000 population) (1)
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Offences
recorded
by the police
Suspects Prosecutions Convictions
Poland 2,473 1,050 na na
Portugal 3,274 2,150 930 376
Romania (2) 1,444 969 na 559
Russian Federation 1,757 974 625 549
Scotland 9,699 na 1,522 1,227
Slovakia 1,901 885 707 449
Slovenia 1,876 743 935 240
Spain 1,763 346 620
Sweden 13,263 997 1,597 690
Switzerland 4,509 na na 955
Turkey (5) na na 2,500 1,148
Ukraine 1,207 571 665 442
USA (6) 5,728 5,174 352
25% quartile 1,506 642 660 352
Median 2,779 1,023 933 512
75% quartile 6,397 1,537 1,339 705
Mean 4,013 1,310 1,145 600
Standard deviation 3,221 1,138 957 369
Median Median Median Median
CEE countries 1,485 718 665 418
Western countries 6,014 1,567 1,067 660
Total 2,779 1,310 933 512
Note
1 In most cases the average of 1995 and 1997. Exceptions are as follows, for which 1994 data are used
where other 1995/97 values are sufficiently close to those for 1994:
(I) Crime rates: Austria, France,  Luxembourg, Malta,
(ii) Suspect rate: Armenia, Austria, France, Macedonia, Russian Federation, Slovakia.
(iii) Prosecution rate: Denmark, Italy, Russian Federation.
(iv) Conviction rate: Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Russian Federation.
2 The values for Azerbaijan, Bulgaria and Romania for prosecutions are omitted as they are much smaller
than convictions.
3 There are fewer recorded crimes in Cyprus than suspects. The former therefore are omitted.
4 Estonia does not distinguish between suspected, and prosecuted invididuals, Thus, the figures are similar.
5 The rate  in Turkey for crimes (475) and suspects (488) are so low as to be implausible, especially given
the number of prosecutions.
6 The USA data on offences only covers selected offences (the so-called Index crimes).
Table IX. (continued)
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Offences recorded
by the police = 100
Suspects Prosecutions Convictions
Andorra 100 na 66 42
Armenia 100 69 57 51
Austria 100 40 na 13
Azerbaijan 100 80 na 78
Belarus 100 na 52 45
Belgium 100 na na 5
Bulgaria 100 45 na 12
Canada 100 21 20 12
Croatia 100 57 na 24
Cyprus 100 na 30 19
Czech Rep. 100 na 28 15
Denmark 100 na 31 16
England & Wales 100 14 10 7
Estonia 100 27 27 22
Finland 100 57 23 22
France 100 20 na na
Georgia 100 53 58 52
Germany 100 32 10 8
Greece 100 85 na 25
Hungary 100 25 22 18
Ireland 100 41 32
Israel 100 27 13 12
Italy 100 33 25 10
Kazakhstan 100 59 60 24
Kyrgyzstan 100 56 na 49
Latvia 100 na 37 30
Lithuania 100 35 na 27
Moldova, Rep. of 100 38 40 38
Netherlands 100 21 18 8
Northern Ireland 100 na 16 12
Norway 100 23 16 6
Poland 100 42 na na
Portugal 100 66 28 11
Romania 100 67 na 39
Russian Federation 100 55 36 31
Scotland 100 na 16 13
Slovakia 100 47 37 24
Slovenia 100 na 50 13
Spain 100 20 na 35
Sweden 100 na 12 5
Switzerland 100 na na 21
Ukraine 100 na 55 37
CEE countries median 49 45 30
Western countries median 25 19 12
All countries median 40 34 21
Note
1 See Table IX for countries for which 1994 data are used.
2 For Macedonia and the USA, although there is no appropriate recorded crime measure, other data on
suspects,  prosecutions and convictions was used in Figures 3 and 4.
Table X. Attrition between crimes recorded, suspects, prosecutions and convictions (1)
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Police
recording
productivy
Suspects
per 100
police
Prosec-
utions per
prosecutor
Convic-
tions per
prosecutor
Convic-
tions per
100 police
CEPPI Corruption
Index
Average of
quartiles
Albania na na na na na 2 1 1.5
Andorra na na 4 4 4 na na 4.0
Armenia na 1 1 1 1 na 1 1.0
Austria 4 4 na 4 3 2 3 3.3
Azerbaijan na na na 1 na na 1 1.0
Belarus 3 na 2 2 na 1 2 2.0
Belgium 4 na na 3 2 3 3 3.0
Bulgaria 2 na na 2 na 2 1 1.7
Canada 4 4 na na 4 4 4 4.0
Croatia 2 2 3 2 1 2 1 1.9
Cyprus na 1 1 1 1 na na 1.0
Czech Rep. 2 na 3 3 2 2 2 2.3
Denmark 4 na na 4 4 4 4 4.0
England &
Wales
4 4 3 3 3 4 4 3,6
Estonia 2 2 2 3 3 1 3 2.3
Finland 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3.9
France 3 3 na na na 4 3 3.2
Georgia 1 na 1 1 3 1 1 1.3
Germany na 4 3 3 na na 3 3.2
Greece na 4 na 4 na na 2 3.3
Hungary 3 3 2 3 4 2 3 2.9
Iceland na na 2 na na na 4 3.0
Ireland na 3 4 na na na 3 3.3
Israel na 2 2 3 2 na 3 2.4
Italy 3 2 na na 1 2 2 2.0
Kazakhstan na 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0
Kyrgyzstan 1 na na 2 na na 1 1.3
Latvia 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1.3
Lithuania 1 1 na 1 2 1 2 1.3
Luxembourg na na na na na na 4 4,0
Table XI. Overall assessment of performance indicators (quartiles)
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Police
recording
productivy
Suspects
per 100
police
Prosec-
utions per
prosecutor
Convic-
tions per
prosecutor
Convic-
tions per
100 police
CEPPI Corruption
Index
Average of
quartiles
Macedonia,
FYR
1 2 3 3 na 3 2 2.3
Malta 2 na na na na 3 2 2.3
Moldova,
Rep. of
2 1 1 3 na 1 5 1.6
Netherlands 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3,9
Northern
Ireland
3 na na na 1 4 4 3.0
Norway na 4 na na 3 na 4 3.7
Poland 2 3 na 2 na 2 2 2.2
Portugal 4 3 2 2 1 2 3 2.4
Romania 1 3 na 4 3 1 2 2.3
Russian Fed. 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.1
Scotland 4 na 4 4 4 4 4 4.0
Slovakia 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 2.0
Slovenia 1 2 3 2 2 3 3 2.3
Spain 2 1 na 4 3 3 3 2.7
Sweden 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 3.4
Switzerland 3 na na na 4 3 4 3.5
Turkey na na 4 4 4 na 1 3.2
Ukraine 1 1 na na 1 1 1 1.0
USA 3 4 4 2 2 4 3 3.1
Table XI. (continued)
6 Sanctions1 2
Elmar G.M. Weitekamp
6.1 Introduction
The Sixth United Nations Survey provided with regard to sanctions information
on the number of adults convicted, the death penalty, corporal punishment, life
imprisonment, the deprivation of liberty, control in freedom, warning or admoni-
tion, fines, and community service orders. According to Kuhn (1998) countries
have a wide range of sanctions at their disposal and they can be imposed, depend-
ing on the country, either by courts, prosecutors or even the police. By comparing
the reported sanctions one has to take into account that the defining, handling, re-
cording and reporting modalities of the countries can vary substantially. The va-
lidity of these kind of data has often been questioned and it is quite difficult to
summarize the number and types of the reported sentences. One finds a similar
problem with police data, where there are also huge differences between coun-
tries with regard to crimes reported to and recorded by the police. However, these
inherent biases within each criminal justice system, based on the way the police
define, handle and count offenses, might be relatively stable over time. Accord-
ing to Killias and Aebi (2000) police recording practices do not change very
much over time and therefore police statistics are relatively valid indicators of
crime trends. The authors think that this pragmatic point of view is particularly
true if one compares crime trends between Europe and America. There are good
reasons to believe that this is also true for comparing the reported data on sen-
tencing as found in the Sixth United Nations Survey and the European
Sourcebook. In looking at data on sentences and punishment, Shinkai and
Zvekic (1999) warn in addition rightly, that one cannot conclude that one coun-
try is more punitive than another based on the percentages of types of punish-
ments reported. Since the question asked in the survey is how many persons were
sentenced to a particular punishment, the reported percentages give answers
about the spectrum of punishments available in a particular country. Even if, ac-
cording to Shinkai and Zvekic (op.cit.), one considers corporal punishment far
more punitive or harsh than other punishments, this would be a value judgment
about the comparative severity of punishments, regardless of to whom and how
often such sentences were imposed.
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1 The author would like to thank Petra Bossert for making the necessary computer runs and for the creation of the tables.
2 This chapter has been modified by the editors taking into account the comments brought forth by well-informed exper-
tise in the field.
6.2 The sixth United Nations survey and
data on sanctions
In the Sixth United Nations Survey participating countries were asked to report
the imposition of the following sanctions: the death penalty, which was sup-
posed to be understood as any sentence by which the convicted person is to be le-
gally deprived of life and which may be carried out by any one of a variety of
means such as electrocution, hanging, firing squad, lethal injection, stoning, etc.;
corporal punishment, meaning any sentence in which the convicted person’s
body is to be subjected to physical pain such as, among other things, flogging,
mutilation, electric shock or branding; life imprisonment, meaning any sentence
in which the convicted person is to be deprived of liberty in an institution of any
kind for the duration of his or her natural life; deprivation of liberty, which may
be understood as various forms of detention, including security measures, com-
bined or split sentences (where at least one part of the sentence involves depriva-
tion of liberty) or any other sanction in which the person is forced to spend at
least one night in an institution of any kind, whereby the period of detention is
fixed at some interval short of the natural life span of the convicted person (i.e. a
determinate sentence); control in freedom, including probation orders, elec-
tronic monitoring, conditional sentences with additional supervision require-
ments, and other forms of so-called controlled liberty (i.e. where the person is re-
quired to fulfil special requirements with regard to supervision); warning or ad-
monition, including suspended sentences, conditional sentences, findings of
guilt without sanctions, formal admonitions, formal warnings, imposing of du-
ties without control, conditional dismissals, conditional discharges; fines, mean-
ing all sentences that involve paying a sum of money, including punitive mea-
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Country 1995 1997 Change
Armenia 5 2 -60.0%
Azerbaijan 30 23 -23.3%
Belarus 37 46 +24.3%
Estonia na 4 na
Georgia 25 7 -72.0%
Latvia 4 na na
Lithuania na 3 na
Russian Federation 141 106 -24.8%
Turkey 0 4 na
USA 240 228 -5.0%
Ukraine 191 128 -33.0%
Total 674 551 -18.2%
Source: 6th Survey
Table 1. Adults on whom death penalty sentences were imposed: 1995, 1997
sures as well as compensation and restitution; and finally community service or-
ders, meaning sentences in which the convicted person is expected to perform
some activity which provides some benefit to the community.
The death penalty: eleven of the participating countries reported the imposi-
tion of death penalty sentences for adults.
There was an 18% reduction in the number of death penalty sentences that
were reported to have been imposed between 1995 and 1997. Nine of the eleven
countries reporting such sentences are former republics of the Soviet Union;
there was a 26% fall in the number of such sentences in these countries. Belarus
reported an increase (of 24%) between the two years and Estonia and Lithuania,
which made no response in respect of 1995, reported four and three respectively
in 1997. The other six former Soviet republics reported fewer cases in 1997 than
in 1995; Ukraine and Russia, the European countries whose courts made most
use of this penalty, reported 33% fewer and 25% fewer respectively. Georgia’s
total fell from 25 to seven. Turkey is a member state of the Council of Europe and
a de facto moratorium on the death penalty has been in force there since 1 Janu-
ary 1997; nonetheless four such sentences were imposed in 1997 (there had been
none in 1995).
The USA is the only country in Western Europe or North America where the
death penalty still exists, but the number of death sentences imposed decreased
between 1995 and 1997 by 5% (from 240 to 228). Amnesty International (2001)
reported that 85 prisoners were executed in the USA in the latest 12 months for
which figures were available, bringing to 683 the total number executed since the
use of the death penalty was resumed in 1977. As of 1 January 2000 over 3,700
prisoners were under sentence of death in the USA where 38 of the 50 US States
provide for the death penalty in law. Amnesty International (op.cit.) reports fur-
ther that over half of the countries in the world have now abolished the death pen-
alty in law or practice. 75 countries have abolished the death penalty for all
crimes, while 13 countries abolished the death penalty for all but exceptional
crimes such as crimes in wartime. An additional 20 countries can be considered
abolitionist in practice since they have not carried out any executions in the past
10 years although according to their laws the death penalty can still be imposed.
Thus 108 countries have abolished the death penalty in law or practice, while 87
countries still retain the death penalty. During 2000 at least 1,457 prisoners were
executed in 28 countries and 3,058 persons were sentenced to death in 65 coun-
tries, but these are only figures known to Amnesty International (op.cit.) and the
actual numbers are higher. 88 per cent of all known executions took place in only
four countries: in China at least 1,000, followed by Saudi Arabia with 123 execu-
tions, while Amnesty International recorded for the USA 85 and Iran 75. Even
though international human rights treaties prohibit anyone under 18 years old at
the time of the crime being sentenced to death, 110 countries still have laws un-
der which such people can be sentenced to death. However, only seven countries
are known, in 2000, to hove executed prisoners who were under 18 years at the
time of the offense: Democratic Republic of Congo, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, USA and Yemen. The country, which carried out the highest num-
ber of executions of child offenders is the USA, where since 1990 14 have been
executed.
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Life imprisonment: In most European and North American countries life sen-
tences can be imposed in cases of severe crimes. However, such sentences con-
stitute only a very small portion of the total number of sentences imposed. Nor-
way is one of the very few countries where life imprisonment has been abolished
(in 1981).
There was a 7% increase in the number of life imprisonment sentences im-
posed between 1995 and 1997, with a 20% increase in European countries, a 3%
rise in the United States and a rise from 13 to 23 (77%) in Canada. The biggest re-
ductions in terms of percentage change were reported by Slovakia, where no life
sentences were imposed in 1997, Northern Ireland and Italy while the steepest
increases were in Canada, Turkey, Moldova, England and Wales and Germany .
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Country 1995 1997 Change
Canada 13 23 +76.9%
Czech Republic na 3 na
England and Wales 247 309 +25.1%
Finland 6 5 -16.7%
Germany 100 122 +22.0%
Greece 37 44 +18.9%
Israel 12 13 +8.3%
Italy 40 6 -85.0%
Latvia na 1 na
Moldova 4 5 +25.0%
Northern Ireland 22 3 -86.4%
Romania 15 9 -40.0%
Russian Federation na 16 na
Scotland 36 35 -2.8%
Slovakia 4 0 -100.0%
Sweden 13 9 -30.8%
Switzerland 4 na na
Turkey 259 379 +46.3%
USA 3,002 3,086 +2.8%
Total 3,814 4,068 +6.7%
Total: European
countries
799 959 +20.0%
Source: 6th Survey
Table 2. Adults receiving life imprisonment sentences, per 100,000 inhabitants:
1995, 1997
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Country 1995 1997 Change in %
Armenia 89.4 96.9 +8.4
Azerbaijan 76.9 75.5 -1.8
Belarus 190.3 207.9 +9.3
Belgium 298.4 na na
Bulgaria 107.8 193.5 +79.5
Canada 299.1 273.0 -8.8
Croatia 29.6 33.4 +12.8
Cyprus 21.2 35.1 +66.1
Czech Republic 112.9 126.9 +12.4
England and Wales 87.5 104.0 +18.8
Estonia 130.3 164.7 +26.4
Finland 125.1 108.8 -13.0
Georgia 71.8 72.8 +1.4
Germany 36.9 41.6 +12.7
Ireland 674.2 621.4 -7.8
Israel 118.1 125.5 +6.2
Kyrgyzstan 243.5 249.9 +2.6
Latvia 103.1 115.1 +11.6
Lithuania 174.8 175.0 +0.1
Moldova 61.7 57.6 -6.7
Netherlands 170.0 159.7 -6.1
Northern Ireland 106.2 97.3 -8.4
Norway 138.0 138.1 +0.1
Portugal 88.4 62.9 -28.8
Romania 145.2 187.2 +28.9
Scotland 174.1 168.3 -3.3
Slovakia 93.7 82.7 -11.8
Slovenia 27.7 31.7 +14.6
Spain 167.1 169.6 +1.5
Sweden 170.7 159.4 -6.6
Switzerland 146.3 134.2 -8.3
Turkey 396.7 360.1 -9.2
USA 235.7 257.0 +9.0
Ukraine 136.1 154.6 +13.7
Mean 154.4 152.8
Standard deviation 123.3 112.9
Percentile
25 88.2 79.1
50 127.7 134.1
75 174.3 181.1
Source: 6th Survey
Table 3. Deprivation of liberty imposed by courts, per 100,000 inhabitants: 1995, 1997
Corporal punishment: According to Kuhn (1998) corporal punishment is al-
most unknown in Europe and North America and he considered it probable that
two countries which reported the use of corporal punishment in their replies to
the Fifth United Nations Survey had misunderstood the information that was be-
ing sought. No imposition of corporal punishment was reported by the 54 coun-
tries who participated in the Sixth United Nations Survey.
Deprivation of liberty: The imposition of prison sentences constitute accord-
ing to Kuhn (1998) the backbone of the system of sanctions in Europe and North
America. As noted by Kangaspunta (1995) for the 4th and by Kuhn (1998) for the
5th United Nations Survey, we find also in the 6th Survey a wide range of the im-
position of deprivation of liberty sentences.
At the low end we find countries where less than 50 sentences of deprivation of
liberty per 100,000 inhabitants in 1995 and 1997 were imposed, countries such as
Croatia, Cyprus, Germany, and Slovenia. At the upper level we find countries with
rates over 200 such as Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Kyrgyzstan (Note: Kyrgyzstan,
although actually a Central Asian country has been considered here as belonging
to the group of Central and Eastern European states, owing to the fact that it was a
republic of the former Soviet Union, and in our previous analyses was treated, to-
gether with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as if it were a
Central and Eastern European state, cf.section 1.1 above), Turkey and the USA.
The highest level was reached by Ireland with a rate for both years of over 600 sen-
tences of deprivation of liberty per 100,000 inhabitants. While Cyprus is one of the
countries with one of the lowest rates it had the steepest increase between 1995 and
1997 (66%). Substantial increases were also registered for Romania (29%), Esto-
nia (26%), England and Wales (19%), Slovenia (15%), Ukraine (14%), Croatia
(13%), Germany (13%), Czech Republic and Latvia (12%), while the most sub-
stantial decreases could be found in Portugal (29%), Finland (13%), Slovakia
(12%), Turkey and Canada (9%), Northern Ireland and Switzerland (8%).
Control in freedom: The proportion of adults who received a control in free-
dom sentence varies drastically from 0.1 per 100,000 inhabitants for Greece to
420.2 for Israel (Note: Israel, although not a European country has, as in previous
analyses of U.N. survey results, been included with Europe, following guidance
from the United Nations Secretariat). Many of these sentences involve various
degrees of supervision, ranging from very close to loose. Sentences of commu-
nity service have been included with this category.
Between 1995 and 1997 the use of control in freedom sentences increased in
general more than they decreased. The biggest increase can be found for Sweden
where use of the sanction increased by 587 per cent, followed by Kyrgyzstan
with 472 per cent and Greece by 111 per cent. However, the countries in question
have reported that their courts do not impose these sentences very often.
The changes for probation between 1995 and 1997 again vary substantially.
Probation is according to Kuhn (op.cit., pp. 116-117) a “procedure whereby an
individual found guilty of an offense is released by the court without imprison-
ment, and placed under the supervision of an official or officially sanctioned
body”. The lowest rate reported for the number of persons on probation on a se-
lected day of the year was 0.4 per 100,000 (just one person) in Iceland in 1995,
which rose to 1.1 per cent (three people) in 1997. Ukraine had the highest in-
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crease per 100,000 inhabitants, a rise of 196%. The highest rate was found in
Canada (469 in 1997), followed by Lithuania (400, also in 1997). The countries
of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Ireland, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Slovenia, Spain, and Turkey reported no probation sentences, but they all
reported conditional release from prison on parole. Parole may be understood to
mean conditional release of a prisoner, whereby the individual is allowed to
serve the remainder of the sentence outside prison, assuming that all the condi-
tions of that release are met. On the other hand three countries, which did not re-
port any cases of parole, namely Cyprus, Northern Ireland and Slovakia, re-
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Country 1995 1997 Change in %
Canada 233.3 243.3 +4.3
Croatia 203.9 190.2 -6.8
Cyprus 1.6 0.8 -52.2
Czech Republic 312.1 329.0 +5.4
England and Wales 103.4 109.6 +6.0
Germany 77.5 85.2 +9.9
Greece 0.1 0.2 +111.1
Israel 420.2 443.5 +5.5
Italy 203.1 268.6 +32.3
Kyrgyzstan 0.4 2.0 472.2
Latvia 136.5 190.1 39.4
Lithuania 17.0 17.0 -0.1
Moldova 150.9 131.1 -13.1
Northern Ireland 47.5 42.7 -10.2
Norway 103.2 112.6 +9.1
Portugal na 14.5 na
Romania 157.8 151.4 -4.0
Scotland 50.8 56.7 +11.6
Slovakia 259.0 218.8 -15.5
Sweden 5.1 34.9 +586.8
USA 96.3 115.7 +20.2
Ukraine 104.7 157.8 +50.8
Mean 127.8 132.5
Standard deviation 112.7 116.9
Percentile
25 32.3 30.4
50 103.4 114.1
75 203.5 197.3
Source: 6th Survey
Table 4. Adults receiving control in freedom sentences, per 100,000 inhabitants:
1995, 1997
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Country Probation
1995
Probation
1997
Change
in %
Parole
1995
Parole
1997
Change
in %
Azerbaijan na na na 24 29 +19.6
Belarus 171 178 +4.3 65 70 +6.7
Bulgaria na na na 10 11 +9.5
Canada 455 469 +3.0 42 33 -21.8
Cyprus 8.3 7.8 -5.9 na na na
Czech Republic na na na 24 32 36.6
Denmark 37 38 +1.4 23 20 -13.9
England + Wales 207 226 +8.9 3.5 4.4 +27.0
Estonia na na na 13 13 -3.8
Finland 41 35 -14.0 23 23 -0.6
Georgia na na na 14 17 +21.9
Greece na na na 11 17 +46.8
Hungary 148 165 +11.4 50 42 -15.7
Iceland 0.4 1.1 +195.6 87 61 -30.2
Ireland na na na 11 14 +23.5
Israel 13 18 +40.8 50 46 -8.1
Kyrgyzstan na na na 80 100 +25.6
Latvia na na na 53 34 -35.5
Lithuania 370 400 +8.2 66 78 +17.9
Moldova 85 103 +21.2 7.1 6.7 -6.3
Northern Ireland 100 108 +7.6 na na na
Norway na na na 72 68 -5.2
Portugal 8 12 +39.0 27 28 +3.2
Romania 51 na na 117 114 -3.0
Slovenia na na na 26 21 -17.2
Slovakia 51 52 +0.8 na na na
Spain na na na 23 22 -5.3
Sweden 89 75 -15.0 43 44 +1.3
Turkey na na na 7.5 7 +3.9
Ukraine 51 151 +196.0 20 25 +24.5
Mean 114.7 127.3 36.7 36.2
Standard deviation 132.1 138.3 28.9 28.4
Percentile
25 18.7 22.0 13.0 16.6
50 68.1 89.0 24.4 27.6
75 165.2 174.9 52.7 45.9
Source: 6th Survey
Table 5. Persons on probation or parole, per 100,000 inhabitants: selected day of the year 1995,
1997
ported probation sentences in their countries. The reported parole rates per
100,000 inhabitants did not vary as much as the reported probation rates. The
changes for increase of parole between 1995 and 1997 range between 1% in
Sweden, followed by Portugal (3%) and Turkey (4%), and reach their height in
England and Wales with 27%, the Czech Republic 37% and Greece with 47%.
The steepest decreases can be found in Latvia with 36% and Iceland with 30%
and the smallest in Finland with less than 1% and Romania with 3%.
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Country 1995 1997 Change in %
Armenia 0.1 0.4 +622.5
Azerbaijan 0.3 1.1 +323.8
Belarus 0.2 0.6 +237.5
Bulgaria 0.3 0.4 +29.5
Canada 13.2 22.4 +69.6
Croatia 4.7 5.2 +12.4
Cyprus 21.3 28.7 +36.0
Czech Republic 307.9 328.1 +6.5
Denmark 343.4 341.1 -0.7
England and Wales 79.4 80.1 -0.9
Estonia 175.3 198.9 +13.4
Finland 248.1 239.0 -3.7
Georgia 9.9 21.4 +116.1
Latvia na 0.7 na
Moldova 0.1 0.3 +454.6
Netherlands 145.3 140.6 -3.2
Northern Ireland 175.4 150.6 -14.1
Norway 2.5 3.9 +56.1
Portugal 98.5 64.8 -34.2
Scotland 108.3 100.5 -7.2
Slovakia 10.1 9.6 -4.8
Slovenia 129.9 197.2 +51.8
Sweden 191.9 159.5 -16.9
Switzerland 466.4 507.1 +8.7
Turkey 201.2 214.1 +6.4
Ukraine 0.4 1.5 +289.2
Mean 109.4 108.4
Standard deviation 128.8 133.8
Percentile
25 1.4 1.4
50 79.4 46.8
75 183.7 197.6
Source: 6th Survey
Table 6. Adults receiving a warning or admonition, per 100,000 inhabitants: 1995, 1997
Warning and admonition: Once again, we find under the reported rates per
100,000 inhabitants considerable variations in the reported rates for warnings
and admonitions.
We find that the biggest changes in the use of these sentences occurred in
countries which in 1995 did not use warnings very often; the changes in terms of
percentages look dramatic but the number of warnings per 100,000 inhabitants
changed only slightly. Armenia reported an increase of 622% between 1995 and
1997, however, the number of adults involved rose only from two to fourteen and
the rate increased from 0.1 to 0.4 per 100,000 inhabitants. The picture is similar
for Moldova, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Belarus, all of whom had increases of
more than 200% but rates of less than 1.6 per 100,000. While their rates are very
low, we find on the other side of the spectrum Switzerland with a rate of 507 per
100,000 inhabitants (1997) and 466 (1995), Denmark 343 (1995) and 341
(1997), the Czech Republic 328(1997) and 308 (1995), and Finland 248 (1995)
and 239 (1997).
Fine: Again we find, as in the Fifth United Nations Survey, that the fine is the
most popular sanction in Western Europe. As Kuhn (op.cit.) pointed out, one has
to be cautious in interpreting these findings and comparisons are difficult to
make since the imposition of fines can in certain countries be made through the
police and prosecutors and may not be recorded in the statistics.
By far the highest rate for fines was reported by Ireland with 4031 per 100,000
inhabitants in 1995 and 3587 in 1997. Belgium reported for 1995 a rate of 1,461,
followed by Finland with a rate of 1,043 in 1995 and 1,032 in 1997. At the low
end we find countries like Georgia with a rate of 2.5 in 1997 and 4.7 in 1995,
Azerbaijan with a rate of 5.5 in 1997 and 14.9 in 1995 and Slovenia with a rate of
16.6 in 1995 and 21.5 in 1997. The sharpest increase is recorded for Bulgaria
where the rate increased between 1995 and 1997 by 178 per cent and from 15.0 to
41.8 per 100,000 inhabitants. Countries with rates above 300 include Canada,
Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Northern Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland
and Turkey.
Non-custodial sentences: The European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal
Justice Statistics includes some information about the types of non-custodial
sentences and how often they are imposed per 100,000. Of the seventeen coun-
tries studied, Moldova uses non-custodial sentences most often with a rate of 405
per 100,000 inhabitants, followed by Northern Ireland with 303, Lithuania with
229, England and Wales with 207, France with 188, and Ireland with 104. In the
remaining eleven countries the rate is below 100 and at the bottom we find Cy-
prus with a rate of 8 per 100,000 inhabitants, Albania, Portugal and Switzerland
with 12, and Malta with 16. We can obtain information in which form these
non-custodial sentences were imposed: as suspended sentences with supervi-
sion, community service orders, probation and other non-custodial sentences
with supervision or care of the correctional services. Albania, Cyprus and Malta
use only probation as a form of non-custodial sentences, while Switzerland uses
only community service orders as such. 82 per cent of the non-custodial sen-
tences in Lithuania were suspended sentences with supervision, while the per-
centage for France is 80, for Austria 77, for Portugal 66, for Belgium 63, for Hun-
gary 57, for Denmark 52, for Northern Ireland 49 and for Norway 44. Commu-
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Country 1995 1997 Change in %
Armenia 21.8 23.9 +9.4
Azerbaijan 14.9 5.5 -62.9
Belarus 64.0 64.3 +0.5
Belgium 1,461.1 na na
Bulgaria 15.0 41.8 +177.9
Canada 326.3 274.6 -15.9
Croatia 56.1 46.1 -17.8
Cyprus 41.6 54.1 +29.9
Czech Republic 46.9 44.9 -4.3
Denmark 858.0 719.0 -16.2
England and Wales 127.5 126.3 -1.0
Estonia 139.5 143.7 +3.0
Finland 1,043.1 1,031.6 -1.1
Georgia 4.7 2.5 -45.8
Germany 416.1 426.8 +2.6
Greece 31.3 44.2 +41.0
Hungary 375.8 376.3 +0.1
Ireland 4,030.9 3,587.4 -11.0
Israel 305.1 303.2 -0.6
Italy 146.1 233.7 +59.9
Kyrgyzstan 26.5 30.4 +14.7
Latvia 65.9 76.8 +16.7
Lithuania 32.4 21.9 -32.3
Moldova 35.2 70.4 +99.8
Netherlands 266.2 273.3 +2.7
Northern Ireland 134.8 116.8 -13.4
Norway 126.4 119.9 -5.1
Portugal 178.0 242.5 +36.2
Romania 92.1 99.2 +7.7
Scotland 474.8 436.6 -8.1
Slovakia 24.1 26.7 +10.9
Slovenia 16.6 21.5 +29.9
Spain 126.7 78.6 -37.9
Sweden 347.3 243.4 -29.9
Switzerland 307.2 290.5 -5.4
Turkey 409.9 377.3 -8.0
USA 69.7 74.5 +6.9
Ukraine 73.5 46.0 -37.4
Mean 324.6 275.6
Standard deviation 689.2 598.9
Percentile
25 34.5 44.5
50 126.5 99.2
75 331.5 282.6
Source: 6th Survey
Table 7. Adults receiving a fine, per 100,000 inhabitants: 1995, 1997
nity service orders were only imposed in twelve of the seventeen countries and
represented, with the exception of Switzerland, in England and Wales 34 per cent
of the non-custodial sentences, while in the rest of the countries the percentage
was below 25 per cent. Probation as a form of non-custodial sentences was not
imposed in six of the 17 countries, but constituted in Sweden 78 per cent of such
sentences, in England and Wales 51, Ireland 38, Northern Ireland 34, Hungary
33, while in Portugal only 13 and in Austria 9. Other non-custodial sentences
with supervision or care of the correctional services were non-existent in six of
the seventeen countries, while, with the exception of Moldova, where the per-
centage was 56, in the remaining countries the percentage was below 40 with a
low of 2 in France and Northern Ireland.
6.3 Prison population: facts and trends
Prison populations grew substantially during the 1990s in many parts of the
world, and in Europe that increase was over 20 per cent in most countries, while
in North America the increase was 12 per cent for Canada and over 60 per cent in
the United States of America (Walmsley, 2001). Going hand in hand with grow-
ing prison populations are concerns about overcrowding and the resulting finan-
cial and human rights problems. These entail increasing costs in corrections,
poorer living and working conditions for both inmates and prison staff, increased
chances of violence between prisoners and aggressive acts against staff, and
fewer treatment programmes. The third edition of the World Prison Population
List (Walmsley, 2002) shows that more than 8.75 million people are imprisoned,
either in pretrial detention or serving a sentence after conviction, throughout the
world. This figure does not include all the juveniles in custody worldwide since
they are often held in institutions that are not part of the prison system. About
half of the world’s prisoners can be found in only three countries, namely the
China, Russia and the United States of America. The USA had the highest prison
population rate at the beginning of the year 2001 with 700 per 100,000 followed
by Russia which also exceeded 650. Next we find Belarus and Kazakhstan. It has
to be pointed out that the rates of countries who have prison population rates of
450 and higher per 100,000 are not the norm and Walmsley (2002) also reports
that almost two thirds of all countries have rates of 150 per 100,000 or less. All in
all we find considerable variations in prison population rates all over the world as
well as in the same continents. The median rate for Central and Eastern European
countries, for example, is more than three times as great as in Southern European
countries.
Walmsley (2001) points out the well established fact that crime rates alone
cannot explain the increases or decreases in the prison populations. In the 1990s
many countries experienced a reduction in their crime rates and often of the rates
of serious crimes. The United States of America, for example, experienced a sub-
stantial reduction in crime rates and violent crime rates, but the imprisonment
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Country Prison
places
1995
Prison
places
1997
Change in
%
Occupancy
rate 1995
Occupancy
rate 1997
Change in
%
Andorra 117.7 108.1 -8.1 61.3 55.0 -10.2
Azerbaijan 184.0 237.4 +29.7 na na na
Belarus 405.0 424.9 +4.9 131.8 135.7 +3.0
Bulgaria 54.0 54.7 +1.2 185.2 237.7 +28.3
Cyprus 65.5 62.7 -4.3 42.1 54.8 +30.2
Czech Republic 176.0 183.5 +4.3 107.3 114.0 +6.3
England and
Wales
109.0 126.4 +16.0 90.5 93.4 +3.1
Finland 78.6 73.6 -6.4 80.9 75.0 -7.3
Georgia 248.9 277.9 +11.7 59.7 66.6 +11.5
Germany 86.9 88.2 +1.5 86.1 102.1 +18.6
Greece 41.4 41.2 -0.7 135.9 na na
Iceland 39.0 50.9 +30.7 94.2 79.0 -16.2
Ireland 61.4 65.1 +6.1 92.0 101.7 +10.6
Israel 153.2 154.8 +1.0 93.1 96.1 +33
Italy 72.5 78.9 +8.8 125.1 109.2 -12.7
Latvia 524.0 394.5 -24.7 71.7 103.9 +44.8
Lithuania 370.4 377.2 +1.8 96.6 97.5 +0.9
Moldova 244.5 284.1 +16.2 97.5 82.1 -15.8
Netherlands 74.7 87.5 +17.1 102.9 101.1 -1.8
Northern Ireland 127.4 129.2 +1.4 86.2 78.2 -9.2
Norway 64.6 65.8 +1.8 77.6 71.0 -8.5
Portugal 91.4 117.9 +29.0 136.2 126.6 -7.0
Romania 200.2 193.6 -3.3 102.1 102.6 +0.5
Scotland 104.2 113.7 +9.1 105.6 104.0 -1.5
Slovakia 174.9 176.8 +1.1 84.2 77.8 -7.6
Slovenia 52.9 52.9 +0.1 60.4 73.3 +21.3
Spain 80.6 99.3 +23.1 150.0 111.3 -25.8
Switzerland 92.0 94.1 +2.3 93.7 91.2 -2.6
Mean 146.2 150.5 98.1 97.7
Standard
deviation
118.5 109.6 30.8 34.9
Percentile
25 67.2 67.8 80.9 77.1
50 98.1 110.9 93.7 96.8
75 181.2 191.1 107.3 105.3
Source: 6th Survey
Table 8. Prison places (beds) available per 100,000 inhabitants and occupancy rate per 100 places
rate is steadily increasing and increased alone between 1997 and 2000 by 9 per
cent. This is partly due to the fact that we find in countries with high incarceration
rates high rates of fear of crime and a belief that locking up people is the best an-
swer to crime rather than looking for alternatives. Blumstein (1993) maintains in
this context that it is quite possible that criminal policy makers, who are in favour
of hard and tough punishments, understand the limits of such policies quite well.
However, they introduce them since the public pressure to do something about
the “severe” crime problem is so big and the policy makers have to do something.
Not having better alternatives, they just can think about getting tough on crime
and to introduce more severe sanctions and they do so not because they believe
that these sanctions will lead to a successful criminal policy but because they
have learned that the introduction of them constitutes an effective way to avoid
political pressure.
The Sixth United Nations Survey measured the prison capacity by asking how
many places (beds) are available in the penal institutions or correctional facili-
ties. The survey defines prisons, penal institutions or correctional facilities as all
public and privately financed institutions where persons are deprived of their lib-
erty. The institutions may include, but are not limited to, penal, correctional or
psychiatric facilities under prison administration. Between 1995 and 1997 the
number of places decreased in only six of the 28 countries for which data are
available (Andorra, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Romania). The mean num-
ber of places increased between those years only slightly (from 146.2 to 150.5),
but the standard deviations show quite a broad range of prison places available
per 100,000 in the participating countries. Most of the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries have by far the highest number of prison beds available. ( No fig-
ures were to hand for the USA.) In 1997 Belarus had the highest number of
prison places per 100,000 inhabitants (405), followed by Latvia, who despite a
decrease of 25 per cent between 1995 and 1997, was second with 396 beds, fol-
lowed by Lithuania (377), Moldova (284) and Georgia (278).The countries of
western and southern Europe have in general much lower numbers of places
available, with Greece having the lowest (41), followed by Iceland (51) and
Slovenia with 53 places per 100,000 inhabitants.
The mean occupancy rate per 100 places in the 26 countries for which data are
available remained at about 98 in 1995 and 1997, but we have again substantial
standard deviations. Bulgaria reports exceptionally high occupancy rates with
185.22 in 1995 and 237.65 in 1997, indicating that the situation worsened dra-
matically between those two years. Belarus follows Bulgaria with an occupancy
rate of 131.8 in 1995 and 135.6 in 1997. Portugal comes in third with a rate of
136.2 for 1995 and 126.6 which represents a reduction by 7 per cent. That Portu-
gal has such a high occupancy rate surprises not too much, since Walmsley
(2001) reports that Portugal has the highest prison population rate in Western Eu-
rope. Portugal had in the beginning of the 1990s an average rate for Western Eu-
ropean countries, but a change in the penal code made it more difficult to grant
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Country 1995 1997 Change in %
Andorra 72.1 59.5 -17.5
Belarus 533.7 576.4 +8.0
Belgium 73.3 85.5 +16.6
Bulgaria 100.0 129.9 +29.9
Canada 130.4 121.6 -6.7
Cyprus 27.6 34.3 +24.6
Czech Republic 188.8 209.2 +10.8
Denmark 66.5 64.3 -3.3
England and Wales 98.7 118.0 +19.6
Estonia 284.6 329.2 +15.7
Finland 63.6 55.2 -13.2
Georgia 148.6 185.0 +24.5
Germany 74.8 90.1 +20.4
Greece 56.3 na na
Hungary 121.8 132.0 +8.4
Iceland 36.7 40.2 +9.6
Ireland 56.4 66.2 +17.3
Israel 142.6 148.8 +4.3
Italy 90.7 86.2 -5.0
Latvia 375.9 409.7 +9.0
Lithuania 357.7 367.7 +2.8
Moldova 238.3 233.1 -2.2
Netherlands 76.9 88.5 +15.1
Northern Ireland 109.8 101.1 -7.9
Norway 50.1 46.7 -6.9
Portugal 124.5 149.3 +19.9
Romania 204.3 198.6 -2.8
Scotland 110.0 118.3 +7.5
Slovakia 147.3 137.6 -6.5
Slovenia 31.9 38.8 +21.3
Spain 120.9 110.5 -8.6
Sweden 65.3 59.0 -9.6
Switzerland 86.2 85.9 -0.4
Turkey 96.7 115.1 +19.0
USA 569.4 612.9 +7.6
Mean 144.4 156.3
Standard deviation 129.7 141.4
Percentile
25 66.3 65.2
50 99.3 115.1
75 148.2 185.0
Source: 6th Survey
Table 9. Prisoner rate per 100,000 inhabitants: 1995, 1997
parole and the other main reason is that the imposed prison sentences are longer
than they used to be.
The mean prisoner rate (i.e. prison population rate) per 100,000 inhabitants of
the European and North American countries responding to the 6th United Nations
Survey, increased between 1995 and 1997 from 144 to 156 and there is consider-
able variation in the number of people who are incarcerated in the 38 countries for
which data are available. On top we find the United States of America where the
rate increased from 569 in 1995 to 613 in 1997, an increase of 7.6 per cent. This
trend continued in the USA who had by the end of 2000, according to Walmsley
(2002), a rate of 700 per 100,000 inhabitants. Next comes Belarus with a rate of
534 in 1995 and 576 in 1997. Belarus experienced an almost identical increase be-
tween those years as the USA with 8 per cent. The next highest rates for 1997 that
are reported in the 6th Survey are in respect of Central and Eastern European coun-
tries such as Latvia (410), Lithuania (368), Estonia (329) and Moldova (233).
Walmsley (2001) reports that after the fall of the iron curtain there was a
marked rise of the crime rate in central and eastern European countries in the
early 1990s and that this seems to have been reflected in the increasing use of im-
prisonment. However, the rise stopped in most of these countries and after 1993
they experienced quite stable crime rates while the prisoner rate continued to rise
substantially. Some of the reasons could be, according to Walmsley (op.cit.), that
the public, media and politicians were alarmed at the changes in the nature of
crimes committed. Numerous crimes unheard of before, such as transnational
organized crime and economic crimes, appeared and created a climate of fear in
these countries and led to an attitude of getting tough on all forms of crime, to
higher rates of pretrial detention, more and longer prison sentences and a more
restricted use of conditional release (parole).
Twelve of the 32 European countries on which information was received show
increases of over 15% in the prisoner rate between 1995 and 1997. The highest
increases were in Bulgaria (29.9%), Cyprus (24.6%), Georgia (24.5%), Slovenia
(21.3%), Germany (20.4%), Portugal (19.9%) and England and Wales (19.6%).
It is to be noted that Cyprus and Slovenia were the two countries with the lowest
prisoner rates both in 1995 and 1997. Walmsley (2001) states that many people
explain the rise in England and Wales, where the prison population in 2000 was
more than 50 per cent higher than in the early 1990s, as attributable to public anx-
iety, aggravated by media reaction, to one particularly serious murder and to
crime in general. The use of custodial sentences rose by 40 per cent and the
length of the sentences increased by 10 per cent. A very similar trend happened
in the Netherlands. The Netherlands, long known for their liberal approach to-
wards criminals and a low prisoner rate, experienced in the 1990s the largest in-
crease of any west European country and almost doubled the prison population.
Again, these dramatic changes in sentencing can be explained by a rise in the use
of prison sentences and an increase in the length of sentences.
The Scandinavian countries experienced a similar development of their pris-
oner rates between 1995 and 1997; the number of prisoners in Denmark, Finland,
Norway and Sweden decreased and all four countries have in general very low
prisoner rates. At the lowest end we find Norway with a prisoner rate of 46.7 in
1997, having recorded a reduction of 6.9 per cent between 1995 and 1997. Next
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Country Prisoner rate Sentenced Pre-trial
(=100 %) Per 100,000
population
% of
prisoner rate
Per 100,000
population
% of
prisoner rate
Andorra 59.5 23.0 38.6 36.5 61.4
Belarus 576.4 461.6 80.1 114.8 19.9
Belgium 85.5 49.6 58.0 25.2 29.5
Bulgaria 129.9 82.2 63.3 47.7 36.7
Canada 121.6 98.1 80.6 22.6 18.6
Cyprus 34.3 27.4 79.9 5.5 16.0
Czech Republic 209.2 134.2 64.1 75.1 35.9
Denmark 64.3 45.1 70.1 17.4 27.0
England and Wales 118.0 93.5 79.2 16.4 13.9
Estonia 329.2 218.6 66.4 107.3 32.6
Finland 55.2 48.7 88.2 5.1 9.2
Georgia 185.0 147.0 79.4 38.0 20.6
Germany 90.1 60.9 67.6 25.4 28.2
Hungary 132.0 92.7 70.2 36.0 27.3
Iceland 40.2 32.5 80.7 7.0 17.4
Israel 148.8 127.9 86.0 20.9 14.1
Italy 86.2 61.2 71.0 22.7 26.3
Latvia 409.7 244.8 59.7 165.0 40.3
Lithuania 367.7 298.2 81.1 69.5 18.9
Moldova 233.1 148.8 63.9 84.3 36.2
Netherlands 88.5 48.3 54.6 28.5 32.2
Northern Ireland 101.1 76.0 75.1 22.7 22.4
Norway 46.7 32.0 68.5 12.7 27.2
Portugal 149.3 105.1 70.4 44.2 29.6
Romania 198.6 120.8 60.8 77.4 39.0
Scotland 118.3 100.0 84.4 16.5 14.0
Slovakia 137.6 106.8 77.6 30.8 22.4
Slovenia 38.8 27.0 69.7 na na
Spain 110.5 82.3 74.5 28.2 25.5
Sweden 59.0 46.0 77.9 12.5 21.2
Switzerland 85.9 60.0 69.9 25.8 30.1
Turkey 115.1 52.0 45.2 40.5 35.2
Mean 142.8 105.5 39.1
Standard deviation 118.7 93.1 36.6
Percentile
25 64.9 47.7 63.6 16.5 18.0
50 112.8 82.2 70.2 25.8 26.3
75 158.2 129.4 79.6 45.9 32.4
Source: 6th Survey
Table 10. Prisoner rate per type of incarceration: 1997
comes Finland with a rate of 55.2 and a decrease of 13.2 per cent, Sweden with a
rate of 59.0 and a reduction of 9.6 per cent and finally Denmark with a rate of
64.3 and a reported decrease of 3.3 per cent.
In 24 of the 33 of the countries for which data are available over two thirds of
the prisoners were under sentence after being convicted and not in pretrial deten-
tion. The only country reporting that over 50 per cent of its prisoners were in pre-
trial detention is Andorra. However, the total number of prisoners (49) is very
small. The highest proportion of sentenced prisoners among the prison popula-
tion was in Finland (88.2%), Israel (86.0%), Scotland (84.4%) Lithuania
(81.1%) and Canada (80.6%). With the exception of Finland, England and Wales
and Scotland who, with 9.2 per cent, 13.9 percent and 14.0 per cent respectively,
reported the lowest proportion of pretrial detainees among the prison population,
all other EU countries reported pretrial detention percentages of over 20 per cent;
the Netherlands was highest with 32.2 per cent. Sweden reported 21.2 per cent
and Northern Ireland 22.4, while Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Portugal
and Spain reported percentages of pretrial detention between 25 and 29.5 per
cent.
As table 11 reveals, there are different trends in the prisoner rates in the coun-
tries for which data are available. One the one hand we have countries where the
rates increased steadily between 1990 and 1997 and mostly by substantial
amounts, namely in Belarus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Turkey
and the USA. With the exception of Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal and the
USA these are all Central and Eastern European countries. Countries with mod-
erate but more or less steady increases of their prisoner rates year by year are
mainly EU countries such as Belgium, England and Wales, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Scotland and Spain and they are accompanied by
countries like Hungary, Moldova, and Switzerland. A further cluster of countries
which can be identified are countries in which the rate went up and down, but by
1996 or 1997 the rate was going down: Austria, Croatia, Greece, Macedonia,
Northern Ireland, Poland, Norway and Sweden. More or less equal or little
change was experienced by Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Iceland and Romania.
In only two countries has the prisoner rate been going down during the 1990s:
Finland and Slovenia.
Table 12 gives information about the conviction rates in 1995 and 1997 in the
countries which supplied data, and the proportion of females among the total of
persons convicted.
Conviction rates for 1995 and 1997 vary between those of five countries with
rates in excess of 1,000 per 100,000 inhabitants, namely Finland (1,642 in 1995;
1,605 in 1997), Denmark (1,535; 1,377), Andorra (1,375; 1,249), Scotland
(1,255; 1,199) and Canada (1,156; 1,070), and those of six countries with rates of
under 200, namely Cyprus ( 87 in 1995; 123 in 1997), Georgia (131; 141), Bul-
garia (140 in 1995 but 263 in 1997), Armenia (167; 195), Azerbaijan (198; 171)
and Slovenia (199 in 1995 but 281 in 1997).
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Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Andorra na na na na na 72.1 na 59.5
Austria 90.5 87.0* 94.8 91.0* 91.5 na 84.0* na
Belarus 204.7 na 314.8 na 477.8 533.7 na 576.4
Belgium 58.9 60.0* 70.9 72.0* 74.1 73.3 76.0* 85.5
Bulgaria 122.7 68.0* 93.9 99.0* 99.1 100.0 126.0* 129.9
Canada 111.0 na 112.6 na 117.9 130.4 na 121.6
Croatia 40.3 43.0* 49.9 55.3* na na 45.0* na
Cyprus 32.0 na 31.3 30.0* 25.1 27.6 35.0* 34
Czech
Republic
79.4 na 135.4 165.0* 181.5 188.8 202.0* 209.2
Denmark 62.1 na 64.4 66.0* 67.4 66.5 61.0* 64.3
England and
Wales
88.1 91.0* 89.0 89.0* 95.0 98.7 107.0* 118.0
Estonia 280.6 na 292.4 na 293.6 284.6 na 329.2
Finland 67.8 63.0* 69.5 62.0* 62.4 63.6 58.0* 55.2
France 82.2 84.0* 83.7 86.0* 90.3 na 90.0* na
Georgia na na 66.2 na 140.9 148.6 na 185.0
Germany 77.8 79.0* na 81.0* 83.0 74.8 83.0* 90.1
Greece na 49.0* 59.5 68.0* 71.0* 56.3 51.0* na
Hungary 118.8 146.0* 154.1 132.0* 123.7 121.8 129.0* 132.0
Iceland 40.6 39.0* 38.5 39.0* 38.2 36.7 na 40,2
Ireland na 60,0* 61,6 60,0* 58,6 56,4 62,0* 66.2
Israel na na na na na 142.6 na 148.8
Italy 56.6 56.0* 83.7 89.0* 89.6 90.7 85.0* 86.2
Kyrgyzstan 201.2 na 216.1 na 299.7 359.7** 412.0** 458.6**
Latvia 326.7 na 313.5 na 359.7 375.9 405.0* 409.7
Liechtenstein na na na na 58.1 na na na
Lithuania 230.7 na 245.2 275.0* 278.3 357.7 323.0* 367.7
Luxembourg 91.9 90.0* 90.5 107.0* 109.2 na 104.0* na
Macedonia,
FYR
49.4 na 47.8 na 62.8 na 50.0* na
Malta 32.5 na 46.6 na 56.0 na 62.0* na
Moldova 204.9 na 216.7 na 215.1 238.3 263.0* 233.1
Netherlands 46.9 na 49.4 51.0* 56.8 76.9 75.0* 88.5
Northern
Ireland
112.3 106.0* 111.8 118.0* 116.4 109.8 na 101.1
Norway 56.5 59.0* na 60.0* 62.0 50.1 52.0* 46.7
Poland na na na 160.0* 163.6 na 148.0* na
Portugal 91.5 82.0* 97.4 111.0* 102.1 124.5 140.0* 149.3
Table 11. Prisoner rate per 100,000 inhabitants: 1990 – 1997
Countries with the highest proportion of females among the total of persons
convicted of a crime in 1995 and 1997 are Germany (17.4% in 1995; 17.5% in
1997), Denmark (17.3%; 16.9%), Finland (15.8%; 15.6%), Italy (14.3%;
17.1%), and Switzerland (15.1%; 15.1%); Belarus recorded 16.2% in 1997.
Countries with the lowest proportion of females being convicted in 1995 and
1997 are: Slovakia (4.1% in 1995; 3.7% in 1997), Georgia (5.1%; 4.9%), Arme-
nia (5.7%; 5.8%) and Macedonia (6.7%; 6.2%). Azerbaijan (5.2%) and Latvia
(6.9%) were the other countries recording less than 7% in 1995 and Bulgaria
(6.4%), and Spain (6.9%) did so in 1997. Most countries reported that females
constituted between 7% and 15% of the total number of convicted persons.
The imprisonment of convicted females is, in general, not a very common
phenomenon as compared with the imprisonment of convicted males. There is
much variation among the countries for which data are available. The mean for
convicted females rose from 4.5 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1995 to 4.8 in 1996
and 5.5 in 1997. The highest rates were reported by Belarus with 17.9 per
100,000 inhabitants in 1995, increasing to a rate of 24.6 in 1996 and 24.8 in 1997.
Rates of above 10 were reported in 1997 also by Ukraine (22.0), Kyrgyzstan
(16.1), Lithuania (14.4) and Latvia (10.4). However, in Latvia the imprisonment
rate decreased from 1995 to 1996 by 5.6 per cent and again between 1996 and
1997 by 5.9 per cent. Kyrgyzstan and Lithuania reported decreases between
1995 and 1996 of 5.4 and 28.7 per cent respectively and then dramatic increases
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Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Romania na na 195.0* 200.0* na 204.3 194.0* 198.6
Russian
Federation
na na 520.2 na 580.2 na 713.0* na
Scotland 92.6 95.0* 102.8 115.0* 108.8 110.0 101.0* 118.3
Slovakia 72.7 na 122.1 136.0* 143.5 147.3 144.0* 137.6
Slovenia 51.3 na 54.5 na 52.2 31.9 31.0* 38.8
Spain 85.5 92.0* 90.4 115.0* 105.9 120.9 na 110.5
Sweden 61.1 55.0* 63.5 66.0* 70.4 65.3 65.0* 59.0
Switzerland 76.9 85.0* 77.1 81.0* na 86.2 85.0* 85.9
Turkey 80.6 44.0* 54.5 52.0* 74.4 96.7 87.0* 115.1
Ukraine na na 518.9 na na na 425.0* na
USA 464.9 na na na 553.9 569.4 na 612.9
Source: UN 5th and 6th Surveys
* European Sourcebook data
** These figures for Kyrgyzstan are based on the response to the Survey question about convicted prisoners,
but other sources (e.g Walmsley, 2000) imply that the response gave the figures for the total prison population.
For later figures for all countries in Table 11 see Walmsley, 2002.
Table 11. (continued)
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Country Conviction
rate 1995
Conviction
rate 1997
Females
1995 (%)
Females
1997 (%)
Andorra 1,375.0 1,248.6 na na
Armenia 166.7 194.5 5.7 5.8
Azerbaijan 198.3 170.6 5.2 7.4
Belarus 572.1 566.3 13.7 16.2
Belgium 426.3 na 14.2 na
Bulgaria 140.0 263.3 7.2 6.4
Canada 1,156.1 1,069.6 14.1 14.4
Croatia 326.7 290.0 8.7 8.2
Cyprus 86.5 123.0 8.4 7.4
Czech Republic 532.0 580.1 8.4 9.1
Denmark 1,535.2 1,376.7 17.3 16.9
England and Wales 609.7 648.4 12.6 13.3
Estonia 539.5 622.2 7.2 9.0
Finland 1,641.6 1,605.2 15.8 15.6
Georgia 131.0 140.7 5.1 4.9
Germany 609.8 646.2 17.4 17.5
Greece na na 12.2 na
Hungary 838.3 867.5 9.5 10.3
Israel 610.1 649.0 10.3 10.2
Italy 356.9 509.3 14.3 17.1
Latvia 409.1 539.6 6.9 8.0
Lithuania 493.8 488.4 11.3 13.9
Macedonia, FYR 453.1 250.1 6.7 6.2
Moldova 353.5 343.2 9.4 8.2
Netherlands 590.3 606.1 11.5 11.0
Northern Ireland 542.7 480.7 11.5 11.8
Norway 403.8 390.2 na 13.6
Portugal 366.8 384.8 9.8 9.4
Romania 448.4 496.0 10.9 10.9
Russian Federation 699.3 688.9 11.8 11.8
Scotland 1,254.9 1,199.0 14.1 14.5
Slovakia 481.7 416.2 4.1 3.7
Slovenia 199.2 281.4 12.3 11.2
Spain 297.7 263.6 7.1 6.4
Sweden 768.3 612.1 12.5 12.1
Switzerland 950.6 960.2 15.1 15.1
USA 332.0 na 15.0 na
Ukraine 415.2 469.0 14.4 14.8
Source: 6th Survey
Table 12. Conviction rates for 1995 and 1997, and proportion of females among the
total of persons convicted
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Country 1995 1996 Change in % 1997 Change in %
Azerbaijan 1.9 3.1 +62.6 4.0 +30.2
Belarus 17.9 24.6 +37.7 24.8 +0.7
Bulgaria 2.7 2.4 -11.3 2.5 +3.6
Cyprus 0.8 1.2 +49.0 0.7 -46.5
Czech Republic 3.9 4.3 +10.2 4.6 +7.1
England and Wales 2.8 3.1 +11.7 3.7 +21.6
Estonia 3.6 4.3 +20.1 6.3 +47.4
Finland 2.8 2.5 -10.2 2.6 +3.6
Georgia 2.0 3.6 +79.8 3.0 -16.3
Germany 1.9 2.1 +6.4 2.1 +4.2
Greece 1.3 1.2 -10.6 na na
Iceland 1.1 0.7 +33.8 2.2 +197.8
Ireland 1.1 1.4 +30.7 1.6 +12.9
Israel 3.9 3.2 -16.6 2.4 -26.9
Italy 2.1 2.1 -1.5 2.0 -2.4
Kyrgyzstan 12.3 11.7 -5.4 16.1 +37.6
Latvia 11.7 11.0 -5.6 10.4 -5.9
Lithuania 13.3 9.5 -28.7 14.4 +51.9
Moldova 4.6 5.0 +8.5 5.4 +7.3
Netherlands 1.9 2.0 +8.9 2.1 +3.7
Northern Ireland 1.7 1.3 -25.2 1.3 -0.3
Norway 1.5 1.3 -11.2 1.8 +38.9
Portugal 4.2 5.4 +29.3 8.2 +51.7
Romania 4.1 4.1 +0.1 4.1 -0.7
Scotland 2.1 2.4 +14.3 2.3 -5.9
Slovakia 3.6 3.8 +5.5 4.1 +9.2
Slovenia 1.3 1.2 -8.1 1.1 -4.2
Spain 7.5 7.0 -6.8 6.9 -0.6
Sweden 2.6 2.5 -4.4 2.2 -11.7
Switzerland 3.7 3.4 -7.0 3.5 +2.2
Turkey 1.1 1.4 +27.6 1.7 +24.6
Ukraine 16.2 20.2 +24.5 22.0 +9.2
Mean 4.5 4.8 5.5
Standard deviation 4.6 5.4 6.0
Percentile
25 1.8 1.5 2.1
50 2.7 3.1 3.0
75 4.2 4.8 6.3
Source: 6th Survey
Table 13. Convicted females in the prison population, selected day 1995-1997, per 100,000 in-
habitants
between 1996 and 1997; in Kyrgyzstan the rate went up by 37.6 per cent and in
Lithuania by 51.9 per cent. Other Central and Eastern European countries such
as Georgia, Estonia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey differ
from the above described countries of that region quite substantially and report
rates which are similar to those of Western European countries. The lowest rate
in 1997 can be found in countries like Cyprus (0.7 per 100,000 inhabitants),
Slovenia (1.1), Northern Ireland (1.3), Ireland (1.6), and Norway (1.8).
Table 14 presents for 1995 and 1997 the average time spent in prison awaiting
trial for all offenses and the average time actually served under a prison sentence.
Pretrial detention is generally shorter in Western European countries than in
Central and Eastern European countries, with the longest time being reported by
the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia, each averaging 7-12 months in
1995. The first two of these countries reported a decrease between 1995 and
1997 to 4-6 months, but the average in Slovakia remained at 7-12 months. Esto-
nia and Portugal, who reported in 1995 an average of 4-6 months pretrial deten-
tion were the only countries reporting an increase in 1997, both rising to 7-12
months. The shortest pretrial detention period of less than 1 month was reported
by Cyprus, Scotland and Sweden, both in 1995 and 1997.
In examining the average length of time actually spent in prison under sen-
tence, we find that inmates in the Western European countries serve on average
less than a third as long as inmates in Central and Eastern European countries.
The longest average times inmates have to serve under a prison sentence (over 4
years) are in Azerbaijan, Estonia, Moldova, Portugal, Romania and Ukraine.
The shortest average lengths of time served under sentence were reported by
Canada (less than 1 month) and Denmark (1-3 months).
In most countries the average time spent in pretrial detention did not change
very much between 1995 and 1997, although reductions were recorded in the
Czech Republic and Lithuania and increases in Estonia and Portugal. The picture
is also very similar for the average time spent in prison under sentence, which re-
mained stable in all countries for which data are available for both years except
the USA (state prisons) where it increased.
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Country Months spent in
prison awaiting
trial:
average,1995
Months spent in
prison awaiting
trial:
average,1997
Months served
under prison
sentence:
average,1995
Months served
under prison
sentence:
average,1997
Andorra 4-6 4-6 25-36 25-36
Azerbaijan na na 49+ 49+
Belarus 4-6 4-6 37-48 37-48
Canada na na Under 1 Under 1
Cyprus Under 1 Under 1 4-6 4-6
Czech Republic 7-12 4-6 37-48 37-48
Denmark 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3
England & Wales 1-3 1-3 4-6 4-6
Estonia 4-6 7-12 49+ 49+
Finland 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3
Georgia 1-3 1-3 37-48 25-36
Germany 1-3 1-3 4-6 7-12
Hungary 4-6 4-6 37-48 37-48
Iceland na 1-3 na 4-6
Italy na 4-6 1-3 1-3
Kyrgyzstan 4-6 4-6 25-36 25-36
Lithuania 7-12 4-6 25-36 25-36
Moldova na na 49+ 49+
Netherlands na na 4-6 4-6
Norway 1-3 1-3 na na
Portugal 4-6 7-12 49+ 49+
Romania 13-24 13-24 49+ 49+
Slovakia 7-12 7-12 na na
Slovenia na na 13-24 13-24
Spain 1-3 1-3 7-12 7-12
Sweden Under 1 Under 1 4-6 4-6
Switzerland 1-3 1-3 4-6 4-6
Turkey 1-3 1-3 4-6 4-6
Ukraine 4-6 4-6 49+ 49+
UK-Northern Ireland na na 7-12 7-12
UK-Scotland Under 1 Under 1 Under 1 Under 1
USA (state prisons) 4-6 4-6 13-24 25-36
Percentile
25 1-3 1-3 4-6 4-6
50 4-6 4-6 25-36 25-36
75 4-6 4-6 37-48 37-48
Source: 6th Survey
Table 14. Average length of time in prison awaiting trial, and time actually served under a prison
sentence: 1995, 1997
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7 Transnational Organised Crime
in Europe and North America:
Towards a Framework for
Prevention1,2
Adam Bouloukos, Graham Farrell and Gloria Laycock
7.1 Introduction
Previous volumes of the HEUNI regional reports have paid little or no attention
to transnational organized crime.3 Although the literature on transnational orga-
nized crime (hereafter TOC) is expanding rapidly, there remain few standardized
measures of the problem. There is even less of a formal framework for thinking
about how to prevent TOC in its various forms. The present chapter begins to ad-
dress these issues, with an emphasis upon practical aspects of the latter.
In the following section, TOC is defined and set in a global context, a broad
overview of factors relating to recent changes is given, and international legisla-
tive responses are described. This is followed by the presentation of a framework
that is frequently used in discussions of more general crime prevention efforts. It
is proposed that its utilization in this context will help inform the analysis of ef-
forts to prevent TOC.
7.2 Globalisation produces criminal opportunities
The term globalisation is simultaneously praised and criticized for many positive
and negative aspects of recent world developments. This reflects the observation
that the world appears to be engaged in a complicated restructuring of its under-
standing of classical national security. Historically, the terms defence and arms
control, as well as the use of force, were primarily referred to in relation to the
sovereign state. Several related factors are believed to have combined to produce
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1 The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the organizations with which they are affiliated.
2 Limiting a discussion of transnational organized crime to a sizable regional designation such as “Europe and North
America” is a bit difficult. Therefore, while this chapter makes reference to regional concerns, it should also be under-
stood that the scoop of criminal activities that emanate or exist in Europe and North America are not limited to but often
extend beyond the region.
3 While the HEUNI regional reports have paid little or no attention to this subject, HEUNI published Adamoli, et al (1998)
which formed part of the discussions below on matters of definitions, trends, and responses. Definitions and responses
were also addressed by Bouloukos and Farrell (1997). See also Winer (1998) for a discussion of trends and responses.
situations conducive to the increase in transnational organized crime: significant
political change (the end of the cold war being the most prominent) has increased
international movement of people and trade, the increasing global economy and
free-market movement of goods, combined with rapid technological change in-
cluding improvements in communications and transportation. It is also some-
times difficult to distinguish factors in western industrialised countries from
those in developing countries, since transnational organised crime can involve
movements between the two in both directions. These significant and wide-
spread changes appear, despite the lack of reliable quantifiable indicators, to
have manufactured a tipping point that has triggered widespread increases in
transnational organized crime. In short, one negative result of globalisation has
been a significant increase in the number of criminal opportunities open to ex-
ploitation by transnational organized criminals. Box 1 shows the types of factors
involved, grouped into two broad categories. The first is of technological change.
The second is socio-economic and political change. The box also includes a brief
description of how each aspect facilitates organized crime and transnational or-
ganized crime.
Box 1: Globalisation Factors producing Opportunities for Transnational
Organised Crime
A. Technological Change
• Cheaper and faster transportation. Effect: Facilitator to trafficking of
illicit products.
• Postal system distribution improvements. Effect: Facilitator to
trafficking.
• Improved computer and electronic communication technologies.
Effect: Facilitates large and rapid cash transactions in layering stages of
money laundering. Facilitates covert communications between and
within criminal groups.
B. Socio-economic and political change
• General trade liberalisation, particularly in developing countries.
Effect: Increased trade provides cover and markets for trafficking illicit
products.
• Increases shipping and aviation (trade and tourism).
• Trade agreements (EC, NAFTA). Effect: Increased flow of licit trade
and reduced border checks both reduce risk of trafficking illicit goods.
• Political integration (Eastern Europe and CIS; South Africa). Effect:
Increased trade to new markets gives increased cover and markets to
traffickers.
• Increased migration. Effect: Family networks, ties and cover for
trafficking and distribution networks.
• Increased global communications and financial transactions. Effect:
Provides opportunity and cover for international money laundering.
Source: Adapted from Keh and Farrell, 1997, p. 91
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The listing of factors that provide opportunities for TOC has one principal ad-
vantage. It implies that, since criminal opportunities can create TOC, then reduc-
ing criminal opportunities can be utilized to prevent TOC. The two sides of the
opportunity coin are necessarily related, and, as suggested below, the aim of
crime policy should be to minimise new opportunities and to eliminate existing
opportunities. The crime prevention framework presented later in this chapter is
intended to encourage the stifling and closing of criminal opportunities.
7.3 Definitions
The recent formal definitions of organized crime and transnational organized
crime outlined below have been based upon a platform of related research. “The
concept of ‘transnational crime’is exactly a quarter century old. The then United
Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch coined the term in order
to identify certain criminal phenomena transcending international borders,
transgressing the laws of several states or having an impact on another country”
(Mueller, 2001, p. 13). In a supplemental survey to the Fourth United Nations
Survey of Crime Trends and Criminal Justice Operations, transnational crime
was defined in the following manner: “Offences whose inception, prevention
and/or direct or indirect effects involved more than one country”. (United Na-
tions, 1995, para 9.)
In 1976, Michael Maltz identified six means by which organized crimes are
executed: violence, theft, corruption, economic coercion, deception, and victim
participation. Kenney and Finckenauer (1995) provide a definition of organized
crime that combines “actors” (those participating in organized criminal and
crime groups) with “acts” (the means of organized crime). For them, organized
crime groups: are non-ideological; have an organized hierarchy; have continuity
over time; use force or threat of force; restrict membership; obtain profit through
illegal enterprises; provide illegal goods and services desired by the general pop-
ulace; use corruption to neutralize public officials and politicians; seek a monop-
oly position to obtain exclusive control over specific goods and services; have
job specialization within the group; have a code of secrecy; and plan extensively
to achieve long-term goals.
Crime is often considered organized if the actors are involved on a sustained
basis, that is, if the activity is one of continuing criminal enterprise. In order to
meet this criteria, organized crime groups often incorporate strategies similar to
those employed in licit markets, including entrepreneurial skill, specialization,
and coordination with the additional components of violence and corruption that
allow for the propagation of illicit activities. Phil Williams draws many parallels
between TOC and the operations of legitimate industry (Williams,1992) and
suggests that they form strategic alliances (Williams, 1994). It may be, however,
that because transnational organised criminals so clearly pursue profits, and take
explicit account of the costs and benefits of exploiting criminal opportunities,
they are vulnerable. This feature of TOC makes it an attractive prospect for pre-
ventive measures that seek to reduce opportunities, impose additional costs, and
reduce the rewards of crime, as discussed later in this report.
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In the context of a debate about whether a set definition of transnational orga-
nized crime is either possible or desirable, the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime outlined some useful characteristics of
TOC without imposing the strict constraints of a tight definition.4 Article 2 of
The Convention deals with use of terms and defines organized criminal group,
serious crime, and structured groups as shown in Box 2.
Box 2: Definitions outlined in the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime
Article 2 states that
“Organized criminal group” shall mean a structured group of three or
more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the
aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in
accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a
financial or other material benefit;
“Serious crime” shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable
by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious
penalty; [and,]
“Structured group” shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for
the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have for-
mally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a de-
veloped structure.
Article 3 notes that an offence is transnational in nature if
a) It is committed in more than one State;
b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation,
planning, direction or control takes place in another State;
c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group
that engages in criminal activities in more than one State; or
d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another
State.
In a similar fashion, The European Union drafted a set of Characteristics of Or-
ganized Crime, containing the eleven components shown in Box 3:5
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4 The Convention was adopted by resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 2000 at the fifty-fifth session of the General
Assembly of the United Nations. In accordance with its article 36, the Convention was open for signature by all States
and by regional economic integration organizations, provided at least one Member State of such organization has
signed the Convention, from 12 to 15 December 2000 at the Palazzi di Giustizia in Palermo, Italy, and thereafter at the
United Nations Headquarters in New York until 12 December 2002.
5 EU/12247/1/94 Rev.1, Annex.
Box 3: Eleven Components of Organized Crime as defined by
the European Union
At least six of these components must be present, three of which must be
those numbered 1, 5 and 11, for any crime or criminal group to be classified
as organized:
1. Collaboration of more than 2 people;
2. Each with own appointed tasks;
3. For a prolonged or indefinite period of time;
4. Using some form of discipline and control;
5. Suspected of the commission of serious criminal offences;
6. Operating on an international level;
7. Using violence or other means suitable for intimidation;
8. Using commercial or businesslike structure;
9. Engaged in money laundering;
10. Exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration,
judicial authorities or the economy;
11. Determined by the pursuit of profit and/or power.
The United Nations International Centre for Crime Prevention has recently
emphasised the notion of dangerousness, that is, the threat that organized crime
poses to persons, institutions, and licit markets, and these elements are outlined
in Box 4. By defining the elements of dangerousness it was intended that govern-
ments would be able to increase the focus of their preventive efforts.
Box 4: Elements of ‘Dangerousness’ of Organized Crime as outlined by
the United Nations International Centre for Crime Prevention
– transnational organized crime groups engage in crimes which are
mala in se, wrong in themselves;
– in economic terms, the groups bring about material loss to victims;
– in psychological terms, the groups foster intimidation, coercion
and fear;
– in a social sense, the groups generate mistrust in institutions;
– an ability to challenge political and institutional authority;
– an ability to invest illicit proceeds into the licit economy;
– the investment in proceeds abroad thus removing resources
from the domestic economy. (United Nations, 2000a, p. 5-7)
This discussion suggests that there is no generally agreed definition of transna-
tional organized crime. However, while a definition of TOC may be necessary
for some legal purposes (if, for example, persons involved in TOC are to be
treated differently by the legal system), a definition that suffices may be suffi-
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cient from the viewpoint of crime prevention. In part this is because the key focus
of crime prevention efforts is largely upon the individual types of crime that are
committed, and the closing of crime-specific opportunities.
7.4 Data collection efforts
The normal practice of the United Nations crime prevention and criminal justice
programme, of which HEUNI is an affiliated member, is to base analyses of
global and regional crime on the periodic Surveys of Crime Trends and Criminal
Justice Operations or on the International Crime Victim Survey. While some of
the data gathered through these methods might be construed as proxies for orga-
nized crime they do not systematically collect information which directly mea-
sures levels of TOC. It is possible that the UNCJS survey could provide some in-
direct indicators of transnational organized crime via its measures related to drug
offences, bribery, fraud and embezzlement. Although many such offences are
not necessarily linked to organized or transnational crime, it is possible that
changes in them over time may reflect underlying increases relating to organized
crime. Some of these have recently been exploited: Van Horne and Farrell (1999)
examined drug offenders in the global criminal justice system and found that
their numbers had almost universally increased at the same time as it was known
that there had been significant increases in the global drug trade. Such figures
provide imperfect and indirect supporting measures of the spread of organized
crime.
Future sweeps of the UNCJS survey however, may benefit from efforts to cap-
ture data on organized crime. Member states could be encouraged, as suggested
by the UN Convention, to include transnational organized crime in their legisla-
tion and to record offenses that fit that category. The Survey could ask Member
States to estimate the proportion of drug offences, bribery, fraud and embezzle-
ment (and other crimes) that were committed by organized crime groups, and to
provide specific counts relating to organized crime. In addition, the Centre for
International Crime Prevention has considered preparing thematic supplemental
surveys that would be linked to the UNCJS survey proper. Such a supplemental
survey on transnational crime was conducted in 1994 as part of the Fourth Survey
and could surely be modified and repeated in the future. Apart from these more
traditional data collection methods of survey, the Centre has also begun to pre-
pare, with the assistance of national experts, criminal economy profiles. The in-
tent is to better understand the phases through which an illicit or licit product
moves through the economy with the assistance of criminal actors.
Elsewhere, pioneering efforts such as those by Phil Williams (1999) have
been made to gather pieces of the picture relating to various specific types of
transnational organized crime. Such efforts should be similarly encouraged – the
old adage that, with a little ingenuity, much knowledge can often be gained from
imperfect partial data – seems to be the case (or more likely the necessity) in this
instance. Williams typically builds a picture by putting together many small data
items from different sources. Often the whole is greater than the sum of the parts
and it is possible to derive larger-scale inferences from the resultant collage.
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It is exactly this collage technique that forms the basis of this HEUNI volume
and the preceding volume. As transnational organized crime is multidimen-
sional, the authors are certain that HEUNI is pointing in the right direction with
regard to the manner in which it purports to describe and explain crime in Europe
and North America.
7.5 Significant developments in transnational
organized crime trends
While some of the components of globalisation that have affected transnational
criminal opportunities were given brief mention above (see Box 1 and related
discussion), this section outlines some of the specific resultant trends. It gives an
overview of some of the factors related to and broad developments in transna-
tional organized crime in Europe and North America.
Perhaps the most significant individual socio-political event of recent de-
cades that has created new opportunities for transnational organized crime has
been the advent of Perestroika, the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union,
and the resultant market-oriented economies. These changes created new oppor-
tunities for organized crime in the region, concurrent with new government insti-
tutions that were ill equipped to address the growing problem. The result was that
“[a]t the end of the 1990’s, official sources reported that Russian organized
crime was composed of around 70,000 members and controlled an estimated
50 percent of the economy, including one third of the country’s 1,800 banks,
1,500 state-owned companies and 4,000 companies quoted on the stock ex-
change. There were an estimated 110 transnational criminal groups based in
Russia, which operated in 40 countries.” (United Nations, 2000b, p. 27)
Organized crime groups infiltrated both public and private institutions and in-
dustries, and, as a result, legitimized themselves so that the line between licit and
illicit rapidly became blurred. Organized crime groups have become major em-
ployers by replacing the formerly state run labor markets and trade unions
(Voronin, 1996). High levels of corruption in public government and private in-
dustry have reduced public trust and the willingness of foreign firms and agen-
cies to invest in the region. The instability of the financial sector has resulted in
massive capital flight, estimated to be about $1 billion per month, which is likely
to include laundered funds from criminal activity (United States, 2000).
The scope of organized crime activities and groups emanating from the for-
mer Soviet Union is difficult to assess. It is broadly accepted that Russian orga-
nized crime groups are active in its neighboring countries including Estonia, Lat-
via, Lithuania, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the
Ukraine, and that its reaches extend into much of Europe as well as North Amer-
ica. The United States Government suggests that
“Russian criminal organizations in the United States are adept at moving
funds through a global complex of front companies, offshore financial service
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centers, and crime-controlled banks to facilitate extraction of criminal pro-
ceeds originating in Russia, as well as to launder funds generated from
US-based criminal operations.” (op.cit., ch.3:17)
It is claimed that Russian groups are fully familiar with modern technologies and
business practices, and make use of documentation fraud, health care fraud, and
credit defaults all of which makes their criminal activities complex and difficult
to detect. (op.cit.).
In contrast to Eastern Europe, Western Europe and North America have expe-
rienced a period of economic stability and unity unprecedented in their history.
“The single market reforms of the European Union (EU) under the Schengen
Agreement that permitted unfettered movement of goods, services, labor, and
capital throughout most of Western Europe; sophisticated infrastructure for
facilitating international trade; and tremendous volume of people and goods
passing through commercial airports and seaports are exploited by interna-
tional criminals to move drugs, arms, illegal aliens, and other contraband
throughout Western Europe and to use EU gateways to reach every other re-
gion in the world.” (op.cit., ch.3:2)
Flows of licit and illicit goods and services, both east to west and west to east, are
exacerbated by the proximity of regions experiencing divergent economic, so-
cial and political realities. The situation is further enhanced by “middleman”
States such as Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic each possessing a suffi-
ciently complex and near-Western infrastructure of roads, railways, and tele-
communications but lacking the law enforcement and institutional mechanisms
to guard against infringements of these institutions. We should note here that we
are not characterizing the West as victims of crime exported from the East, but
rather that the rapid socio-economic transformation of the east has sped the
growth of criminal opportunities (as in the West but arguably from a more devel-
oped base) so that it has outpaced the growth of legislation and prevention ef-
forts.
7.6 Responses
The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000)
makes use of legal mechanisms intended to “promote cooperation to prevent and
combat transnational crime more effectively” (Article 1). It attempts, among
other things, to promote rules and practices that encourage States to define, de-
sign and enforce instruments for law-enforcement and prosecutorial agencies,
and thus to encourage legislative consistency across jurisdictions. Such consis-
tency should minimise the loopholes that organized crime can exploit. Part of the
Convention (Article 31) encourages the development, evaluation and sharing of
best practices; the reduction of the possibility of illicitly obtained monies from
entering the licit economy; the reintegration into society of persons convicted of
organized crimes; the periodic evaluation of legislation and administrative regu-
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lations; the promotion of public awareness campaigns; and, the sharing of agen-
cies and authorities that might assist other States.
The Convention encourages a number of approaches to the prevention of
TOC. Specifically, it encourages ‘rule setting’ that blocks the criminal opportu-
nities available to organised crime (Clarke and Homel, 1997). This approach is
one of many in the preventive repertoire. Efforts to develop preventive ap-
proaches to TOC would benefit from greater conceptual clarification of the kind
that is common in the discussion of crime prevention more generally. There are a
number of options for classifying crime prevention (e.g. Lab, 1999; Lavrakas
and Bennett, 1988; Van Dijk and De Waard, 1991). In what follows,
Brantingham and Faust’s (1976) classification of primary, secondary or tertiary
is utilised. Primary crime prevention, rather like preventive medicine, is in-
tended to stop the crime before it happens. Secondary prevention is directed at
those at heightened risk of offending. Tertiary prevention deals with known of-
fenders – in effect it operates through the criminal justice system. Much of the
discussion of ‘prevention’ in the existing literature relating to TOC conflates
these approaches to prevention.
For the reasons given below, the discussion that follows focuses upon primary
prevention. Primary prevention “identifies conditions in the physical and social
environment that provide opportunities for or precipitate criminal acts”. Primary
prevention can be divided into social and situational components. Social preven-
tion addresses the inclination to offend; it might include education programs, job
training, or the alleviation of poverty. Such schemes would be available to all cit-
izens – potential offenders or not.
Although clearly social crime prevention has a role to play in the prevention of
crime generally, its potential is limited and it is inefficient as a means of prevent-
ing transnational organised crime. The crime prevention ‘pay-off’ from such so-
cial interventions is longer term. It is not until the children grow that the benefits
of education as a crime prevention measure, for example, come into their own.
Arguably, something more immediate is required in tackling transnational or-
ganised crime. Furthermore, although there are many excellent reasons for try-
ing to improve education levels, provide job training schemes, and reduce pov-
erty, the prevention of transnational organised crime would not be among the key
contenders. Citizens have the right of access to education and employment op-
portunities for their own sake, not simply as a crime prevention measure.
Not only is the potential preventive effect of social measures long term, but
their relevance may be questionable in relation to transnational organised crime.
There is no evidence that all members of organised crime syndicates are socially
marginalised. Indeed, in the former Soviet Union some of the major members of
organised gangs, rather like the Italian Mafia, are wealthy and well-educated in-
dividuals. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the members of organised
crime groups come from any particular locality. They could be drawn from a very
wide region, and attempting to improve education levels or provide school-based
or other social programs as a means of preventing transnational organised crime,
would require investment over a potentially vast area. It is difficult to see how it
could be targeted on high-risk individuals and therefore difficult to see how it
could be cost effective. Finally there is no shortage of transnational organised
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criminals operating in advanced democracies where education levels and legiti-
mate job opportunities are relatively common. To somehow suggest, as some
commentators have, that an education program in Colombia might reduce the in-
cidence of corruption and transnational drug trafficking, when it has had limited
success in the United States, does not seem a rational or efficient use of limited
resources.
Situational crime prevention, on the other hand, offers more immediate
pay-off as a preventive approach and is as effective in preventing crime by rich
and poor, disorganised and organised. It has been defined by Clarke (1983) as
comprising measures:
1 that are directed at highly specific forms of crime
2 that involve the management, design, or manipulation of the immediate
environment in as systematic and permanent a way as possible
3 that reduce the opportunities for crime and increase the risks as perceived
by a wide range of offenders.
This approach to prevention addresses features of the environment in which
crimes occur, or aspects of the target against which crimes occur. It analyses,
with some precision, the context within which criminal events happen and then
reduces the opportunity for their recurrence. It is closely affiliated with the prob-
lem-oriented approach to policing (see Goldstein 1990) that is too rarely dis-
cussed in the context of TOC.
The remainder of this section considers the potential of situational crime pre-
vention when applied to transnational organised crime. It argues that, from one
perspective, it already operates as an approach to the prevention of transnational
organised crime, and has already demonstrated its efficacy. In addition, and most
importantly, however, it proposes that it might be more effective if applied more
formally and systematically, taking lessons from situational applications in other
crime control contexts.
There are numerous examples of changes in the ‘situation’ resulting in reduc-
tions in crime. Clarke (1992) produced a useful classification of these situational
techniques which illuminates the underlying principles through which they op-
erate. This classification was later elaborated upon by Clarke and Homel (1997),
resulting in a sixteen-cell framework laying out the techniques of situational
crime prevention and providing examples from the research literature. The
framework is set out below in Box 5, including examples that are routinely (or
specially) used to prevent organised crime.
The list of preventive techniques and the examples given in Box 5 will not be
explained in full. The interested reader is referred to Clarke (1998) for the most
up-to-date explanation of these preventive techniques. It is, however, worth ex-
plaining the framework and some of the examples in order to demonstrate their
general utility and the manner in which they should assist the international com-
munity in developing a portfolio of prevention efforts to tackle TOC.
The framework divides into four broad categories of preventive effort: in-
creasing the effort, increasing the risks, reducing the rewards, and removing the
excuses. These categories fit the analysis of organized crime as being based
upon, broadly speaking, rational decision-making of criminal actors that incor-
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Technique (and brief definition) ‘Traditional’ crime prevention Preventing organized crime
A. Increasing the Effort
1. Target hardening: making the
commission of a crime more
difficult.
Slug rejecter devices
Steering locks
Bandit screens
Tower of London
(Crown Jewels)
Fort Knox (Gold)
Car anti-theft devices stop
organized car theft
2. Controlling access to targets:
limiting access of would-be
perpetrators to the place where
crime is possible.
Parking lot barriers
Fenced yards
Entry phones
Password protection
Security at art galleries
Border checkpoints
Crop-dusting plane registers
3. Deflecting offenders and victims:
inducing offenders or victims to be
elsewhere than at a place where
crime is possible.
Bus stop placement
Tavern location
Street closures
Decoy Vehicles
Decoy shipments
Ships travelling in convoy
4. Controlling crime facilitators:
Controlling the means whereby
crime is made possible or easier.
Credit card photo
Gun controls
Caller-ID
Controlling precursors
chemicals used in the
production of drugs
B. Increasing the risks
5. Screening entrances and exits:
increasing conspicuousness when
rules are not being observed.
Automatic ticket gates
Baggage screening
Merchandise tags
Passport and Visa controls
Import and Export Documents
Biometric scans
6. Formal surveillance (of victims
and offenders): locating perpetrators,
victims or crime-prone places in time
and space.
Red light cameras
Burglar alarms
Security guards
X-ray machines
Custom’s checks
Satellite surveillance
7. Surveillance by employees:
the oversight by those at work as
part of their work function.
Pay phone locations
Parking attendants
CCTV systems
Support for whistle-blower
policies in employee
regulations
8. Natural surveillance: making crime
or the identity of those committing
crime more visible.
Defensible space
Street lighting
Cab driver ID
Journalistic reports on mafia
bosses
Ten Most Wanted list
C. Reducing the rewards
9. Removing targets: making a crime
impossible because its purpose is
precluded or its object unavailable.
Removable car radio
Women’s refuges
Phonecard
Eliminating high value bank
notes stops their forgery
10. Identifying property: making
stolen goods more easily
recognisable.
Property marking
Vehicle licensing
Cattle branding
Unique dot-marking of art and
valuables
Intellectual property registers
Box 5: Prevention Techniques for Organized Crime (and ‘traditional’ crime)
porates an assessment of the costs and benefits involved. Transnational orga-
nized crime occurs because those involved perceive the likely benefits to out-
weigh the likely costs. The overarching aim of the situational approach there-
fore, is to tip the scales of this analysis by increasing the costs and/or reducing the
rewards to transnational organized crime.
Although the column of cells addressing measures to tackle organized crime
focuses upon crimes that are ‘traditionally’ thought of as organized, it is of note
that many measures directed at ‘ordinary’ crimes can have an effect on some
forms of organised crime. Street lighting could impact upon criminal opportuni-
ties for organized car crime, as could legislation that made car immobilizers
compulsory. Alarms, sensor systems and closed-circuit television on business
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Technique (and brief definition) ‘Traditional’ crime prevention Preventing organized crime
11. Reducing temptation: limiting
occasions on which a potential target
is publicly identifiable as such.
Gender-neutral phone lists
Off-street parking
Rapid repair
Decoy shipments (money;
prisoners etc.)
GPS tracking of goods
12. Denying benefits: design or later
action make the crime less profitable
after the fact.
Ink merchandise tags
PIN for car radios
Graffiti cleaning
Exploding dye on bank money
Asset seizure legislation
D. Removing Excuses
13. Setting rules: clearly defining
the law and unacceptable conduct
(and the consequences).
Harassment codes
Customs declaration
Hotel registrations
Cash deposits limits to stop
money laundering
No-negotiation anti-hijacking
policy
14. Alerting conscience: publicising
the rules (subtly or otherwise) to
make offenders think twice.
‘Walking tall’
Roadside speedometers
‘Shoplifting is stealing’
‘Idiots drink and drive’
Goods to declare channel at
customs
“Drug production by-products
damage the environment”
message
15. Controlling disinhibitors: reducing
the frequency of states that may
induce rule breaking.
Drinking age laws
Ignition interlock
V-chip
Control of precursors of drugs
Clear definitions of corruption
Sealed cargo containers
16. Assisting compliance: making it
easy to follow the rules or law.
Easy library checkout
Public lavatories
Trash bins
Regular monitoring of arms
manufacturers
Assistance in destroying
biological weapons
International decommissioning
bodies (eg. Monitoring arms
decommissioning)
Bomb-proof trash bins
Box 5: (continued)
premises may reduce thefts of goods that would result in transnational shipments
prior to sale. Sealed cargo containers can eliminate an avenue for illicit transna-
tional shipments if illicit goods cannot be added to a container that is shipped un-
der the auspices of a reputable licit trader. Such measures may have positive
domino effects – for example, if the removal of the shipment opportunity meant
that there was no point (that is, reward to) obtaining the illicit goods for ship-
ment.
The boundary between organized crime and transnational organized crime is
somewhat blurred in the final column of Box 5. It is proposed that the prevention
of many types of organized crime, in addition to those of a transnational nature,
will benefit from the more widespread formal development of situational crime
prevention interventions. Many types of crime that were previously just labelled
‘organized’are increasingly being labelled ‘transnational’because the process of
globalization has created the potential for interaction between new markets. Or-
ganized car theft and shipment is one example of such a crime. It is also an exam-
ple of a type of crime where modifications to the potential target (design changes
to cars) are likely to be a fruitful avenue for prevention since law enforcement ef-
forts aimed simply at organizations leave the same criminal opportunities to be
adopted by others. The highly dynamic illicit drug trade has demonstrated this
kind of adaptation on several occasions when the collapse of one large criminal
organization has left it to be replaced by one or more others.
Some efforts to prevent TOC are so common that they appear second-nature
and are not recognized as crime prevention efforts. Passports are one of the most
straightforward examples of everyday efforts to tackle TOC. By providing a
means of controlling access to and from countries, they discourage and make it
more difficult and risky to cross international borders illegally, and reduce the
level of the illicit movement (trafficking) of humans. Although the smuggling of
humans across borders still occurs, it is far less prevalent than it would be in the
absence of passports and border checks. Passports have become such an every-
day part of many people’s lives that their formal crime prevention role, and the
mechanism by which they work to prevent transnational crime, can be easily
overlooked. As the manufacture of passports has become more sophisticated, the
costs of forging passports, and the skills required, have increased significantly.
This increases the costs to organized crime and will have eliminated most illegal
border crossings that would occur in the absence of passports and border checks.
Those organized border crossings that remain are in vastly reduced numbers and
are far more risky and costly to organized criminals than they would otherwise
be. Hence, although we would be hard pressed to provide the relevant empirical
evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that simple and accepted measures such as
passports can have significant effects upon the prevalence of TOC. The orga-
nized crime of counterfeiting of money has likewise become more difficult as
production technologies have improved, although even here an ‘arms race’ can
take place between criminals and crime preventers. Many relatively simple situ-
ational measures – for example, using paper that is difficult to obtain, incorporat-
ing watermarks, using complex designs that are difficult to replicate, have served
to make the counterfeiting of money extremely difficult and costly, as well as in-
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creasing the likelihood of detection. Still, new criminal opportunities arise. The
new European currency unit, the Euro, is alleged to have at least one coin that is
virtually indistinguishable from a lower value coin from another country. This
presents a new opportunity for TOC – the transnational shipments of such coins
and their substitution for the higher value coins will prove a profitable continuing
enterprise unless efforts are made to remove the opportunity. Possible interven-
tions could include coin re-design, publicity to alert potential victims, re-valuing
or withdrawing one of the coins, or improved techniques for the identification
and marking of one of the coins.
The monitoring of the level of cash that can be deposited in financial institu-
tions in single over-the-counter transactions is another simple situational mea-
sure used to tackle money laundering. Many criminal transactions utilise cash
since it is seldom traceable, but the result can be that higher-level criminals are
left with large sums of money to deposit and launder. Without receipts and in-
voices (a paper trail that can be traced) there is little alternative to depositing this
money in banks in large amounts. However, since this is not an everyday occur-
rence for most people, imposing a limit on cash deposits and introducing simple
monitoring procedures will primarily hinder organized crime without imposing
significant costs on legal transactions. Legal depositors can complete the rele-
vant paperwork with impunity, whereas illegal depositors are unlikely to do so.
The result in some instances has been a tactical displacement to ‘smurfing’ –
multiple small deposits by different individuals working for the same criminal
network. However, smurfing incurs far more effort and risk for organized crime:
it means that many more low-level criminals have to be both paid, and entrusted
with lumps of money. These workers may, if detected, be more likely to give up
any intelligence information they may have. When combined with additional sit-
uational measures such as tracing the paper-trail of suspect monies, the gradual
closing of legal loopholes that exist in certain countries (such as off-shore havens
with limited legal requirements for financial transactions), and other situational
measures such as asset seizure (which remove the rewards to organized crime),
organized criminals are constantly being squeezed, making such crime a less at-
tractive prospect.
Despite claims that money laundering is still relatively easy, it does not seem
unreasonable to expect that continued efforts to close the loopholes and to trace
illegal money via various methods, will prove a long-term success in the fight
against many types of organized crime. While such situational prevention efforts
are specific to the crime of money laundering, they also impact upon a range of
related organized crime that provides the money to be laundered. In general, such
efforts also increase the skill-level that is required of organised criminals, pro-
ducing an effective ‘barrier to entry’ to criminals who do not have these skills. In
this way, situational prevention may in the longer term also reduce the propensity
to turn to organised crime among the pool of potential offenders.
Problem-oriented policing and crime analysis techniques that allow the iden-
tification of patterns and trends in crime and its characteristics, have all proved
useful in tackling many types of non-organised crime. These approaches should
be encouraged in relation to the prevention of organised crime and are a comple-
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ment to situational prevention efforts. While the international community has
begun to foster some movement towards the dissemination of such techniques in
relation to ‘traditional’ non-organized crime, there appears to be a need for such
work to be promoted in relation to TOC.
7.7 Conclusions
The conclusions to this chapter take two forms. The present chapter has focused
primarily upon a theoretical rather than an empirical contribution to the preven-
tion of transnational organized crime in Europe and North America. It is pro-
posed that the accumulation of knowledge must be incremental and that efforts
in the future might benefit from drawing together the empirical data sources on
specific types of transnational organized crime. This includes analysis of those
aspects of the UNCJS survey that might fruitfully provide some indirect indica-
tors relating to organized crime – measures relating to drug offences, bribery,
fraud and embezzlement. Their combination with other indicators such as the
Corruptions Perception Index developed by Transparency International may
shed empirical light upon general trends and patterns in these crimes. It is also
hoped that future sweeps of the UNCJS survey might incorporate more direct
measures of organized crime. This knowledge will prove of more practical utility
if it can be combined within a preventive framework and if it is supported by lo-
cal and crime-specific analyses. Increased knowledge and understanding of
TOC is, after all, only useful and worthwhile if it is used to inform preventive ef-
forts in some fashion.
The emphasis of a significant part of this chapter has been upon developing a
framework around which practical efforts to prevent organized crime might be
developed. This seems appropriate given the stage which we have now reached
in relation to the study and prevention of transnational organised crime. There
have been many recent efforts to describe the nature and extent of organized
crime. These are certainly important and should continue, with increasing em-
phasis upon the details of the crime and context-specific analysis. To date, how-
ever, there has been little effort expended upon the study and evaluation of practi-
cal preventive efforts. There is, therefore, a great need for the delineation of a for-
mal prevention framework such as that proposed here. The transfer of a proven
and existing framework for these purposes provides a significant opportunity for
knowledge transfer. The approach is only new in the present context – hence
there are potential benefits of cross-fertilization to the field of transnational or-
ganised crime from the established situational crime prevention experience of
dealing with other offences. It is proposed that increasing the costs and reducing
the benefits to organised crime should prove a more productive and cost-effec-
tive approach to tackling the problem. It is likely that the most significant inroads
into organised crime will be made through the continued adoption of the tech-
niques of situational prevention. A formal framework such as that proposed here
provides a means by which such efforts can be promoted and encouraged.
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8 Concluding notions
Kauko Aromaa and Seppo Leppä
The report in hand is the fifth of its kind, aiming at analyzing and summing up the
results of the United Nations Surveys on Crime Trends and Operations of Crimi-
nal Justice Systems, originating in the national responses of the member states of
the European and North American regions. The consecutive reporting undertak-
ings, covering the survey cycles from the second to the fifth, have aspired time
after time to refine the exploratory power of the final analysis by methodological
means. In contrast to these efforts, the idea dominating this sixth survey report
has from the outset been, inter alia, to explore various comparative approaches
utilized in this enterprise in order to find out whether it is on the whole apposite to
continue with this type of a research efforts.
Mixed exposure is given to this question by chapters two to seven of the report.
The trustworthiness of the available data is not very much questioned in chapters
five and six: the data are taken largely at face value and utilized as baseline mate-
rial for further analysis. The limitations of the data are, however, given a central
role in, for example, chapters three and four, and consequently very advanced
conclusions are not drawn on the basis of the resulting analysis. In the two re-
maining chapters (two and seven), it is explained at the outset that the aim of the
exercise is by nature descriptive rather than explanatory.
All in all, the picture is not a too encouraging one. The main cause of this un-
certainty is the structural incommensurability of the indicator variables used in
measuring phenomena in the field of crime. In chapter 3 above Howard and
Smith suggest that triangulation, i.e. the application of more than one – as a rule
three – measuring instruments, might be one way out of this dilemma. Com-
monly, there are only two measuring tools are applicable in the crime context,
namely the official crime statistics and the data emanating from victim surveys.
After rigorous statistical analyses of these two sources of data, Howard and
Smith conclude that precious little agreement exists between the entities, which
leads the researchers to mistrust the validity of cross-national measurements in
this field. They say that the further inference of this is that “a firmer answer to the
question of validity will have to await a more complete application of the notion
of triangulation, and as the name suggests this exercise will require at least three
different types of crime data, each with their own sources of error. Perhaps a ro-
bust effort to implement rigorous cross-national self-report studies of crime will
help to resolve this problem in the future” (see ch. 3, pp. 66-67 above).
The hopes of Howard and Smith might be crushed at least by the following
facts: As regards self-report studies, only less serious offences will be reported to
the researchers, It is fairly safe to assume- even though there is no direct experi-
ence of the matter – that actual career criminals are rather reluctant to reveal seri-
ous crimes in a standard survey, particularly if organized crime is involved, and
that studies in this category can hence be meaningful only among the target
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groups composed either of juveniles or ordinary people. Criminal careers of de-
linquent juveniles very seldom incorporate really serious offences or crimes de-
manding special skills. And serious offences committed by ordinary people, or
acts that they see as aggravated transgressions of the law, are too infrequent for a
satisfactory measurement, and since quite large samples of study objects are
needed, this kind of exercises will become quite expensive and are thus not easily
realized. As to the victim studies we have to keep in mind that a great number of
offences are so-called victimless crimes (or in many cases the context is such that
victims are not even aware of being victimized), and a lot of actual cases will not,
therefore, be recorded as such in victim studies.
All this means that a considerable number of crimes actually committed will
not be recorded by any of the triangulation instruments. The consequence, as we
understand it, is that we will never be able to produce robust methodical tools
aiming at comparative cross-national exercises by utilizing crime-connected in-
dicators, however much effort we put in to refine them qualitatively. A part of the
phenomenon will always remain concealed from us.
A further option might be to look for more valid and reliable indicators with
sufficient explanatory power in this field, which would not be connected with the
phenomenon at all or at least to a lesser degree than those presently used. The
next exercise to analyze the results of the United Nations Survey on Crime
Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, should avail itself primarily
of this kind of considerations.
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Centre for International Crime Prevention
Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
and
Statistics Division
Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
United Nations
Questionnaire for the
Sixth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends
and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems,
covering the period 1995-1997
Country name:  
The officer responsible for coordinating the collection of the data for the entire
questionnaire should return all sections of the completed questionnaire no later than 1
October 1999 to the Centre for International Crime Prevention, Office for Drug Control
and Crime Prevention, P.O. Box 500, A-1400, Vienna, Austria, or to the Statistics
Division, United Nations, New York, N.Y. 10017, United States of America.
This questionnaire is  being distributed through the Statistics Division network. 
In order to facilitate any clarification of the data provided, information about the
coordinating officer should be given below and on the first page of each of the sections of
the questionnaire.
Coordinating officer’s name:
Functional title:  
Agency::    
Street:   
City/state/country:  
Telephone (including country code and city code):  
Fax (including country code and city code:
E-mail:  
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Introduction
A. Objectives of the Sixth Survey 
1. The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 1984/48 of 25 May 1984,
requested the Secretary-General to maintain and develop the United Nations crime-related
database by continuing to conduct surveys of crime trends and operations of criminal
justice systems.
2. The main goal of the Sixth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations
of Criminal Justice Systems, covering the period 1995-1997, is to collect data on the
incidence of reported crime and the operations of criminal justice systems with a view to
improving the analysis and dissemination of that information throughout the world. The
results of the Sixth Survey will provide an overview of crime trends and relationships
between various parts of the criminal justice system and promote informed decision-
making in administration, at the national and international levels.
3. The data gathered by the Sixth Survey will benefit both the international community
as a whole and each responding Government. The information will be used in determining
crime trends and problem areas for intervention in the form of technical cooperation, in
preparing reports such as the Global Report on Crime and Justice1 and in comparing the
crime situation in one country with that of another country in a similar position.
4. The questionnaire for the Sixth Survey consists of a series of questions designed to
elicit responses in the form of data, primarily statistical data, on the main components of
criminal justice systems for the period 1995-1997. The questionnaire for the Sixth Survey
is 65 per cent shorter than the questionnaire for the Fifth United Nations Survey of Crime
Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, which covered the period 1990-1994.
The instructions in the paragraphs below should be carefully studied before the
questionnaire is completed. Partial replies should be reviewed by the central responding
office to ensure that the jurisdictions to which the data refer (for example, national or
federal jurisdictions) are clearly defined and that the data are statistically valid. It is
important to review the replies in all parts of the questionnaire for consistency.
B. Instructions for completing the questionnaire
5. The questionnaire is compiled in such a way that it can be divided up between
different agencies and reassembled in the central responding office before it is returned.
In the replies received for the Fifth Survey: (a) the same information was given in two parts
of the questionnaire; (b) there were figures on operations in later stages of the criminal
justice process that were higher than the corresponding figures in earlier stages of the
process; and (c) no explanations given for significant statistical changes. In those cases,
the Secretariat sent requests for validation of the data. The procedure was very
time-consuming for all those involved in the provision and analysis of the data, resulting
in considerable delays. Respondents are requested to bear that in mind when completing
the questionnaire for the Sixth Survey.
6. In addition, respondents completing the tables are requested to keep the following
in mind:
4
(a) If figures provided in one table differ significantly from one year to the next,
the discrepancy should be explained in notes to the table; 
(b)  If it is not possible to provide data as classified or defined in a table, an attempt
should be made to adjust the data as far as possible and to describe the steps involved in
notes to the table or on the facing page;  
(c) If data are not yet available, provisional data or estimates may be inserted and
noted accordingly;
(d) If a table can be completed only in part, it should be explained in a note in the
appropriate section that the rest of the data are “not available”;
(e) If no data at all are available, the words “not yet available”, “not tabulated” or
“not collected” as the case may be, should be written in the appropriate space;
(f) In most cases, the calendar year should be used as the reporting period. Where
some other annual period is used, such as a fiscal year not corresponding to the calendar
year, that fact should be noted;
(g) Statistics on such matters as criminal justice personnel, court action and the
prison population should include data from all levels of government, that is, from the
national, state and local authorities.
7. Requests for any clarification or further information in respect of this questionnaire
should be addressed to the Director, Centre for International Crime Prevention, Office for
Drug Control and Crime Prevention, P.O. Box 500, A-1400 Vienna, Austria. Such requests
can also be sent by fax (43-1-26060-5898) or by e-mail (adam.bouloukos@cicp.un.or.at).
3 4
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Questionnaire for the
Sixth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends
and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems,
covering the period 1995-1997
I.  Police
Country name:  
Please complete this section of the questionnaire and return it no later than 1 September
1999 to the coordinating officer, whose name is provided in the box below. The
coordinating officer will, in turn, send all sections of the completed questionnaire to the
Centre for International Crime Prevention, Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention,
P.O. Box 500, A-1400, Vienna, Austria, or to the Statistics Division, United Nations, New
York, N.Y. 10017, United States of America.
This questionnaire is being distributed through the Statistics Division network.
Coordinating officer’s name:  
Functional title:  
Agency:    
Street:   
City/state/country:  
Telephone (including country code and city code): 
Fax (including country code and city code:
E-mail:  
6
Definition of terms
1. The definitions below are applicable to many legal codes.
2. “Intentional homicide” may be understood to mean death deliberately inflicted on a
person by another person, including infanticide. 
3. “Non-intentional homicide” may be understood to mean death not deliberately
inflicted on a person by another person. That includes the crime of manslaughter but
excludes traffic accidents that result in the death of persons.
4. “Assault” may be understood to mean physical attack against the body of another
person, including battery but excluding indecent assault. Some criminal or penal codes
distinguish between aggravated assault and simple assault, depending on the degree of
resulting injury. If such a distinction is made in your country, please provide the relevant
data for aggravated assault under the category “Major assault”. Under the category “Total
assault” should be included data on both aggravated assault (i.e. major assault) and simple
assault. Please provide the main criterion for distinguishing between aggravated assault and
simple assault if such a distinction is made in your country.
5. “Rape” may be understood to mean sexual intercourse without valid consent.  Please
indicate whether statutory rape is included in the data provided.  If, in your country, a
distinction is made between sexual assault and actual penetration, please provide relevant
information.
6. “Robbery” may be understood to mean the theft of property from a person, over-
coming resistance by force or threat of force.
7. “Theft” may be understood to mean the removal of property without the property
owner’s consent. “Theft” excludes burglary and housebreaking as well as theft of a motor
vehicle. Some criminal and penal codes distinguish between grand and petty theft,
depending on the value of the goods and property taken from their rightful owner.  If such
a distinction is made in your country, please provide the relevant data for grand theft under
the category “Major theft”. The category “Total theft” should include data on both grand
theft (i.e. major theft) and petty theft. Please provide the main criterion for distinguishing
between grand theft and petty theft if such a distinction is made in your country.
8. “Automobile theft” may be understood to mean the removal of a motor vehicle
without the consent of the owner of the vehicle.
9. “Burglary” may be understood to mean unlawful entry into someone else’s premises
with the intention to commit a crime.
10. “Fraud” may be understood to mean the acquisition of another person’s property by
deception. Please indicate whether the fraudulent obtaining of financial property is
included in the data provided.
11. “Embezzlement” may be understood to mean the wrongful appropriation of another
person’s property that is already in the possession of the person doing the appropriating.
12. “Drug-related crimes” may be understood to mean intentional acts that involve the
cultivation, production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, offering for sale, distribution,
purchase, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit,
5 6
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1 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 520, No. 7515.
2 Ibid., vol. 1019, No. 14956.
3 Official Records of the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Vienna, 25 November-20 December 1988, vol. I
(United Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.XI.5).
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transport, importation and exportation of internationally controlled drugs. Where
applicable, reference may be made to the provisions of the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs of 19611 and other regulations adopted in pursuance of the provisions of the
Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 19712 and/or the United Nations Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988.3
13. “Bribery and/or corruption” may be understood to mean requesting and/or accepting
material or personal benefits, or the promise thereof, in connection with the performance
of a public function for an action that may or may not be a violation of law and/or
promising as well as giving material or personal benefits to a public officer in exchange for
a requested favour.
14. “Recorded crimes” may be understood to mean the number of penal code offences
or their equivalent (i.e. various special law offences), but excluding minor road traffic
offences and other petty offences, brought to the attention of the police or other law
enforcement agencies and recorded by one of those agencies.
15. “Police personnel or law enforcement personnel” may be understood to mean
personnel in public agencies whose principal functions are the prevention, detection and
investigation of crime and the apprehension of alleged offenders. If the police are part of
the national security force in your country, please try to focus your replies as much as
possible on the civil police rather than on the national guard or local militia. If there are
many local forces, please provide data on those forces if possible. If police or law
enforcement personnel fulfil prosecutorial functions, that fact should be noted in the space
below table 1. Data concerning support staff (secretaries, clerks etc.) should be excluded
from your replies.
16. If the categories given in paragraphs 2-13 above are not fully compatible with the
legal code in your country, please try to adjust the data as far as possible. Alternatively,
you may indicate in the space below the table concerned or on the facing page what kinds
of crime are included in your statistics that might be comparable to the categories
suggested or how the comparable types of crime are defined in your country.
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a Please see the definition of the term “police personnel” in paragraph 15 on page 7.
b If some alternative reference date has to be used, please indicate that date here: ____________.
c Total police budget/financial resources should include all monies allocated to the civil police
function at the national level, including salaries and fixed assets.  When calculating salaries,
please include total monies spent on every individual employed in the given area.  When
calculating fixed assets, please include all monies invested in non-personnel assets, such as
buildings, automobiles and office equipment.
Table 1
Police personnel,a by sex, and financial resources, 1995-1997
Category
As at 31 Decemberb
1995 1997
1.1 Total police personnel
1.2  Females
1.3  Males
1.4  Total police budget/ financial resources
        (millions of local currency units)c
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a Please see the definitions of the terms in paragraphs 2-13 on pages 6-7.
b Please note that the total number of recorded crimes may be greater than the sum of the figures
given for the individual types of crime listed in the table. The total should not include minor road
traffic offences.
Table 2
Crimes recorded in criminal (police) statistics, by type of crime including attempts to
commit crimes, 1995-1997
Type of crimea 1995 1996 1997
2.1Total recorded crimes, regardless of typeb
2.2 Intentional homicide: Committed
2.3 Attempted
2.4 Committed with a firearm
2.5 Non-intentional homicide
2.6 Assault: Major assault
2.7 Total assault
2.8 Rape
2.9 Robbery
2.10 Theft: Major theft
2.11 Total theft
2.12 Automobile theft
2.13 Burglary
2.14 Fraud
2.15 Embezzlement
2.16 Drug-related crime
2.17 Bribery and/or corruption
Source(s) of the data provided in this table:
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a Please see the definitions of the terms in paragraphs 2-13 on pages 6-7.
b Please note that the total number of persons brought into formal contact with the criminal justice
system may be greater than the sum of the numbers given for the individual types of crime listed in
the table.
Table 3
Persons brought into initial formal contact with the police and/or the criminal justice
system, by type of crime, where initial formal contact might include being suspected,
arrested, cautioned etc., 1995-1997
Type of crimea 1995 1996 1997
3.1 Total persons brought into initial formal
contact with the police and/or the criminal
justice system, regardless of the type of
crimeb
3.2 Intentional homicide: Committed
3.3 Attempted
3.4 Committed with a firearm
3.5 Non-intentional homicide
3.6 Assault: Major assault
3.7 Total assault
3.8 Rape
3.9 Robbery
3.10 Theft: Major theft
3.11 Total theft
3.12 Automobile theft
3.13 Burglary
3.14 Fraud
3.15 Embezzlement
3.16 Drug-related crime
3.17 Bribery and/or corruption
Source(s) of the data provided in this table:
9 10
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If, in your opinion, there are some additional explanations that might contribute to a
better understanding of the data that you have entered in this part of the
questionnaire, please provide those explanations in the space below or on an attached
sheet.
Table 4
Persons brought into formal contact with the criminal justice system, by sex and age
group, where formal contact might include being suspected, arrested, cautioned etc.,
1995-1997
Category 1995 1996 1997
4.1 Females
4.2 Males
4.3 Adults
4.4       Female adults
4.5       Male adults
4.6 Juveniles
4.7       Female juveniles
4.8       Male juveniles
Source(s) of the data provided in this table:
Please provide the definitions of “adult” and “juvenile” that are used in the national
criminal justice system:
Adult: 
Juvenile:
11 12
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Questionnaire for the
Sixth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends
and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems,
covering the period 1995-1997
II.  Prosecution
Country name:  
Please complete this section of the questionnaire and return it no later than 1 September
1999 to the coordinating officer, whose name is provided in the box below. The
coordinating officer will, in turn, send all sections of the completed questionnaire to the
Centre for International Crime Prevention, Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention,
P. O. Box 500, A-1400, Vienna, Austria, or to the Statistics Division, United Nations, New
York, N.Y. 10017, United States of America.
This questionnaire is  being distributed through the Statistics Division network.
Coordinating officer’s name:  
Functional title:  
Agency:    
Street:   
City/state/country:  
Telephone (including country code and city code):  
Fax (including country code and city code:
E-mail:  
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Definition of terms
1. The definitions below are applicable to many legal codes.
2. “Intentional homicide” may be understood to mean death deliberately inflicted on a
person by another person, including infanticide. Please indicate whether certain categories
of attempted homicide are charged or prosecuted as “aggravated assault”.
3. “Non-intentional homicide” may be understood to mean death not deliberately
inflicted on a person by another person. That includes the crime of manslaughter but
excludes traffic accidents that result in the death of persons.
4. “Assault” may be understood to mean physical attack against the body of another
person, including battery but excluding indecent assault. Some criminal or penal codes
distinguish between aggravated assault and simple assault, depending on the degree of
resulting injury. If such a distinction is made in your country, please provide the relevant
data for aggravated assault under the category “Major assault”. Under the category “Total
assault” should be included data on both aggravated assault (i.e. major assault) and simple
assault. Please provide the main criterion for distinguishing between aggravated assault and
simple assault if such a distinction is made in your country.
5. “Rape” may be understood to mean  sexual intercourse without valid consent.  Please
indicate whether statutory rape is included in the data provided.  If, in your country, a
distinction is made between sexual assault and actual penetration, please provide relevant
information.
6. “Robbery” may be understood to mean the theft of property from a person, over-
coming resistance by force or threat of force.
7. “Theft” may be understood to mean the removal of property without the property
owner’s consent. “Theft” excludes burglary and housebreaking as well as theft of a motor
vehicle. Some criminal and penal codes distinguish between grand and petty theft,
depending on the value of the goods and property taken from their rightful owner.  If such
a distinction is made in your country, please provide the relevant data for grand theft under
the category “Major theft”. The category “Total theft” should include data on both grand
theft (i.e. major theft) and petty theft. Please provide the main criterion for distinguishing
between grand theft and petty theft if such a distinction is made in your country.
8. “Automobile theft” may be understood to mean the removal of a motor vehicle
without the consent of the owner of the vehicle.
9. “Burglary” may be understood to mean unlawful entry into someone else’s premises
with the intention to commit a crime.
10. “Fraud” may be understood to mean the acquisition of another person’s property by
deception. Please indicate whether the fraudulent obtaining of financial property is
included in the data provided.
11. “Embezzlement” may be understood to mean the wrongful appropriation of another
person’s property that is already in the possession of the person doing the appropriating.
12. “Drug-related crimes” may be understood to mean intentional acts that involve the
cultivation, production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, offering for sale, distribution,
purchase, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit,
transport, importation and exportation of internationally controlled drugs. Where
applicable, reference may be made to the provisions of the Single Convention on Narcotic
13 14
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1 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 520, No. 7515.
2 Ibid., vol. 1019, No. 14956.
3 Official Records of the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Vienna, 25 November-20 December 1988, vol. I (United
Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.XI.5).
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Drugs of 19611 and other regulations adopted in pursuance of the provisions of the
Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 19712 and/or the United Nations Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988.3
13. “Bribery and/or corruption” may be understood to mean requesting and/or accepting
material or personal benefits, or the promise thereof, in connection with the performance
of a public function for an action that may or may not be a violation of law and/or
promising as well as giving material or personal benefits to a public officer in exchange for
a requested favour.
14. “Prosecution personnel” may be understood to mean a government official whose
duty is to initiate and maintain criminal proceedings on behalf of the state against persons
accused of committing a criminal offence. In some countries, a prosecutor is a member of
a separate agency, in others, a prosecutor is a member of the police or judiciary. Please
indicate the title of the agency in your country under which the prosecutor functions. If
more than one criminal justice system operates in your country (e.g. federal/provincial
systems or civilian/martial systems) please provide separate information about prosecu-
torial functions in each system. Data concerning support staff (secretaries, clerks etc.)
should be excluded.
15. “Persons prosecuted” may be understood to mean alleged offenders prosecuted by
means of an official charge, initiated by the public prosecutor or the law enforcement
agency responsible for prosecution.
16. If the definitions given in paragraphs 2-13 above are not fully compatible with the
legal code in your country, please try to adjust the data as far as possible. Alternatively,
you may indicate below the table concerned or on the facing page what kinds of crime are
included in your statistics that might be comparable to the categories suggested or how the
comparable types of crime are defined in your country.
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a Please see the definition of the term “prosecution personnel” in paragraph 12 on pages 14-15.
b If some alternative reference date has been used, please indicate that date here:
________________.
c Total prosecution budget/financial resources should include all monies allocated to the prosecution
function at the national level, including salaries and fixed assets. When calculating salaries, please
include total monies spent on every individual employed in the given area. When calculating fixed
assets, please include all monies invested in non-personnel assets, such as buildings, automobiles
and office equipment.
Table 5
Prosecution personnel,a by sex, and financial resources, 1995 and 1997
As at 31 Decemberb
Category 1995 1997
5.1 Total  prosecution personnel
5.2 Females 
5.3 Males 
5.4 Total prosecution budget/financial resources
(millions of local currency units)c
15 16
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a Please see the definitions of the terms in paragraphs 2-13 on pages 14 and 15.
b Please note that the total number of persons prosecuted may be greater than the sum of the
numbers given for the individual types of crime listed in the table.
Table 6
Persons prosecuted, by type of crime, 1995-1997
Type of crimea 1995 1996 1997
6.1 Total  persons prosecuted for any type of
crimeb
6.2 Intentional homicide: Committed
6.3 Attempted
6.4 Committed with a firearm
6.5 Non-intentional homicide
6.6 Assault: Major assault
6.7 Total assault
6.8 Rape
6.9 Robbery
6.10 Theft: Major theft
6.11 Total theft
6.12 Automobile theft
6.13 Burglary
6.14 Fraud
6.15 Embezzlement
6.16 Drug-related crime
6.17 Bribery and/or corruption
Source(s) of the data provided in this table:
18
If, in your opinion, there are some additional explanations that might contribute to a
better understanding of the data that you have entered in this part of the questionnaire,
please provide those explanations in the space below or on an attached sheet.
Table 7
Persons prosecuted, by sex and age group, 1995-1997
Category 1995 1996 1997
7.1 Total  persons prosecuted
7.2 Females
7.3 Males
7.4 Adults prosecuted
7.5 Female adults
7.6 Male adults
7.7 Juveniles prosecuted
7.8 Female juveniles
7.9 Male juveniles
Source(s) of the data provided in this table:
Please provide the definitions of “adult” and “juvenile” that are used in the national
criminal justice system:
Adult:
Juvenile:
17 18
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Questionnaire for the
Sixth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends
and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems,
covering the period 1995-1997
III.  Courts
Country name:  
Please complete this section of the questionnaire and return it no later than 1 September
1999 to the coordinating officer, whose name is provided in the box below. The
coordinating officer will, in turn, send all sections of the completed questionnaire to the
Centre for International Crime Prevention, Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention,
P. O. Box 500, A-1400, Vienna, Austria, or to the Statistics Division, United Nations, New
York, N.Y. 10017, United States of America.
This questionnaire is  being distributed through the Statistics Division network.
Coordinating officer’s name:  
Functional title:  
Agency:    
Street:   
City/state/country:  
Telephone (including country code and city code):  
Fax (including country code and city code:
E-mail:  
1 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 520, No. 7515.
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Definition of terms
1. The definitions below are applicable to many legal codes.
2. “Intentional homicide” may be understood to mean death deliberately inflicted on a
person by another person, including infanticide. Please indicate whether certain categories
of attempted homicide are charged or prosecuted as “aggravated assault”.
3. “Non-intentional homicide” may be understood to mean death not deliberately
inflicted on a person by another person. That includes the crime of manslaughter but
excludes traffic accidents that result in the death of persons.
4. “Assault” may be understood to mean physical attack against the body of another
person, including battery but excluding indecent assault. Some criminal or penal codes
distinguish between aggravated assault and simple assault, depending on the degree of
resulting injury. If such a distinction is made in your country, please provide the relevant
data for aggravated assault under the category “Major assault”. Under the category “Total
assault” should be included data on both aggravated assault (i.e. major assault) and simple
assault. Please provide the main criterion for distinguishing between aggravated assault and
simple assault if such a distinction is made in your country.
5. “Rape” may be understood to mean sexual intercourse without valid consent.  Please
indicate whether statutory rape is included in the data provided.  If, in your country, a
distinction is made between sexual assault and actual penetration, please provide relevant
information.
6. “Robbery” may be understood to mean the theft of property from a person, over-
coming resistance by force or threat of force.
7. “Theft” may be understood to mean the removal of property without the property
owner’s consent. “Theft” excludes burglary and housebreaking as well as theft of a motor
vehicle.  Some criminal and penal codes distinguish between grand and petty theft,
depending on the value of the goods and property taken from their rightful owner.  If such
a distinction is made in your country, please provide the relevant data for grand theft under
the category “Major theft”. The category “Total theft” should include data on both grand
theft (i.e. major theft) and petty theft. Please provide the main criterion for distinguishing
between grand theft and petty theft if such a distinction is made in your country.
8. “Automobile theft” may be understood to mean the removal of a motor vehicle
without the consent of the owner of the vehicle.
9. “Burglary” may be understood to mean unlawful entry into someone else’s premises
with the intention to commit a crime.
10. “Fraud” may be understood to mean the acquisition of another person’s property by
deception. Please indicate whether the fraudulent obtaining of financial property is
included in the data provided.
11. “Embezzlement” may be understood to mean the wrongful appropriation of another
person’s property that is already in the possession of the person doing the appropriating.
12. “Drug-related crimes” may be understood to mean intentional acts that involve the
cultivation, production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, offering for sale, distribution,
purchase, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit,
transport, importation and exportation of internationally controlled drugs. Where
applicable, reference may be made to the provisions of the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs of 19611 and other regulations adopted in pursuance of the provisions of the
2019
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1 Ibid., vol. 1019, No. 14956.
2 Official Records of the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Vienna, 25 November-20 December 1988, vol. I
(United Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.XI.5).
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Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 19711 and/or the United Nations Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988.2
13. “Bribery and/or corruption” may be understood to mean requesting and/or accepting
material or personal benefits, or the promise thereof, in connection with the performance
of a public function for an action that may or may not be a violation of law and/or
promising as well as giving material or personal benefits to a public officer in exchange for
a requested favour.
14. “Persons convicted” may be understood to mean persons found guilty by any legal
body duly authorized to pronounce them convicted under national law, whether the
conviction was later upheld or not. If persons are convicted by any agency other than the
courts, please state which agency and provide statistical details in the space provided after
tables 10 and 11. In those tables the total number of persons convicted includes the number
convicted of serious special law offences but excludes the number convicted of minor road
traffic offences and other petty offences.
15. “Professional judges or magistrates” may be understood to mean both full-time and
part-time officials authorized to hear civil, criminal and other cases, including in appeal
courts, and make dispositions in a court of law. Please include in that category associate
judges and magistrates, who may be authorized as above.
16. “Lay judges or magistrates” may be understood to mean persons who perform the
same functions as professional judges or magistrates but who do not regard themselves, and
are not normally regarded by others, as career members of the judiciary. Data concerning
support staff (secretaries, clerks etc.) should be excluded.
17. If the categories given in paragraphs 2-13 above are not fully compatible with the
legal code in your country, please try to adjust the data as far as possible. Alternatively,
you may indicate below the table concerned or on the facing page what kinds of crime are
included in your statistics that might be comparable to the categories suggested or how the
comparable types of crime are defined in your country.
22
a If some alternative reference date has to be used, please indicate that date here: ________.
b Please see the definition of the term “professional judges or magistrates” in paragraph 15 on
page 21.
c Please see the definition of the term “lay judges or magistrates” in paragraph 16 on page 21.
d Total court budget/financial resources should include all monies allocated to the judiciary at the
national level, including salaries and fixed assets. When calculating salaries, please include total
monies spent on every individual employed as a judge in the criminal justice system. When
calculating fixed assets, please include all monies invested in non-personnel assets, such as
buildings, automobiles and office equipment.
Table 8
Judges, by status and sex, and financial resources, including in appeal courts, 1995
and 1997
As at 31 Decembera
Category 1995 1997
8.1 Total professional judges or magistratesb
8.2 Females
8.3  Males
8.4 Total lay judges or magistratesc
8.5 Females
8.6 Males
8.7 Total court budget/financial resources (millions of local 
currency units)d
21 22
206
23
Table 9
Persons brought before the criminal courts, 1995 and 1997
Category 1995 1997
9.1 Total persons brought before the criminal
courts: 
9.2     Convicted
9.3      Acquitted
9.4   Other (please specify):
   ____________________________
  ____________________________
   ____________________________
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a Please see the definitions of the terms in paragraphs 2-13 on pages 20-21.
b Please note that the total number of persons convicted may be greater than the sum of the figures
given for the individual types of crime listed in the table.
Table 10
Persons convicted in the criminal courts, by type of crime, 1995-1997 
Type of crimea 1995 1996 1997
10.1 Total persons convicted of any type of
crimeb
10.2 Intentional homicide: Committed
10.3 Attempted
10.4 Committed with a firearm
10.5 Non-intentional homicide
10.6 Assault: Major assault
10.7 Total assault
10.8 Rape
10.9 Robbery
10.10 Theft: Major theft
10.11 Total theft
10.12 Automobile theft
10.13 Burglary
10.14 Fraud
10.15 Embezzlement
10.16 Drug-related crime
10.17 Bribery and/or corruption
Source(s) of the data provided in this table:
23 24
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a If there is more than one sentence per adult convicted, please count the most severe sentence.
b “Death penalty” may be understood to mean any sentence in which the convicted person is to be
legally deprived of life. The death penalty may be carried out by any one of a variety of means,
including electrocution, hanging, firing squad, lethal injection or stoning.
c “Corporal punishment” may be understood to mean any sentence in which the convicted person’s
body is to be subjected to physical pain, such as, among other things, flogging, mutilation, electric
shock or branding.
d “Life imprisonment” may be understood to mean any sentence in which the convicted person is to
be deprived of liberty in an institution of any kind for the duration of his or her natural life. 
e “Deprivation of liberty” may be understood to mean various forms of detention, including security
measures, combined or split sentences (where at least one part of the sentence involves deprivation
of liberty) or any other sanction in which the person is forced to stay at least one night in an
institution of any kind, whereby the period of detention is fixed at some interval short of the
natural life span of the convicted person (i.e. a determinate sentence).
f Including probation orders, electronic monitoring, conditional sentences with additional
supervision requirements and other forms of so-called controlled liberty (i.e. where the person is
required to fulfil special requirements with regard to supervision).
g Including suspended sentences, conditional sentences, findings of guilt without sanctions, formal
admonitions, formal warnings, imposing of duties without control, conditional dismissals,
conditional discharges.
h “Fines” may be understood to mean all sentences that involve paying a sum of money and may
include punitive measures as well as compensation and restitution.
i “Community service orders” may be understood to mean sentences in which the convicted person
is expected to perform some activity which provides some benefit to the community. 
Table 11
Adults convicted of any type of crime, by type of sentence, 1995 and 1997
Type of sentencea 1995 1997
11.1 Total adults convicted, regardless of type
of sentence
11.2       Death penaltyb
11.3       Corporal punishmentc
11.4       Life imprisonmentd
11.5       Deprivation of libertye
11.6       Control in freedomf
11.7       Warning or admonitiong
11.8       Fineh
11.9       Community service orderi
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If, in your opinion, there are some additional explanations that might contribute to a
better understanding of the data that you have entered in this part of the questionnaire,
please provide those explanations in the space below or on an attached sheet.
Table 12
Persons convicted in the criminal courts, by sex and age group, 1995-1997 
Category 1995 1996 1997
12.1 Females
12.2 Males
12.3 Adults
12.4 Female adults
12.5  Male adults
12.6 Juveniles
12.7 Female juveniles
12.8 Male juveniles
Source(s) of the data provided in this table:
Please provide the definitions of “adult” and “juvenile” that are used in the national criminal
justice system:
Adult:
Juvenile:
25 26
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Questionnaire for the
Sixth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends
and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems,
covering the period 1995-1997
IV.  Prisons/penal institutions
Country name:  
Please complete this section of the questionnaire and return it no later than 1 September
1999 to the coordinating officer, whose name is provided in the box below. The
coordinating officer will, in turn, send all sections of the completed questionnaire to the
Centre for International Crime Prevention, Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention,
P.O. Box 500, A-1400, Vienna, Austria, or to the Statistics Division, United Nations, New
York, N.Y. 10017, United States of America.
This questionnaire is being distributed through the Statistics Division network.
Coordinating officer’s name:  
Functional title:  
Agency:    
Street:   
City/state/country:  
Telephone (including country code and city code):  
Fax (including country code and city code:
E-mail:  
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Definition of terms
1. The definitions below are applicable to many legal codes.
2. “Prisons,  penal institutions or correctional institutions” may be understood to mean
all public and privately financed institutions where persons are deprived of their
liberty.  The institutions may include, but are not limited to, penal, correctional, or
psychiatric facilities under prison administration.
3. “Prison staff” may be understood to mean to all individuals employed in penal or
correctional institutions, including management, treatment, custodial and other
(maintenance, food service etc.) personnel.
4. If the categories given in paragraphs 2 and 3 above are not fully compatible with the
legal code in your country, please try to adjust the data as far as possible.
Alternatively, you may indicate below the table concerned or on the facing page what
kinds of crime are included in your statistics that might be comparable to the
categories suggested or how the comparable types of crime are defined in your
country.
27 28
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a If some alternative reference date has to be used, please indicate that date here: ________.
b Please see the definition of the term “prisons and penal or correctional institutions” in paragraph 2
on page 28.
a If some alternative reference date has to be used, please indicate that date here: _________.
b Please see the definition of the term “prisons and penal or correctional institutions” in paragraph 2
on page 28.
Table 13
Adult prisons and penal or correctional institutions, 1995 and 1997
Item
As at 31 Decembera
1995 1997
13.1 Adult prisons, penal institutions or correctional
institutionsb (excluding temporary jail lock-ups)
13.2 Places (beds) available
Table 14
Juvenile prisons and penal or correctional institutions, 1995 and 1997
Item
As at 31 Decembera
1995 1997
14.1 Juvenile prisons, penal institutions or
correctional institutionsb  (excluding jail lock-
ups)
14.2 Places (beds) available
30
a Please see the definition of the term “prisons and penal or correctional institutions” in paragraph 2
on page 28.
b Please see the definition of the term “prison staff” in paragraph 3 on page 28.
c If some alternative reference date has to be used, please indicate that date here:
________________.
d Total prison budget/financial resources should include all monies allocated to prison staff in both
adult and juvenile facilities, including salaries and fixed assets. When calculating salaries, please
include total monies spent on every individual employed as a prison staff member in the criminal
justice system. When calculating fixed assets, please include all monies invested in non-personnel
assets, such as buildings, automobiles and office equipment.
Table 15
Staff of adult or juvenile prisons and penal or correctional institutions,a by sex, and
financial resources, 1995 and 1997
Category of prison staff b members
As at 31 Decemberc
   1995 1997
15.1 Total  staff of adult prisons
15.2       Females
15.3       Males
15.4 Total  staff of juvenile prisons
15.5       Females
15.6       Males
15.7 Total prison budget/financial resources, for adult
and juvenile institutions (millions of local
currency units)d
29 30
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a The population of incarcerated people awaiting trial or adjudication and/or imprisoned offenders
on one selected day should be given, preferably a day that may be considered typical for the
year.
b The total number of persons incarcerated should not include the number of persons detained due to
public intoxication.  Please note that the total number of persons incarcerated may be greater than
the sum of  the figures given for the other categories of incarceration listed in the table.
c Please indicate whether the figure in the category “Awaiting first trial or adjudication” includes
persons who were sentenced in the court of first instance but appealed the verdict:
Yes____No____.
a “Time spent in prison awaiting trial” may be understood to mean the time spent in custody (e.g.
police custody, remand prison) between the time of arrest or apprehension and the time of
pronouncement of guilt or innocence by a criminal court or other legal body duly authorized to
make such a finding by national law, irrespective of whether the decision was later upheld or not.
Table 16
Persons incarcerated, by category of incarceration, selected day, 1995 and 1997
Category of incarceration
Selected day of the year:a __________
1995 1997
16.1 Total persons incarceratedb
16.2       Awaiting first trial or adjudicationc
16.3       Sentenced
16.4       Administrative detention
16.5       For non-payment of penal fine
16.6       Civil law incarceration
Table 17
Adult prisoners: time spent in prison awaiting trial, 1995 and 1997
Length of detention (months) 1995 1997
17.1 Average length of time spent in
prison awaiting trial,a for all
offences 
Less than one month
1-3 months
4-6 months
7-12 months
13-24 months
25 months or more
Less than one month
1-3 months
4-6 months
7-12 months
13-24 months
25 months or more
Note: Please circle the average length of time for each year. (Circle only one time period under the
column heading “1995” and one time period under the column heading “1997”.)
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a “Probation” may be understood to mean a procedure whereby an individual found guilty of a crime
is released by the court without imprisonment and is placed under the supervision of an official.
Table 18
Adult prisoners: time actually served in prison after conviction, 1995 and 1997
Item 1995 1997
18.1 Average length of time actually
served in prison
Less than one month
1-3 months
4-6 months
7-12 months
13-24 months
25-36 months
37-48 months
49 months or more
Less than one month
1-3 months
4-6 months
7-12 months
13-24 months
25-36 months
37-48 months
49 months or more
Note: Please circle the average length of time served in prison for each year. (Circle only one time
period under the column heading “1995” and one time period under the column heading “1997”.)
Table 19
Persons on probation,a by age group, selected day, 1995 and 1997
Selected day of the year: _______________
Category 1995 1997
19.1 Total  persons on probation
19.2       Adults
19.3       Juveniles
31 32
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a “Parole” may be understood to mean conditional release of a prisoner whereby the individual is
allowed to serve the remainder of the sentence outside the prison, assuming that all the terms of
that release are met.
Table 20
Persons on parole,a by age group, selected day, 1995 and 1997
Selected day of the year ________________
Category 1995 1997
20.1 Total persons on parole
20.2       Adults
20.3       Juveniles
34
If, in your opinion, there are some additional explanations that might contribute to a better
understanding of the data that you have entered in this part of the questionnaire, please
provide those explanations in the space below or on an attached sheet.
Table 21
Convicted prisoners, by sex and age group, selected day, 1995-1997
Selected day of the year: ____________
Category   1995 1996   1997
21.1 Total convicted prisoners
21.2 Females
21.3 Males
21.4 Adult convicted prisoners
21.5 Female adults
21.6 Male adults
21.7 Juvenile convicted prisoners
21.8 Female juveniles
21.9 Male juveniles
21.10 Convicted prisoners who are citizens of
other countries
Source(s) of the data provided in this table:
Please provide the definitions of “adult” and “juvenile” that are used in the national criminal
justice system:
Adult:
Juvenile:
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Annex B
Variables used in constructing indices and
tables of this report
Variables used in constructing the tables of chapter three (in addition to the Sixth
United Nations Survey variables UNHOMAVG, UNASSAVG, UNRAPAVG,
UNROPAVG, UNMTFAVG, UNBURAVG, UNDRGAVG and UNATMAVG)
• Centre for Disease Control, ”Firearm-related deaths” (acronym: CDC data),
reported in Krug, Powell and Dahlberg (1998); statistical data based on infor-
mation collected by the CDC in January and February 1996 from the Ministry
of Health or the National Institute for Statistics in each of the countries cov-
ered;
• Council of Europe, ”European Sourcebook of Crime and Justice Statistics”
(1999) (acronyms: ESIHCAVG, ESASAVG, ESRAPAVG, ESRBTAVG,
ESTFTAVG, ESBRTAVG, ESDRTAVG and ESTFMAVG), statistical data
provided by a co-ordinated network of 34 national correspondents within the
framework of a Council of Europe project;
• Hatalak, Alvazzi del Frate and Zvekic (1998), and Mayhew and van Dijk
(1997), ”International Crime Victim Survey” (ICVS data) (acronyms: INC2,
INC4, INC6, INC10, INC16, INC31A, INC33, INC34, INC36, INC38 and
LIFESTYLE), quantitative data collected on crime victimization from nu-
merous European and North American countries, random samples of the pop-
ulation, nationally or the largest city, carried out in 1989, 1992 and 1996;
• HEUNI, ”HEUNI Burglary Index” (acronym: BURGIND), compilation of an
index from the Sixth United Nations Survey data, and ICVS data (see above);
”HEUNI Homicide Index” (acronym: HOMIND), compilation of an index
from the Sixth United Nations Survey data, WHO data (see below), CDC data
(see above) and Interpol data (see below); ”HEUNI Motor Vehicle Crime In-
dex” (acronym: MVCI), compilation of an index from Liukkonen, M. ”Motor
Vehicle Theft in Europe” and ICVS data (see above); ”HEUNI Violence
Against Women Index” (VIOWOM), compilation of an index from the Sixth
United Nations Survey data and ICVS data (see above);
• Interpol, ”International Crime Statistics” (Interpol data) (acronyms:
IPHOMAVG, IPSASAVG, IPRAPAVG, IPROBAVG, IPAGTAVG,
IPBURAVG, IPDRGAVG and IPAUTAVG), statistical data provided by the
national Interpol bureaux of the member states;
• Kurian (1997), ”Ethnic Homogeneity” (acronym: ETHNHOM);
• United Nations Development Programme (2000), ”Human Development Re-
port” (acronyms: AGRICULT, ENERGY, GDI98, GEM, GENINEQ, HDI98,
HDRDIV98, HDRFEA98, HDRTEL98, MODERN, SANITATE and
URBPOP98), data emanating from the year 2000 volume of the report;
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• United Nations Statistical Division (1999), ”Indicators on Youth and Elderly
Population” (acronym: UNDER15), data emanating from UNSD database;
• World Bank (1997), ”World Development Report” (acronym: TOP20), data
emanating from the year 1997 volume of the report;
• World Health Organization (1999), ”Atlas on Violence” (acronym:
WHOMAVG), data emanating from the WHO Mortality Database.
(For bibliographical references, see the list at the end of chapter three).
Indices used in constructing the figures and
tables of chapter four and five, respectively
Burglary index
• Averaged ICVS national burglary rate, 1991, 1995, 1999
• Averaged ICVS city burglary rate, 1991, 1995, 1999
• Averaged ICVS rural burglary rate, 1991, 1995, 1999
• Sixth UN Survey: Burglary, 1995 and 1997
• European Sourcebook: Burglary, 1995 and 1997
Homicide index
• Sixth UN Survey: Committed intentional homicide 1995 and 1997
• Interpol: rate of murder 1998
• WHO: rate of homicide 1995 and 1997
• European Sourcebook: Rate of completed intentional homicide 1995
and 1996
Non-fatal violence index
• Averaged ICVS national assault and threat rate 1991, 1995, 1999
• Averaged ICVS city assault and threat rate 1991, 1995, 1999
• Averaged ICVS rural assault and threat rate 1991, 1995, 1999
• Averaged ICVS national robbery rate 1991, 1995, 1999
• Averaged ICVS city robbery rate 1991, 1995, 1999
• Averaged ICVS rural robbery rate 1991, 1995, 1999
Violence against women
• Averaged ICVS national violence against women 5-year rate 1987-99
• Averaged ICVS rural violence against women 5-year rate 1987-99
• Averaged ICVS city violence against women 5-year rate 1987-99
• Sixth UN Survey: Rape 1995 and 1997
• European Sourcebook: Rape 1995 and 1996
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Motor vehicle crime index
• Averaged ICVS national theft from/of car rate 1991, 1995, 1999
• Averaged ICVS city theft from/of car rate 1991, 1995, 1999
• Averaged ICVS rural theft from/of car rate 1991, 1995, 1999
• Sixth UN Survey: Automobile theft, 1995 and 1997
• European Sourcebook: Theft of motor vehicle, 1995 and 1996
Petty crime index
• Averaged ICVS prevalence of victimisation (1991, 1995, 1999) for:
car vandalism, theft of motorcycle or moped, theft of bicycle, theft of
personal belongings, indecent or offensive behaviour, threats.
Corruption index
• Averaged ICVS national corruption 1991, 1995, 1999
• Averaged ICVS city corruption 1991, 1995, 1999
• Averaged ICVS rural corruption 1991, 1995, 1999
• World Economic Forum: Corruption 1999
Opportunity for crime index
• ICVS data on ownership of autos, of motorcycles or mopeds, and of bicycles
• ICVS data on average number of evenings spent away from home for
recreation
• ICVS data on the number of single-person households, and
• ICVS data on the percentage of females with paid employment
Motivation for crime index
* ICVS data on the percentage of the population that is male, young and
either unemployed or dissatisfied with their income
Law enforcement resources index
• Sixth UN Survey: Police officers 1995 and 1997
• Sixth UN Survey: Prosecutors 1995 and 1997
• Sixth UN Survey: Professional judges and magistrates 1995 and 1997
• Sixth UN Survey: Prison personnel 1995 and 1997
Criminal justice gender balance index
• Sixth UN Survey: Percentage of female police officers of all police
officers 1995 and 1997
• Sixth UN Survey: Percentage of female prosecutors of all prosecutors
1995 and 1997
• Sixth UN Survey: Percentage of female professional judges and
magistrates of all professional judges and magistrates 1995 and 1997
• Sixth UN Survey: Percentage of female prison personnel (adult and juvenile
prisons) of all prison personnel (adult and juvenile prisons) 1995 and 1997
214
Citizen evaluation of police performance
• Averaged ICVS city percentage of victims of contact crimes who reported
their victimization to the police 1987-1999
• Averaged ICVS city percentage of victims who where satisfied with their
report to the police 1987-1999
• Averaged ICVS city percentage of all respondents who are satisfied with
the police crime control 1992, 1996, 2000
215
Annex C
The two indices strongly correlated with the serious violence index:
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Non-fatal Violence Index: 1990-1994 & 1995-1997, respectively
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Fig. II. Non-fatal Violence Index
